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A bstract
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Britain's trade policy towards Japan between 
1950 and 1954. This period was chosen as these were the years when the foundations 
of Britain's post-war trade and diplomatic relations with Japan were established. 
Moreover, the study was undertaken to redress the imbalance in scholarly research 
which is dominated by U.S.-Japan relations. Although the study does not refute the 
dominant political and economic influence of the United States in Japan, it elucidates 
the role played by other countries during Japan's early post-war period.
The study contends that there was a period in the early fifties when Britain played an 
influential role in its trade relations with Japan. This was primarily because Japan relied 
on the sterling area for one-third of its imports. As a banker to the sterling area's dollar 
reserves, Britain had influence over the area's policy as a whole. In order to 
understand the reasons why Britain's influence over Japan waned, the thesis examines 
the sterling payments agreement talks between Japan and Britain. By studying the 
negotiations behind the agreement it is possible to ascertain the gradual independence of 
the sterling area countries from British control, and the establishment of their respective 
bilateral relations with Japan as Britain became sidelined. The other issue examined in 
the study is Britain's opposition to Japan's entry into the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade and the factors which led to this policy. The study of the two issues 
highlights the complexity of the decision-making process in foreign policy formulation. 
In particular, it indicates the various interests that had to be taken into consideration, 
such as domestically the views of the textiles industry in Lancashire and those of the 
various ministries in Whitehall, and internationally Britain's relations with the United 
States, Japan and the Commonwealth.
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Usage
The usual conventions concerning Japanese names are observed throughout this thesis, 
with the family name followed by the given name. The exceptions are for Japanese 
scholars who publish in English. Japanese words are romanized according to the 
modified Hepburn system. Long vowels are indicated by circumflexes but they do not 
appear in well-known place names such as Tokyo. Chinese names are given in Pinyin. 
The terms 'Far East1 and 'East Asia' have been used intermittently in the thesis due to 
the popular usage of the term Far East in the 1950s. An attempt has however been made 
to use East Asia wherever possible. Moreover, the geographical area described by both 
terms refer to China, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. The term 'Southeast 
Asia' refers to Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. British interests in Southeast Asia refer to Britain's 
colonies in the region.
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In tro d u c tio n
Since Japan's high-speed growth in the 1960s, there has been a growing amount of 
scholarly work on Japan's post-war 'success' and these reached a peak in the 1980s 
when Japan became the world's second strongest economy and the world's largest 
creditor nation. The focus of the inquiry was the western desire to understand how a 
country deficient in raw materials, devastated in the second world war and stripped of 
its empire could have recovered so quickly from defeat and risen to become one of the 
strongest economies in the world in a matter of few decades.1 Much of the focus on 
Japan's so-called 'economic miracle' examined the peculiarities of Japan's political and 
economic framework such as the emphasis on consensus and cooperation between the 
ruling party, the bureaucracy and big business.2 There have also been studies on 
institutional characteristics such as the seniority wage system and the practice of life­
time employment.3 Other factors that have been highlighted are Japan's education 
system, the 'paternalistic orientation behind the notion of labour and management... 
enthusiastic acceptance of benevolent guidance, the work ethic and an inclination to 
save'.4 Although there have been numerous works emphasizing one aspect of Japan's 
society or the other to explain the reasons for Japan's 'economic miracle', the factors 
have become cliched over the years. At times, they have fuelled the notion that Japan is 
'unique' or that it is 'different' from the rest of the world which has not been very 
constructive nor particularly insightful.
In 1982, this trend to 'mystify' Japan was broken when Chalmers Johnson published 
his work, MIT! and the Japanese Miracle. Johnson focuses his research on Japan's 
industrial policy and in particular on the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
and its predecessor, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. He has concentrated on 
the MITI to argue the position that Japan's economy had far more 'state' intervention 
than its American counterpart, and it was this 'state' involvement that enabled Japan to 
recover at such a rapid pace.5 Johnson's work is of great interest to the historian for 
two reasons. First, because Johnson highlights the continuity in Japan's industrial 
policymaking dating back to the inter-war period, therefore, elucidating the fact that the 
post-war 'economic miracle' did not occur 'out of the blue'.6 Second, by taking a 
historic approach, it has been possible to understand with greater clarity that many of 
the policies enacted by the Japanese government in the post-war period were in reaction 
to internal and external factors. Therefore, Johnson's work highlights the continuities 
in Japan's industrial policy and the flexible response of the policymakers to the post­
war situation.
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As mentioned above, much of the research on Japan's economic recovery has been on 
internal factors, but this trend has also been broken with the thirty-year rule governing 
the release o f American and British government documents. The appearance of such 
documents has enabled diplomatic historians to examine the United States and British 
policy towards Japan in the post-war period, thereby highlighting the external factors 
which governed Japan's post-war foreign relations. Works of note are, Michael 
Schaller's The American Occupation of Japan: Andrew J. Rotter's The Path to Vietnam: 
and William Borden's The Pacific Alliance. Schaller's work focuses on Washington's 
decision to reverse the course of the occupation due to the deepening of the cold war 
and places the role of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Douglas 
MacArthur, in the occupation firmly back in its proper perspective. Moreover, he 
highlights the decision by American policymakers to promote Japan's 'Greater Co- 
Prosperity Sphere' by linking Japan's economy with that of Southeast Asia in order to 
promote Japan's economic recovery and to ensure that Southeast Asia did not enter the 
communist orbit. Rotter has gone one step further by linking American policymakers' 
decision to sponsor Japan's economic recovery with the eventual American 
involvement in the Vietnam war. Although Borden also argues that the United States 
actively supported Japan's economic recovery, he highlights the importance of Japan's 
economic recovery to America's plans for a multilateral trading system in the non­
communist world. For such a system to succeed, the United States needed to provide 
sufficient economic aid to Europe and Asia, to enable the 'free' world to continue 
purchasing American products.
All o f the three works cited above refer in passing to Britain's postwar Asian interests. 
Schaller has dealt the least with Britain's perspective, while Borden has conducted
some research based on American documents. Rotter, who has conducted archival
Recorrl
research at the Public Reeerds Office in Kew, deals in greater detail on Britain's 
interests in Southeast Asia. All three indicate the importance that Britain placed on its 
economic ties with Southeast Asia and argue that British industrialists felt threatened by 
Japan's economic links with the region, but they produce little convincing research on 
Britain's response to Japan's trade recovery. Although Rotter elucidates the possibility 
of a clash of British and Japanese interests, he has not converged the two strands of his 
research with great success.
The problem with the approach of the three scholars mentioned above has been their 
acceptance of the argument that Britain felt threatened by Japanese competition in 
Southeast Asia. The reason why this argument has not been challenged in the United 
States is largely due to their examination of British policy through contemporary US 
assessment of Britain. In fact, this argument, cited as early as 1979 in John Dower's
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Empire and Aftermath, has become proverbial in that it has been widely accepted by 
American scholars dealing in this area of research. This is evident in the research 
conducted by American scholars in the 1990s as none have so far tackled this 'accepted 
view '.7 Many have either accepted earlier scholars' views, or accepted American 
officials' views concerning British policy towards Japan.8 Thus crystallizing the notion 
that Japan's economic recovery was due to the extensive effort of the United States, 
and that this effort was obstructed by the United Kingdom which felt threatened by 
Japanese competition in its traditional trading area.9
Conversely, there has been comparatively less interest in Britain in regard to Japan's 
economic recovery and Britain's role vis-a-vis Japan in the postwar period. The most 
comprehensive study undertaken in the 1980s was Roger Buckley's Occupation 
Diplomacy. Buckley undertook research on Britain's occupation policy towards Japan 
from 1945 to 1952 in order to highlight an alternative perspective of the allied 
occupation experience. He has elucidated differences between the American and British 
policymakers' views towards the occupation, and British policy towards Japan in the 
immediate post-war period. Although Buckley argues that Anglo-Japanese relations in 
the post-war period were primarily based on commercial relations, his work is 
curiously lacking in Treasury, Board of Trade and Bank of England document 
citations. Buckley has managed to argue his case using Foreign Office documents 
(primarily FO 371 documents), but one is left wondering about the views of the other 
ministries in Whitehall. Another scholar who has been working extensively on Britain's 
policy towards East Asia in the 1950s is Peter Lowe. He has undertaken extensive 
research on British policy towards Korea, China and Japan, but his focus has been 
primarily diplomatic.10
The reason why Anglo-Japanese relations have not enjoyed greater academic interest in 
Britain is the fact that historians have expressed stronger regard for topics relating to its 
former empire and the decolonization process. One of the topics which has fuelled an 
extensive amount of research among scholars in the last few years has been the sterling 
area system. The sterling area as an informal economic and financial 'club' has been 
seen as one of the factors that have kept the British Empire together and therefore a 
number of scholars have conducted research on the ties between the city of London and 
Britain's formal and informal Empire,11 while others have concentrated on the sterling 
area system.12 Although most scholars working on the sterling area have until now 
concentrtateq-on the internal dynamics of the informal financial system, studying the 
sterling area's external relations is as important as it highlights how important the 
sterling area was for Britain as its power-base in the 1950s. Britain, which could no 
longer consider itself in league with the superpowers, needed a foundation on which it
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could wield its power in the post-war world, and it was the sterling area and the 
Commonwealth which became the source of its influence. Therefore, it is within this 
setting that Anglo-Japanese relations will be examined.
In Japan, although there have been an increasing number of historians conducting 
research on Japan's post-war external relations, most have concentrated on its relations 
with the United States for obvious reasons. Some academics have, however, focused 
on British and Commonwealth policy towards Japan such as Hosoya Chihiro and 
Kibata Yoichi. The former has written an outstanding account of the lead up to the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, but it does not deal with post-occupation relations. The latter 
has conducted extensive archival research in Britain, Malaysia and Australia, but his 
emphasis has been on Malaya.13 On Japan's entry to the GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade), Akaneya Tatsuo's work is the most comprehensive work to date in 
any language.14 Akaneya has, however, gathered most of his documentary evidence in 
Australia and therefore, his perspective on British policymaking is limited. Although 
there has been growing interest in Japan's trade relations with the sterling area, 
publications to date suggest that scholars are examining Japan's bilateral relations with 
former sterling area countries without reference to Britain's sterling policy.15 This 
approach is short-sighted as Britain as the banker of the sterling area set the guide-lines 
for the sterling area for much of the 1950s, therefore, without the British perspective, it 
is difficult to understand the complete picture.
Therefore, despite the increasing amount of research in the field of foreign relations and 
a greater sophistication in the use of government documents, there is scope for research 
on Britain's trade policy towards Japan as there are still visible gaps in current 
scholarship due to the narrow parameters set by researchers and general acceptance of 
unchallenged views.
This thesis deals with an aspect of foreign relations that is gaining increasing 
recognition, namely, economic diplomacy. The thesis examines the decision-making 
process in Britain's formulation of sterling and GATT policies towards Japan. 
Therefore, the emphasis is on various cabinet committees and cabinet conclusions. The 
views of different players in the decision-making process have been incorporated in the 
thesis, including cabinet ministers, middle-ranking officials, and British officials in 
Japan, Southeast Asia and the United States. On the whole, Britain's sterling policy 
was dealt by middle-ranking civil servants and British officials in Japan and Southeast 
Asia. Conversely, Britain's GATT policy reached the Cabinet level from an early stage, 
indicating the relative sensitivity of the latter issue in contrast to the former. Britain's 
sterling policy was dealt with without much 'fanfare' until 1954. It should be noted that
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Britain kept in close contact with the Commonwealth over various issues, but on the 
whole the sterling area policy was dealt by Britain, and the Commonwealth members 
were guided in their policy towards Japan. 1950 has been chosen as the starting point 
of this study as this year saw the outbreak of the Korean war, and thus accelerated 
American and British policymaking towards Japan. Conversely, 1954 has been chosen 
as the end point because the year clearly illustrated Britain's inability to find a consistent 
policy towards Japan.
Although statistics have been incorporated in the thesis, they have been included purely 
to highlight trade volumes. Furthermore, the thesis does not examine the views of 
British businesses in Japan or the views of individual British industries, although 
documents from the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of British 
Industries have been incorporated in the thesis in order to illustrate industrial influence 
on government decision making. There will be reference to Anglo-Japanese competition 
in Southeast Asia, but this will be explained only when the issues were significant 
enough to reach Cabinet level, or if a particular incident had a notable effect on British 
policy. Moreover, the rice allocation issue which is discussed in chapter one is highly 
political and complicated, and deserves to be researched as a separate Ph.D., topic, 
therefore, the researcher has not ventured to follow the issue beyond 1950. Lastly, 
although American and Japanese archival documents have been used, the researcher has 
not made an attempt to analyze American and Japanese policymaking in as much depth 
as the British documents. The above documents were consulted to highlight the fact that 
British policymaking was not conducted in a vacuum, and that Britain's policies were 
part of an inter-play of decisions which led to international agreements or disagreements 
between the countries concerned.
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Chapter One: British Trade Policy towards Japan in 1950
Introduction
This chapter aims to establish the setting for the thesis. The first section deals with the 
development of the post-war economic system, and the problems that ensued for 
Britain. This section also deals with the Cold War that affected both sides of the globe, 
and in particular, its effects on America's policy towards Japan. The second part of the 
chapter focuses on the opening of Britain's trade relations with Japan, and Britain's 
views towards extending most-favoured-nation treatment to Japan.
The Post-War Economic Situation
The post-war economic system was designed to prevent the world from returning to the 
economic nationalism, discriminatory trading blocs and 'beggar-my-neighbour- 
policies' of the inter-war period.1 In order to achieve international stability it therefore 
aimed to encourage domestically full employment and economic growth, and 
internationally the establishment of a stable world economic order where countries had 
fixed exchange rates and fair and competitive tariff rates.2 Plans for the post-war 
economic order were discussed as early as 1942, and negotiations for the blue-print of 
the world economic order began between Britain and the United States in 1943. The 
economic experts who prepared documents for the negotiations were John Maynard 
Keynes and Harry Dexter White.3 Disagreements occurred between the two sides 
during the course of the discussions, but US economic dominance guaranteed that its 
plans would be implemented at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.4 The two 
institutions established at Bretton Woods were the IMF (International Monetary Fund) 
and the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The IMF's 
role was to monitor exchange stability and balance of payments, while the IBRD's 
function was 'to encourage long-term international investment'.5 As a by-product of the 
conference, the GATT was established in 1946.6 Initially, it was a temporary meeting 
between the original member countries until the ITO (International Trade Organization) 
Charter was ratified. However, with the failure of the United States to ratify the charter, 
the ITO was never realized as an organization.7 Instead, the GATT became the 
alternative body and replaced the ITO as the third pillar of the post-war economic 
system. The two aims behind the GATT were, first, 'a multilateral and non- 
discriminatory approach to international trade'; and second, 'condemnation of 
quantitative trade restrictions'.8
Although much planning and discussion had taken place to establish the Bretton Woods 
system, in reality, the world that emerged after the war was in no condition to 
implement it. The reason behind this was the physical devastation in Europe and Asia
16
which meant that governments were far more concerned with domestic reconstruction 
than with liberal international trade. One of the countries most affected by the war was 
Britain. During the war, it had run down its gold and dollar reserves as well as its 
overseas assets. Furthermore, Britain had accumulated huge sterling liabilities with the 
sterling area countries in order to finance the war. The loss of its overseas assets, 
continuing military commitments abroad and the sterling liabilities meant that Britain 
faced a very serious balance of payments problem. In addition to these problems, 
Britain, like so many other countries, was facing a dollar shortage or a dollar-gap. 
What this meant was that Britain sought American goods, but did not have enough 
foreign exchange to buy them. Furthermore, the abrupt decision by the United States to 
end the Lend-Lease (Mutual Aid) programme on 17 August 1945, in order to prevent 
the recipient countries from using American aid for reconstruction, only exacerbated 
British difficulties.9
Recognizing Britain's financial problems, the United States agreed to extend a loan. 
Negotiations began in September and an agreement was signed on 6 December 1945.10 
There were several conditions to the loan. First, the loan of $3.75 billion was not 
interest-free. Britain was to pay two percent interest on the loan from 31 December 
1951 in fifty annual instalments. Second, Britain had to pledge to make sterling 
convertible to countries outside of the sterling and dollar areas on all current 
transactions after 31 December 1946. Third, an attempt was made to solve the problem 
of the sterling balances, and it was agreed that 'some balances would be written off, 
some funded, and some immediately released'.11
After the signing of the loan agreement, Britain made preparations for the convertibility 
of sterling by concluding bilateral agreements with holders of sterling starting with the 
Anglo-Argentine Agreement of September 1946.12 Britain expected the convertibility of 
sterling to be carried out in an orderly fashion, and furthermore, it expected many 
countries to continue holding sterling as a medium of foreign exchange. However, 
when convertibility was put into place on 15 July 1947, a major disaster struck, as 
dollars drained rapidly from Britain. In order to stop the tide of the dollar drain, 
convertibility was suspended from 20 August, and full convertibility did not then take 
effect until 1958. The attempt and the failure to make sterling convertible signified that 
convertibility of currencies was premature. Given that there was an overall sterling 
surplus and dollar shortage, it should have been clear to officials that sterling 
convertibility would not work. Furthermore, an attempt to convert sterling in a world 
where most currencies were inconvertible was a recipe for disaster.
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For the first half of its inconvertibility, therefore, the sterling area was established into a 
trading bloc with four different account areas: the sterling, the American, the 
transferable and the bilateral. Sterling transfers within each bloc were permissible, with 
the exception of the bilateral account. Bilateral account countries were able to transfer 
sterling automatically to sterling account countries, but were unable to transfer sterling 
to another member of the bilateral account without the approval of the Bank of England. 
Transferable account countries were able to transfer sterling within the account group 
and to sterling account countries, but they were not permitted to transfer sterling to 
American account countries. The greatest freedom was given to the members of the 
American account group who were able to exchange their sterling into dollars and vice 
versa. They were also allowed to transfer their sterling to the sterling account or the 
transferable account groups. This complicated division of countries into different 
groups was designed so as to restrict convertibility of sterling into dollars (see figure 
l ) .13
The United States attempt to rid the post-war international economic order of unfair 
trade practices was also unsuccessful. As mentioned above, the ITO was never ratified 
because of differences in British and American aims. The United States wished to see 
an end to quota restrictions and imperial preferences. In the negotiations for the charter 
of the ITO, the United States agreed that quota restrictions should be applied only 
during a transitional period ending in 1949, but Britain was unable to accept a set date 
as it was uncertain of the conditions which might prevail after convertibility; therefore, 
Britain was determined to keep quota restrictions indefinitely. The United States' 
intention concerning imperial preferences was to abolish them. Commonwealth imperial 
preferences dated back to the Ottawa conference of August 1932, and it was these that 
they wished to eliminate, but their quest was unsuccessful. At the Geneva Conference 
of 1947, it was able to terminate preferences for Commonwealth goods going to 
Britain, but it was unable to terminate preferences for British goods going to the 
Commonwealth. The former was easier to accomplish as the Commonwealth countries 
were not very enthusiastic about imperial preferences. During tariff negotiations, 
Britain terminated a mere five percent of its pre-war preferences to the Commonwealth, 
while 70 percent were kept in tact.14 Imperial preferences were important for Britain to 
ensure favourable export markets for its goods, and to maintain full domestic 
employment. Although the United States was also concerned with full employment, it 
was to America's advantage to press for free trade in order to achieve full economic 
activity in the United States. With the breakdown of the ITO talks, Britain was allowed 
to maintain quantitative restrictions, and to continue the practice of imperial preferences 
for existing agreements, but the ultimate US goal was still equal trade tariffs and the 
abolition of preferential blocs.
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Although Britain was able to keep the United States and its multilateral trading system 
at bay, it was faced with an additional challenge as the cold war deepened. Namely, 
Japan's economic recovery under US sponsorship. When the United States realized 
that its former war-time ally, the Soviet Union, was not to be trusted in Eastern Europe, 
the United States became determined that East Asia should not fall into the Soviet 
sphere. The area which particularly concerned the United States was Northeast Asia 
and Japan. The war-time allies had originally agreed to allow the Soviets to establish a 
sphere of influence over Manchuria in return for Russian entry into the Pacific war 
three months after Germany's defeat. After the defeat of Germany however, the 
American position shifted. It sought to curtail Soviet influence in Manchuria and even 
became ambivalent about Soviet entry into the Pacific war.15
On 6 August the US dropped an atom bomb on Hiroshima. This was followed by a 
bomb on Nagasaki a few days later. The bombs were used to avoid the unnecessary 
deaths of allied combatants but also potentially had the added benefit of ending the war 
without the need for Soviet entry. The Soviet Union declared war against Japan, 
however, a few days before Japan's surrender. With the end of the war, there was a 
scramble by the Guomindang, with the assistance of the United States, and the Chinese 
Communists for the key cities in Northeast China. Initially, both the Soviet Union and 
the United States supported the Guomindang government, and only with the support of 
both countries was the nationalist party guaranteed future control over the country. The 
growing rift between the two countries, however, cast a shadow over the 
Guomindang's ability to govern China. Moreover, domestic instability raised doubts 
about China's ability to fulfil its role as one of the four 'police' men in the post-war 
period. By the end of 1945, Guomindang and Chinese Communist forces were 
clashing over territory in Northeast China. In an attempt to find a peaceful solution, US 
President Harry Truman asked George Marshall to mediate. By January 1947, 
however, Marshall announced the failure of his mission.16 The uncertainty in China, 
together with the continued division along the Korean peninsula had a direct effect on 
America's policy towards Japan.
From September 1945 to 1947, the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Powers), General Douglas MacArthur, followed the post-war reform programme 
produced by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee entitled the 'Initial Post- 
Surrender Policy for Japan' (SWNCC 150/4/A).17 The reforms set out in SWNCC 
150/4/A were far-reaching. They included destroying military power, building a 
representative government, changing the constitutional role of the monarch18 and 
establishing free labour unions to name but a few.19 One of the occupation force's main
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aims was the dissolution of Japan's large business conglomerates or zaibatsu as many 
believed that their business interests and influence had enabled the militarists to wage 
war. In addition, during the early period of the occupation, there was talk of 
transferring Japan's industrial capacity to the rest of Asia as reparations. This 
undertaking would ensure that Japan would have to rely on Asia for manufactured 
goods, and it would also guarantee that Japan's economic strength would be no higher 
than that of its Asian neighbours.20 During this period, Japan was only able to conduct 
trade under the strict control of the occupation authorities (also referred to as SCAP).21 
Trade was a means to enable Japan to feed its population and to maintain a m inim um  
standard of living, but Japan faced huge economic problems as it was cut off from its 
traditional trading areas in Northeast Asia. It had a growing population restricted to the 
four main islands and the post-war years saw domestic crop failures leading to famine. 
Furthermore, it was faced with a dollar shortage due to its inability to sell silk to the 
United States, which had been Japan's main export in the pre-war period. With the 
production of cheap synthetic fibre such as nylon, Japan's silk was no longer in 
demand; therefore, Japan had to rely extensively on the US Army's GARIOA 
(Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) programme for humanitarian aid.22
With the failure of the Marshall mission in early 1947 as mentioned above, and 
increasing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Truman 
administration was beginning to view very seriously the idea of reconstructing 
Germany and Japan, the so-called 'workshops' of Europe and Asia. The idea was a 
development of George Kennan's containment strategy which argued that US national 
security could only be maintained by protecting as many of the five centres of industrial 
power within the world as possible. The five were the United States, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan. With the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and later 
the PRC (People's Republic of China), firmly entrenched in the communist sphere, it 
became all the more important to safeguard Japan and Germany.23 It was hoped that the 
two economies would act as economic pivots in Europe and Asia and encourage 
economic integration between the 'free' countries in their respective regions, thereby 
preventing more countries from going communist. Building up Japan's economy was, 
however, not only motivated by strategic reasons. Another motive was to aid the US 
economy by overcoming the post-war dollar gap. The dollar gap was created by the fact 
that 'the United States made the products that the rest of the world wanted to buy ... 
both for present consumption and for reconstruction, but the devastated areas did not 
have suitable goods and services to exchange'.24 In order to safeguard American 
interests, it was imperative that Europe and Asian countries be given financial aid to 
purchase American goods. Therefore, the United States was motivated by two 
concerns: strengthening the economies of the 'free' countries in Europe and Asia
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against communism, and ensuring that those countries had enough dollars to continue 
purchasing American goods. The change in American attitude towards the two defeated 
nations meant an urgent formation of new policies. The new policy towards Japan was 
drawn up by Kennan, who was the head of the State Department's PPS (Policy 
Planning Staff). Kennan visited Japan in early 1948 to see the situation prevailing there 
for himself. His visit overlapped with that of the Under Secretary of the Army, William 
H. Draper. The findings of the Kennan and Draper missions were incorporated into the 
NSC document 13/2 which was approved and signed by Truman on 9 October 1948. 
This document initialled the beginning of the 'reverse course’ in Japan.
The new role created for Japan was that of a bulwark against the spread of communism 
in Asia. In order to fulfil this role, Japan's economic recovery became crucial which 
meant reorganizing Japan's domestic economy, and encouraging Japan's trade with the 
outside world. The post-war period, however, saw rampant inflation in Japan as the 
'wartime governments had printed money to finance arms production and the collapse 
of the civilian goods sector drove consumer prices skyward'.25 Inflation was also 
encouraged by Japanese businesses, which wished to reduce the real burden of their 
financial debts to the government through increased prices. Moreover, the RFB 
(Reconstruction Finance Bank), which was established in October 1946, provided 
generous loans to various industries, further exacerbating the inflationary situation in 
Japan.26 The inflation was a prime obstacle to Japan's economic recovery, as the 
economic conditions increased the cost of production in Japan, making them 
uncompetitive abroad. The person brought in to solve the Japanese economic problem 
was Joseph M. Dodge, a Detroit banker. The policy implemented by Dodge was a nine- 
point stabilization programme, which was aimed at balancing the budget and reducing 
inflation. The three main points of the Dodge Plan were first, a balanced budget 
through a large-scale reduction of the government workforce, a decrease in total 
government expenditure and an increase in taxes. Second, the phasing out of the RFB 
and its replacement by the Counterpart Fund which would be under Dodge's control, as 
it was thought that a more stringent loan system would prevent unnecessary 
government expenditure. Finally, the establishment of a single exchange rate, set at 360 
yen to the dollar, to enable Japan to enter the western economic system.27
One idea behind this programme was that Japan should achieve economic recovery 
without US aid. Therefore, emphasis was placed on Japan's trade expansion with its 
neighbouring countries.28 America's plan was to see an expansion of Japan's trade 
with Southeast Asia so that Japan could gain access to raw materials there, and sell the 
raw materials to the United States to alleviate Japan's dollar gap. A key difficulty for 
this policy was, however, that Southeast Asia was not only linked with Japan's
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economic recovery, it was also linked with Britain's. Britain as a Southeast Asian 
colonial power relied on sales of raw materials, such as Malayan tin and rubber, from 
this region to the United States for dollars. As Britain was experiencing a shortage of 
dollars in the post-war period, there was an attempt to re-establish this pre-war trade 
link which was known as the triangular trade.29 Therefore, America's plans for the 
expansion of Japan's exports to Southeast Asia raised fears in some industrial sectors 
in Britain.
These fears were not unfounded, as Japan had been one of Britain's major competitors 
in the 1930s, particularly in the area of textiles. After the end of the First World War, 
Britain was unable to regain its pre-war share of the world's cotton goods export. This 
was due to various reasons ranging from the establishment of indigenous cotton 
industries in Britain's former traditional markets, Japan's successful penetration of the 
East Asian textiles market and the demand for cheaper textiles during the depression 
when quality became a secondary issue for most consumers.30 By 1933, Japan had 
overtaken Lancashire as the world's largest exporter of cotton piece goods. As the 
Lancashire cotton industry became increasingly threatened, they began to accuse Japan 
of dumping goods, exploiting its labour, and of heavy state subsidies to the cotton 
industry, and from 1932 onwards a number of parliamentary members representing 
Cheshire and Lancashire began making 'bitter attacks' against Japanese competition in 
the House of Commons.31 In order to assist Britain's beleaguered industries, 
protectionist measures were implemented including the Ottawa Agreements of 1932 and 
colonial quotas against foreign textile imports starting in 1934. Although these 
measures checked Japanese exports British exports were never able to regain their pre­
war market share.32
The British textiles industry continued to have a voice in Britain in the immediate post­
war period, as cotton textiles exports played a vital role in balancing Britain's economy 
between 1945-1951 when Britain was facing difficulties exporting enough goods to 
meet its imports.33 It should also be noted that the cotton textiles interests had 
representation inside and outside the government through bodies such as the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Cotton Board, which kept the textiles issue 
alive.34 Furthermore, members of parliament from Staffordshire, Lancashire and 
Manchester, such as Ralph Assheton (Blackburn, Conservative), Sydney Silverman 
(Nelson and Colne, Labour), Ellis Smith (Stoke-on-Trent, Labour) and Anthony 
Greenwood (Rossendale, Labour) continued to raise matters regarding Japanese 
competition in the House of Commons. The general view of the above MPs was that 
'Lancashire could not, and should not be expected to compete' against Japanese 
competition.35 There was also an element of racial prejudice linked with the belief that
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Japan had started the war unfairly in East Asia and this concept of unfairness seems to 
have translated into the concept of Japanese 'unfair competition', therefore, the textiles 
issue became representative of anti-Japanese feeling as a whole rather than just 
concerning the plight of Lancashire's textile workers.36 Lancashire textile interests, 
therefore, had an enormous influence on the Board of Trade, which was responsible 
for representing the British industrialist cause in Whitehall.
The setting of the Anglo-Japanese trade relations in the post-war period was, therefore, 
the following. The post-war world was transformed into one divided between the east 
and west. The western bloc was led by the United States which became the undisputed 
economic power. Britain maintained many of its pre-war imperial preferences due to 
severe economic problems, but these were opposed by the United States which 
championed multilateral trade in the western world. Moreover, the United States 
reversed its policy towards Japan and supported its economic recovery through trade 
with Southeast Asia. Britain was in a dilemma as it was uncertain of the consequences 
of accepting Japan in the western economic bloc. To what extent would Japan's re- 
emergence affect Britain's trading position, and what could be done to guarantee 
security for British goods? Conversely, how important was Japan as a trading partner 
for Britain, and was there room for expansion of sterling area trade with Japan? These 
questions were considered as early as 1947, and at that time Britain placed importance 
on Anglo-Japanese trade for the following reasons. First, to enable British commercial 
interests to return to Japan. Second, to encourage the expansion of Commonwealth- 
Japan relations and finally, to prevent a US-Japan economic link which was considered 
to be potentially far more damaging than an independent Japanese economic recovery 
on its own.37 The following chapters will examine whether the same issues concerned 
British officials in the period between 1950 and 1954.
Open Payments Agreement with Japan
Private trade between citizens of the Allied countries and Japan was permitted from the 
summer of 1947.38 In the autumn of that year, a limited trade agreement was signed 
between the sterling area and Japan.39 Official trade began on 31 May 194;8 in the form 
of the OPA (Open Payments Agreement) which was a government-operated trade 
arrangement. The British and Japanese aims behind the opening of trade relations were 
different. For Japan, trade was a means by which it could get raw materials. For 
Britain, trade with Japan was an important non-dollar source of cotton textiles for two 
reasons.40 First, it alleviated domestic demand for textiles, so that the British textile 
industry could concentrate on manufacturing for overseas markets to earn dollars. 
Second, grey cloth imports from Japan were re-exported as finished cotton textiles, 
accounting for nearly twenty percent of Britain's total exports of these types of goods
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in the first year of the agreement alone.41 Table 1.2 shows the amount of cotton textiles 
Britain imported from Japan and the total purchase from Japan. It also indicates the 
percentage of Britain's cotton textile purchases from Japan. The table shows a heavy 
British dependence on cotton textiles in the period 1947-1950 but less so in the period 
after.
Although SCAP agreed to bilateral trade on a sterling basis, it was only after lengthy 
negotiations that it agreed to conduct all of its trade with the sterling area in sterling. In 
the first instance, SCAP had hoped to conduct part of the trade in dollars. It decided, 
however, to trade in sterling on the condition that SCAP be allowed to convert surplus 
sterling into dollars at six-monthly intervals (30 June and 31 December). This was 
agreed upon by the sterling area countries, with the knowledge that if there was any 
serious imbalance in their bilateral trade, it would lead to a dollar drain. In short, 
sterling trade with Japan took place on a bilateral basis, and was severely regulated 
because SCAP was given the right to convert its sterling surplus into dollars. 
Therefore, trade was restricted to goods which were deemed essential, and less 
essential goods were justified only on the ground that it provided the sterling bloc with 
goods that were 'useful' to Britain.42 The OPA between the sterling area and Japan was 
further complicated by the fact that the steriing-area signatories were divided into 
participants and non-participants. This division was established at the outset when 
some countries agreed to join a trade pool which was designed so that the 'participants' 
could enjoy more flexible trade relations vis-a-vis Japan 43 By pooling all their quotas 
together, it was hoped that there would be less restrictions on trade. Participants 
included countries such as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and the United 
Kingdom. The non-participants such as Burma, Pakistan and Iraq were sterling 
countries which declined to join the trade plan. They were expected to balance their 
trade with Japan on a bilateral basis.44
In the first year, the sterling bloc had a trade deficit with SCAP because SCAP bought 
seasonally (purchases were divided into the October-March and April-September 
budgets respectively) and around sixty percent of the trade was conducted between 
December and March. In contrast the sterling area bought on a continual basis and 
import licences were given out much more freely within the sterling area, as they 
expected to see SCAP purchases eventually balance out those made from the sterling 
area. SCAP's purchases, however, did not reach the estimates given at the time of the 
agreement; therefore, SCAP accumulated excess sterling, which raised the 
convertibility issue from the first year of the trade agreement. The sterling bloc 
obviously did not want to see a dollar drain, and hoped that SCAP would retain sterling 
as part of their capital. SCAP, however, was divided between 'two schools of
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thought', between those who believed that Japan must earn dollars from the sterling 
area, and those, including General MacArthur himself, who believed that the main 
objective was to increase Japan's trade with the sterling area to a maximum and 
therefore supported surplus sterling holdings.45
Although there were assurances from MacArthur that he had no intention of earning 
dollars from the sterling area, these were not enough to calm British fears. In 
Whitehall, the OPA with Japan was discussed in July 1949 by an inter-departmental 
working party represented by various ministries and financial institutions such as the 
Board of Trade, the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Ministry of Food, the Colonial 
Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Bank of England and the Ministry of 
Supply. The working party reported to the Cabinet's ONC (Overseas Negotiations 
Committee) and sometimes to the EPC (Economic Policy Committee) when issues were 
not resolved in the former. The working party compiled a memorandum concerning the 
sterling surplus with SCAP, in which they proposed the establishment of a regulation 
whereby SCAP would be made to hold a minimum of ten million pounds sterling 
balance. In other words, the existence of a minimum balance meant there could be an 
imbalance in trade relations of up to ten million pounds before SCAP converted its 
surplus into dollars 46 The proposal was approved by the ONC and the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, and eventually accepted by SCAP. Despite assurances from SCAP, the 
Treasury was not going to take any chances in the next set of negotiations for the year 
1949/50. Its aim was to prevent any form of dollar liability even if it meant cutting 
down on trade with Japan to negligible proportions. This very stringent approach was a 
reflection of the overall British policy adopted at the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference of July 1949, where Britain asked each individual sterling Commonwealth 
to set national import programmes and abide by their respective targets. The aim behind 
this approach was to keep down sterling-dollar expenditure and minimize the dollar 
drain.47
Until the summer of 1949 Japan's economic recovery, although not spectacular, was 
progressing without any serious effect on British interests. Japan's trade with the 
sterling area was relatively balanced and controlled. Britain predicted that if there was to 
be any problem, it would be over the convertibility wrangle with SCAP. Therefore, 
Britain was unprepared for the change that arose as a result of American efforts, as part 
of the Dodge Plan, to force Japan to increase its purchases of raw material.
The result was that by the start of 1950 and for the rest of that year, the sterling area 
could hardly keep up with SCAP purchases. The main reason for these increased 
purchases was the gradual depletion of American aid which was to be cut off
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permanently by 1952. American aid had amounted to $483 million in 1950, but the 
Army Department had only asked for $266 million for 1951,48 American aid had up to 
this point been propping up Japan's unstable economy and SCAP was aware that when 
aid was cut off, it could no longer rely on imports from America.49 SCAP thus made it 
clear that Japan would be obliged to obtain sixty percent of its requirements of imported 
food from countries with which it had trade arrangements.50 Placed in this difficult 
situation, Japan needed cheap raw materials from a soft currency area. The obvious 
choice was for Japan to look towards Southeast Asia with a view to increasing trade.
The most serious problem faced by the sterling area was Japan's rice purchases from 
Burma at a time when the whole of Southeast Asia was facing a rice shortage as a direct 
result of the Japanese occupation policy in the inter-war period. During the war, Japan 
forced Indochina, Burma and Thailand to aim for economic self-sufficiency, therefore, 
rice production in the above countries was scaled down, while rice importing countries 
like Indonesia and Malaya faced starvation.51 The post-war period saw the continuation 
of the rice problem despite attempts by the rice producers in the region to increase their 
rice yield to the pre-war level. Japan's rice purchases became a problem as SCAP had 
bought 473,000 tons of rice in the trade year 1949-50, but in the trade year 1950-51, it 
wished to buy 933,000, approximately double the amount of the previous year.52 It 
planned to finance the extra purchase by using the £12 million surplus from the 
participant pool. In short SCAP wished to use money from the participant balance in 
trade with a non-participant country. SCAP's planned purchases brought several issues 
to the forefront of discussions. First, the consequences of SCAP's purchases of scarce 
commodities. The ONC and the Treasury feared that SCAP's over-buying would lead 
to an indirect dollar drain from the sterling bloc because the sterling area would have to 
seek its own raw material sources from the hard currency market. Second, SCAP's 
increased purchases meant that sterling area countries that agreed to join the participant 
pool in trade with Japan would have to buy a larger volume of less-essential items if it 
hoped to match SCAP's purchases under the agreement, and prevent SCAP from using 
its sterling with a non-participant sterling country. Third, there was a question as to 
whether it was morally right that Japan should seek and have access to rice imports 
from Burma over the demands of Asian countries (such as Hong Kong, Malaya, 
Indonesia, Ceylon, India and the Philippines) which had traditionally depended on rice 
from Burma and Indochina and thus had prior claims over those of Japan.53 Fourth, 
was the fear that Japan's expanded trade relations with the sterling area would lead to 
increasing competition between Britain and Japan as they both exported manufactured 
goods to the same area.54
26
In short, Britain was faced with unexpected changes in 1950. The US sponsorship of 
Japan's economic recovery meant that Japan would be expanding its exports to the 
western world. By gradually weaning Japan off American aid, the United States' aim 
was to encourage Japan to look towards Southeast Asia and the sterling area for its raw 
materials. Until 1950, the OPA between the sterling area and Japan was a useful 
agreement by which Britain could buy non-dollar cotton textiles. With the expansion of 
Japanese exports, however, the bilateral agreement became a much more complex 
issue. If Japan increased its purchases, the sterling area would have to reciprocate and 
purchase more goods in order to balance payments. The consequence of not doing so 
was the possibility of SCAP converting its sterling into dollars, or SCAP using 
participant sterling to purchase non-participant goods. Furthermore, with the increase in 
sterling area-Japan trade, there was the fear that Britain's own exports might be 
affected. Britain's problem was how to reach a trade balance with Japan without a loss 
of dollars and without a threat to British industries, but at the same time still be able to 
assure the sterling area that it had its interests at heart rather than the welfare of Britain's 
domestic industries.
Britain was, therefore, under pressure to balance the various interests effectively at the 
trade negotiations which began on 7 June. Some of the issues on the agenda were 
discussed and settled early in the negotiations. For instance, SCAP's proposal for a 
two-year trade plan was rejected outright by Britain because a longer trading period did 
not necessarily lead to smoother trade. Moreover, Britain was afraid that it might lead to 
increased accumulation of sterling by SCAP.55 Another issue which was settled early 
in the negotiations was the question of the establishment of official Japanese overseas 
agencies throughout the sterling area. This proposal by SCAP was rejected as the 
British colonies were still not ready to give MFN (most-favoured-nation) treatment with 
respect to the free entry of Japanese nationals, as the people of Southeast Asia still held 
bitter memories of the occupation and of their maltreatment during the war.56 They 
were ready to accept Japanese products but not Japanese nationals.57 Furthermore, 
SCAP's requests for the extension of MFN treatment as regards shipping, and 
guarantees of non-discriminatory trade and tariff treatment were rejected, as these were 
matters to be considered by the individual sterling area countries.58
What was more complicated was agreeing to an estimated amount of trade between the 
two sides during the period 1 July 1950 to 30 June 1951. The eventual agreed amount 
was £92.6 million in each direction,59 approximately £38 million more than in the 
previous year.60 The increase in trade was due to an overall expansion of sterling 
imports from Japan. For example, Australia's estimated trade plan was £14 million, a 
£10 million increase from the previous year. India's was £11 million, a £6 million
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increase, and South Africa's purchases were estimated at £12 million, which was an 
increase from £750,000.61
The significance of these new trade levels was, of course, the large increase in the 
purchase of Japanese goods by the sterling area. For example a serious problem arose 
as a result of colonial estimates for the coming trade plan. The colonies expected to 
increase their trade with Japan from £21 million to £31 million. The breakdown of this 
estimate included direct textiles imports of £22.9 million from Japan, an increase of 
£4.4 million from the previous year's estimate.62 Opposition to the colonial estimates 
came from the Board of Trade. They argued against the estimates on two points. First, 
they indicated that it was not essential for the colonies to expand their textiles imports 
given that there were still some unused licences in the colonial buyers' hands. 
Furthermore, the figures supplied by six west African colonies, which accounted for 
half of the trade of these territories, indicated that there was 14 months supply of 
textiles either in production or in transit. Given this information, the Board of Trade 
argued that the colonial purchases were not essential.63 Second, the Board of Trade 
opposed an increase in textiles imports because there were fears in Lancashire that if the 
Commonwealth and colonies continued to increase their cotton purchases from Japan, it 
might eventually affect the sales of British textiles. There was fear among employers 
and trade unions alike in Lancashire, that 'His Majesty's Government have no 
intention, or will be unable when the time comes to do anything to help them against 
Japanese competition'.64 Increased purchase of Japanese textiles would, therefore, be 
. interpreted by Lancashire as a sign that Japan had been allowed to begin an export drive 
into the British market. Moreover, it was interpreted as a sign of what was to come in 
the future for Lancashire: that colonies would buy their textiles from the cheapest 
producers in the future and price Lancashire out of the market.65
The Colonial Office, however, could not accept the Board of Trade's position. They 
understood the importance of restricting imports in order to save gold and dollars but 
opposed restrictions which were predominantly based on the British government's 
wish to 'secure sheltered position for UK manufacturers'66 Furthermore, the Colonial 
Office argued that the colonies themselves were far better equipped to judge the amount 
of textiles they should be importing than the Board of Trade, and that, in fact, increased 
Japanese textiles imports were necessary as both India and Germany had priced 
themselves out of the colonial market by raising their textiles prices. Japanese textile 
exports were the only source that was in the right price-range.
The ONC was unable to help the Board of Trade's position as the colonial estimates 
were based on essentials and therefore there was no ground on which the ONC could
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ask them to revise the figures. Furthermore, Britain could only ask the colonies to 
reduce their imports on balance of payments grounds and not on the basis of protecting 
British manufacturers.67 The issue was finally settled two months later at an EPC 
meeting on 28 July 1950 chaired by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. It was agreed 
after much discussion that 'the estimate of colonial textile requirements by direct 
shipment from Japan should be increased to the figure proposed by the Secretary of 
State for the colonies'.68 The deciding factor was the political consequence of the 
colonies finding out that their import estimates had been scaled down for the 
consideration of UK manufacturers.
The outcome of the talks was clearly not in the interest of Lancashire. Their anxieties 
were not lifted either by a report compiled by the Anglo-American Cotton Mission 
which visited Japan in May. The findings showed that Japan had a 'cheap and 
competent labour and an efficient management'.69 Sir Raymond Streat, the Chairman 
of the Cotton Board who was a delegate on the mission, expressed his views at a 
Cotton Board meeting on 13 June:
...If the world were entirely free, he could not believe that anything could 
prevent Japan capturing almost the whole volume of international trade in most 
cotton goods within, say, the next ten years. Lancashire was in a most 
disadvantageous position to cope with the latent danger because she was not 
producing enough to satisfy the demands of markets which would otherwise 
look to Japan.70
Therefore, Japan's trade expansion caused anxieties for the British textiles industry. In 
fact, after the Mission's report was compiled, a series of joint meetings were held by 
the Textile Exporters' Committee and the Cotton and Rayon Merchants’ Association. 
Both associations were represented at the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. The 
meetings were convened to discuss ways of maintaining Britain's competitive edge 
against Japanese textiles competition, and the associations planned to submit a report to 
the Cotton Board in order to lobby their interests with the government.71
The other problem which became apparent during the negotiations was the rising 
suspicion and the dissatisfaction among the participants over trade allocations with 
Japan. Britain as the head of the sterling area, was the controller of the agreement, and 
therefore was responsible for balancing trade plans. Britain's role was becoming more 
difficult as the Dominions, such as Australia, India and Ceylon, were anxious to see 
trade liberalization with Japan because they felt constrained by the limits placed on their 
purchasing power.72 There were even grievances raised by the Dominions 
representatives when Britain decided that UK and colonial figures for the trade plan 
should be a single figure instead of separate figures during the meeting of the sterling
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area delegation in Tokyo. The representatives of the Dominions believed that Britain's 
motives for the change was to reserve the right to raid colonial purchasing power for its 
own benefit.73
These incidents indicate the difficulties Britain faced in allocating purchasing powers 
that were satisfactory to all the member countries. It also highlighted the fact that many 
of the members did not entirely trust the system led by Britain. Australia and Ceylon 
wished to see a liberalization of trade, but had it been carried out, there would have 
been two setbacks to the system. First, an increase in purchases by Australia and 
Ceylon without an equal amount of purchases by SCAP would have led to a drain in 
dollar reserves. Second, liberalization of trade might have led to the sterling countries 
trading direct, rather than trading through Britain which would have led to the gradual 
disintegration of the sterling bloc; therefore, it was in Britain's best interests not to 
encourage liberalization. But at the same time, Britain was not altogether in a favourable 
position vis-a-vis its sterling bloc, therefore, it had to undertake a sensitive balancing 
act of trading goods without using dollars or gold, and at the same time working to 
keep its sterling members satisfied.
The most serious problem in the talks arose as a result of differences between SCAP 
and the sterling area concerning SCAP's sterling holdings. The position taken by 
SCAP was that it should be free to 'spend its holdings as it pleased with either 
participant or non-participant sterling countries, subject only to the area's normal 
currency controls and the agreement that trade under the sterling area-Japan plan reach 
an approximate balance by the end of the trading year'.74 Britain was of the view that 
rigid controls had to be placed as Japan's purchase of Burmese rice using participant 
balances in 1949 had 'reduced the availability of sterling' for the participants, and they 
wished to avoid a repetition of this.75 The deadlock was lifted in October when it was 
decided that £3 million would be put aside in case difficulties arose in 'maintaining an 
exact trading balance at all times'.76 Both sides also agreed that sterling balances could 
not be diverted from one account to the other 'except under the agreed trade plan or by 
mutual readjustment of such a plan'.77 On reaching these decisions, the agreement was 
finally signed on 29 November. The irony of the agreement was that, on agreeing not 
to divert sterling balances from one account to the other, both SCAP and 'participant' 
representatives believed that they had secured their respective positions. SCAP officials 
believed they could still divert some sterling from the participant account if it was 
discussed with the participants in advance, while the negotiators for the participant 
countries were convinced they had 'won their point on restricting Japan's free usage of 
participant sterling'.78
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At the same time SCAP's request for increased rice purchases was vigorously opposed 
by the head of the UKLM (United Kingdom Liaison Mission) in Japan, Alvary 
Gascoigne.79 His argument was that in the first instance, rice production in Southeast 
Asia was below normal because the region had been ravaged by Japan during the war 
and the economies were still disrupted. Second, he believed that the Southeast Asian 
countries which relied on Burma's rice productions in the past had prior claim over 
those of Japan. Moreover, Southeast Asian countries had a higher priority because 
Japan had a considerable indigenous production and the Japanese had a greater 
tolerance for other grains. Finally, heavy demand by Japan threatened to raise rice 
prices making it difficult for Southeast Asian countries to purchase foodstuffs; 
consequently, Southeast Asia would become more vulnerable to communist pressure 
and infiltration.80 Gascoigne, therefore, suggested that SCAP should study the 
feasibility of increasing indigenous production of foodstuffs in Hokkaido, and to what 
extent wheat and other grains could substitute for rice imports.81 However, despite 
Gascoigne's opposition, Japan was allocated large supplies of Burmese rice. This was 
because Burma was a non-participant and therefore free to reach trade agreements 
independently of Britain. Table 1.3 indicates that the amount of rice Japan imported 
from Burma rose dramatically from 1949 to 1950, although percentage-wise, Japan 
relied more heavily on Burmese rice in 1949 than in 1950 or in subsequent years (see 
table 1.4).
Britain, therefore, faced numerous problems in regard to Japan in 1950. These included 
increased raw material purchases by Japan, and the possible revival of Japanese 
competition. Furthermore, there was rising frustration on the part of the participant 
countries who wished to see a greater expansion of trade between themselves and 
Japan. Although all the problems were dealt with during the negotiations, officials in 
Whitehall were aware that a long-term approach was necessary. Therefore in July, the 
ONC set up a working party to study the long-term relations between the sterling area 
and Japan.82 In the meantime, Britain and Japan faced more difficulties concerning raw 
materials; namely, the Japanese attempt to enter the International Wheat Agreement.
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Japan's Application to Enter the International Wheat Agreement
Rice was not the only food in short supply in the post-war period. A parallel set of 
negotiations was taking place in 1950 in regard to Japan and Germany's applications to 
join the IWC (International Wheat Council). The IWC was an international organization 
which went back to 1931 when the first meeting was held in Rome. Although several 
meetings were held throughout the years, it was not until the seventh meeting of the 
IWC in 1949 that the IWA (international wheat agreement) was signed and ratified by 
all the participants.83 The IWA was made up of both wheat exporters and importers, 
and the organization's aim was to stabilize wheat prices so that exporters were 
guaranteed a set price for its wheat while importers were guaranteed an agreed amount 
of wheat for the duration of the agreement. The signatories agreed to buy or sell wheat 
at a price which would not exceed $1.98 Canadian as a maximum and $1.65 Canadian 
as a minimum for the four-year duration of the agreement, starting 1 July 1949 to 31 
July 1953.84 In November 1949, Germany and Japan applied to join the Agreement 
under US sponsorship. In order to become members, Germany and Japan needed the 
approval of two-thirds of the wheat exporters and importers respectively. Their 
application was turned down in November due to the opposition of the wheat importers 
to Japan's membership. Therefore, the joint application of Germany and Japan was 
delayed until January 1950.85
In the meantime, Britain was working out its policy in regard to Japan and Germany's 
application. On 5 January, the issue was raised at the EPC, and it was decided that 
Britain would be prepared to agree to the accession of Germany and Japan only if it did 
not adversely affect Britain's position.86 Five days later, the British delegation met the 
representatives of the major wheat exporters, the United States, Canada and Australia, 
and came to the conclusion that none of the wheat exporters understood Britain's 
concerns. Therefore it had no other choice but to oppose Japan and Germany's entry to 
the IWA.87 The issue was discussed on 12 January at a meeting of the IWC. The term 
of Japan's entry was that it would be guaranteed 900,000 metric tons of wheat and 
Germany would be guaranteed 1,800,000 metric tons annually for the four-year 
duration of the IWA.88 An objection was raised at the meeting by the United Kingdom 
because it feared that if Japan bought wheat from Australia, the amount available for 
Britain would decrease. This in turn meant that Britain would have to look to the dollar 
area for wheat.89 In order to overcome Britain's opposition, Australia proposed to sell 
wheat to Britain at the beginning of the year, and sell whatever was left to Japan. 
Although SCAP was not happy with this proposal, it was ready to accept any 
agreement which could be reached between Australia and Britain and enable Japan and 
Germany to become members of the IWA.90 Britain, however, argued that the 'mere 
possibility' that Japan would buy Australian wheat would send sterling wheat prices
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up, and asked that Japan agree to buy only a specified amount from Australia.91 
Britain's position was for Japan and Germany to agree to restrict their purchases from 
Australia and France to the amount increased by the two producers for their benefit. On 
20 January, the German representative wrote a note to the Wheat Council agreeing to 
Britain's demand.92 The deadlock continued, however, due to Australia's opposition to 
Britain's formula.
The question of Japan and Germany's membership was raised again on 13 March. A 
vote was taken in which all of the exporting countries (US, Canada, Australia, 
Uruguay, France) and twelve of the 19 importing countries agreed to their membership. 
Those who opposed the motion thereby preventing the membership of Germany and 
Japan were Ceylon, Greece, India, Israel, New Zealand, the Philippines and the UK.93 
At a subsequent meeting two days later, German and Japanese membership were 
considered separately. As Germany had written a letter to the Council expressing their 
intention to self-regulate their wheat purchases from Australia, they became a member 
of the IWA. Conversely, Japan, which did not furnish a similar letter to the Council 
had its membership turned down. The next meeting of the IWC was scheduled for 19 
June.
Meanwhile, British officials were continuing their talks with the Australians in order to 
reach an agreement which would safeguard Britain's purchases, but satisfy the 
Australians. They were also continuing talks with officials in Washington and with 
SCAP hoping that they would agree to Japan's conditional entry to the IWA. At a 
meeting between British and American officials in Washington on 3 May, the 
Americans asked whether a Japanese undertaking addressed privately to the British 
government not to buy excess Australian wheat would suffice.94 By the end of May, all 
the Commonwealth importers including Britain had indicated their agreement with the 
above proposal.95 The only affirmative answer needed to break the deadlock was 
SCAP's.
On 25 May, the representatives of Japan's ESB (Economic Stabilization Board), the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) met 
to discuss whether to accept the conditional entry to the IWA. The meeting was held as 
they had been told that SCAP would leave the decision to the Japanese. However, 
while they were deliberating, Japanese officials received the news that MacArthur had 
stated to Washington, without prior consultation with the Japanese or other SCAP 
officials, that Japan would not accept conditional entry.96 MacArthur's motives behind 
his unilateral approach were based on two points. First, under conditional membership, 
Australia's wheat would be contracted to the United Kingdom and other sterling area
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countries first, therefore, the amount of non-dollar wheat available to Japan would be 
too small to be of any advantage to Japan. For example, if Japan purchased 400,000 
metric tons of Australian wheat, it would save $2,800,000, but if Japan only had 
access to 100,000 metric tons of Australia wheat it would only save $1,100,000, as it 
would have to purchase the rest of its quota from the US market (see table -U?j. 
Second, British documents indicate that MacArthur had linked the wheat issue with the 
difficulties SCAP was facing in regard to rice purchases from Burma. Although 
MacArthur stated in a conversation with Gascoigne that neither SCAP, Washington nor 
Japan would accept anything that would lead to Japan losing face or being treated as a 
second class member in the IWA, MacArthur was more concerned with his face than 
that of Japan's.97 The IWA was a 'bargaining chip' against difficulties he was 
encountering in negotiating the new trade plan with the sterling participants. 
Furthermore, he politicized the issue by crusading for Japan's unconditional 
membership of the IWA. Although MacArthur's actions were well-meant his unilateral 
decision was an affront to Japanese officials because his actions implied that he was a 
better judge of the matter.
Therefore, when the IWC met again on 19 June, Japan's application for unconditional 
membership was turned down due to the opposition votes placed by the following 
importers: the UK, India, Ceylon, Egypt, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia and Greece.98 
The case of Japan's attempts at IWA membership highlights the shortage of food 
supplies in the post-war period, and the high demand for non-dollar foodstuffs. It 
indicated Britain's fears of a decrease in non-dollar wheat sources if Japan was 
accepted unconditionally to the IWA.
The incident indicates that Japan's entry to the IWA, which should have been relatively 
easy, was complicated first by Britain's opposition, and later made more complicated 
by MacArthur. British officials were unhappy with the fact that MacArthur linked the 
wheat and rice issues, but from SCAP's perspective, bargaining one against the other 
made a lot of sense. From SCAP's side, Britain seemed less than conciliatory towards 
Japan's plight. The raw materials issue became controversial in 1950 because it was the 
first time that Japan's purchases had an impact on the traditional clients of the supplies. 
The effects of Japan's economic recovery was not to end there. In order to buy raw 
materials, Japan needed to sell products. In order to ensure that Japan could sell its 
products in the western market, the United States campaigned for an extension of the 
MFN treatment for Japan's goods. This proposal was to cause even more dilemmas for 
Britain.
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MFN Treatment for Japan
One part of Joseph Dodge's nine point stabilization programme was the establishment 
of a single exchange rate between the dollar and the yen, and the pound and the yen. 
This step was designed to facilitate trade relations between Japan and western 
countries. For an expansion of Japan's trade, however, Japan needed the assistance of 
its foreign trade partners. What this assistance entailed was equal tariff rights for Japan. 
Without better tariff rates, Japan's produce would continue to be in a disadvantageous 
position, and for this reason the United States wished to see Japan granted MFN rights 
and eventual accession to the GATT. Clearly, the United States' motives behind 
Japan's entry was to see the latter's products receive equal tariff rates abroad so that it 
could undertake economic recovery without American assistance. Another reason 
behind American eagerness for Japan to enter the GATT as soon as possible was the 
anxiety that stemmed from the fact that if an agreement was not concluded quickly US 
manufacturers would rise up in opposition to the increased level of Japanese goods in 
the US market. Therefore, in order to prevent complications, the State and Army 
Departments wished to rush the matter through and establish an international agreement 
to grant MFN treatment to Japan." Conversely, there were various reasons why Japan 
itself wished to become a signatory of the GATT. First and foremost, was the political 
prestige linked with becoming a member, as it would signify the return of Japan into 
the international community. Second, Japan could gather information, and exchange 
information with other countries concerning international trade.100 More important, 
however, was the realization in Japan that negotiating tariffs through the GATT was 
fairer and more practical than attempting to regulate trade with each individual trading 
nation through bilateral agreements.101
America's initial approach towards Japan's GATT application was very modest. The 
first step was to gain MFN treatment for the duration of the US occupation. Although 
West Germany was granted MFN treatment for goods in 1948, Japan was not extended 
the same right in that year. The major obstacle to Japan was Britain and its Dominions. 
Therefore, a four-day meeting was convened in London in November 1948 between 
the representatives of Britain, the Dominions, and the State and Army Departments as 
well as a SCAP representative to discuss the issue.102 Britain and the Dominions gave 
a series of reasons why they thought it was premature to give MFN treatment to Japan. 
First, MFN treatment should only be given to sovereign states; second, Japan would 
have to have a uniform exchange rate; third, that bitterness towards Japan created a 
major political obstacle to extending MFN treatment; and fourth, anxieties over Japan's 
trade practices and labour costs in the post-war period were a cause for concern in 
Britain.103 Although the talks were informative, no real progress was made towards 
extending MFN treatment to Japan.
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Even after the uniform exchange rate was established between the dollar and the yen, 
and the pound and the yen, Britain remained opposed to granting MFN treatment to 
Japan.104 The State and Army Departments decided not to discuss the Japan issue at the 
GATT talks in Geneva in February 1950 because of opposition from various quarters. 
Instead, they decided to continue with the original approach of acquiring MFN 
treatment for Japanese merchandise through bilateral agreements. By 1950, eight 
countries had extended MFN treatment to Japan. Those were Austria, the French zone 
of Occupation in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Turkey. Those 
countries that had agreed in principle to extend MFN treatment were South Korea, 
Hong Kong and Burma.105 Having acquired this degree of support, the United States 
decided to place the Japan issue at the GATT session in Torquay in November. 
Conversely, Britain was still against granting MFN treatment to Japan. The issue was, 
therefore, scheduled for discussion at the EPC in September in order to decide on 
Britain's position.106 The Board of Trade prepared a memorandum for the committee in 
which it recommended that Britain should stop stalling and tell the United States 
outright that Britain was unable to extend MFN treatment to japan.107 The main reason 
behind the Board of Trade's opposition to Japan was the low cost of Japanese products 
as a result of'low wages combined with modem and efficient plant and methods'.108 
Although the President of the Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, did not wish to support 
a policy which 'nursed inefficient UK industries', he did not wish to undertake a policy 
which might lead to 'widespread unemployment problems' in the United Kingdom.109 
Therefore, his policy was to protect the UK against Japanese competition. He also 
hoped the Commonwealth countries would follow Britain and retain their freedom of 
action. If the Commonwealth countries extended MFN treatment to Japan, there was 
the chance that they would have to take action to protect their own industries against 
Japanese competition. This meant they would be forced to take equal discriminatory 
action against British goods. Furthermore, Wilson indicated that it was inappropriate 
for the United States to propose the MFN issue independently of the issue of Japan's 
application to the GATT. Therefore, he thought the issue should be postponed until 
such a time when Japan's membership to the GATT could be discussed.
On receiving the Board of Trade's memorandum prior to the scheduled meeting of the 
EPC, the Foreign Office prepared its argument to counter the Board of Trade's 
proposal. The Foreign Office prepared two sets of objections. One was based on 
international political implications. The Foreign Office's argument was based on the 
fact that if Japan continued to rely on American charity, it would consequently strain 
western resources as a whole. In addition, if Japan did not become economically 
viable, there was a chance that the Japanese communists might take advantage of
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general disgruntlement to cause civil unrest and disrupt industrial production through 
their association with the trade unions.110 There was, therefore, always the potential 
threat of a communist uprising from within, which could lead to the eventual loss of 
Japan from the 'western camp'.111 Furthermore, the Foreign Office highlighted the 
importance of cheap Japanese exports for the colonies whose people depended on 
them. Moreover, the Foreign Office emphasized the importance of pursuing a policy of 
eliminating restrictions on world trade as a whole, and this included giving MFN rights 
to Japan.
The second objection concerned the protection of British industries. The Foreign Office 
viewed the British refusal to give MFN rights to Japan as unproductive as it would only 
encourage a few other countries such as Australia and New Zealand to follow its lead. 
It was also pointed out that the UK would only be able to protect its industries in the 
UK and the colonies; therefore, there was little point in refusing to give MFN treatment 
to Japan. Furthermore the Foreign Office indicated that they did not see any signs of the 
textiles industry being threatened from Japanese competition, especially as the order 
books of most industries were still full.112
In short, the Foreign Office was aware of the American position on the issue, and saw 
a need to align British policy with that of the United States. They were also aware from 
the UK Liaison Mission's reports that without greater trade relations with western 
countries, Japan's economy could collapse, leading to internal chaos and creating the 
perfect opportunity for communism to rise from within. The Foreign Office's concern 
was well justified, as the Japan Communist Party had been instructed by the 
Cominform to carry out a violent revolutionary struggle in Japan. Moreover, the SCAP 
clamp-down on communist activities had driven many members underground.113
Despite preparing a full set of arguments, the Foreign Office was unable to dissuade the 
EPC from endorsing the Board of Trade's position on 15 September.114 The decision 
in the EPC was not taken very well by Foreign Office officials, and one official noted 
that 'an open refusal at present will, in addition to the offence it gives to the Americans, 
appear as most uncalled for in the Japanese eyes and may cause us embarrassment in 
future relations after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty1.115
The result was that the US attempt to have the Japan issue discussed at the GATT 
conference in Torquay was derailed once again in November 1950. This time, the 
British position was a firm 'no' to the prospect of an international obligation to extend 
MFN treatment to Japan. In short, what was highlighted by this issue was the 
importance of reassuring British industrial concerns about their future and protecting
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British exports to the Commonwealth, over and above its relations with the United 
States.
Although the United States was no nearer to getting MFN treatment for Japan, it 
nevertheless persisted with its endeavour. At the Torquay meeting, it began to 
campaign for Japan's observer status with each contracting member country with the 
hope of raising the issue successfully at the GATT conference in 1951.116
Conclusion
1950 saw the continuing US sponsorship of Japan's economic recovery which began 
with the 'reverse course' in 1948. It was the first year since the beginning of the OPA 
that Britain and the sterling area countries experienced the full impact of Japan's 
economic recovery, as Japan sought increased food purchases from Southeast Asia and 
the sterling area countries. The consequence of this was the possible imbalance in the 
OPA as SCAP sought to buy extra raw materials from Burma using participant sterling. 
In order to prevent SCAP using its sterling reserves from the participant pool, it became 
all the more important for participant countries to increase their trade levels with SCAP. 
Although this was the most sensible solution, it led to other problems such as increased 
purchases of cotton textiles direct from Japan. This led to the Board of Trade raising 
alarm bells over the possible demise of Lancashire due to competition from Japan's 
cheap and efficient labour force. Furthermore, by the third year of the trade plan, there 
was an accumulation of dissatisfaction by all the participants who felt constrained by 
the controls placed on their purchases. The anger was directed at Britain, as the various 
participants thought that Britain was reducing their trade allocations for its own benefit. 
Moreover, there was the constant sterling anxiety over SCAP's right to convert its 
sterling balances into dollars. All these issues led officials in Whitehall to take the 
initiative and in July, an inter-ministerial working party was set up by the ONC to study 
the sterling area's long-term relations with Japan.
A feature of 1950 was the issue of the scarcity of raw materials in the post-war world. 
The rice issue and Japan's attempt to enter the IWA highlighted Britain's inability to 
accept Japan's presence in its trading sphere. Britain was afraid that Japan might buy 
up the limited, non-dollar raw materials and raise prices. In the end, however, it was 
not Japan, but the outbreak of the Korean war on 25 June that skyrocketed raw material 
prices.
Furthermore, Britain was against the extension of the MFN treatment to Japan because 
if equal tariff rights were granted to Japan the market would be flooded with cheap 
goods, thereby threatening domestic industries in the Commonwealth. Britain feared
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that this would force the Commonwealth to raise tariffs against all imports regardless of 
their origin, therefore, nullifying any imperial preferential rights enjoyed by British 
goods and eventually driving Britain out of its traditional trading area.
What could be gathered from the three issues above, was the challenge presented to 
Britain by the gradual return of Japan into the western comity of nations through US 
assistance. On the surface, Britain seemed less than friendly to Japan's economic 
recovery. In reality, there was no unanimity between the ministries concerned. This 
was obviously because each ministry defended their own specific interests. The Board 
of Trade had the interests of British industries at heart in regard to the MFN treatment. 
The Treasury expressed its concern with the overall balance in Britain's financial 
affairs. Conversely, the Foreign Office was concerned with Britain's relations with 
foreign countries. If there was any major discrepancy, it was over the MFN issue 
between the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office. It was inevitable that the Board of 
Trade would gain the upper hand as it had been responsible for commercial treaties 
since the 1920s and the question of MFN rights fell under the Board of Trade's sphere 
of responsibility.117 Britain's relations with Japan and the United States, therefore, 
depended very much on whether a compromise could be reached between Britain's 
domestic and external interests.
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Figure 1: The Sterling Account System. 1952
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Table 1.1
Japan's Exports of Cotton Textiles to Great Britain. 1947-1955
1,000 dollars)
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
total 20,314 16,642 32,985 25,979 54,003 73,132 33,141 51,125 60,765
cotton
textiles
14,497 10,666 26,046 17,102 5,661 7,781 2,970 1,391 1,903
percentage of 
the total
71% 64% 79% 66% 10% 11% 9% 3% 3%
Source: MITI (ed.), Nihon Bdeki no Tenkai: Sengo 10 nen no Ayumikara 
[Development ofJapan’s Trade: A Review o f the Postwar Decade] (Tokyo: 
Shokoshuppan, 1956), pp. 404-405.
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Table 1.2
Japan's Rice Imports bv Country. 1949-1954
value: tons
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Total 128,873 671,571 798,817 978,520 1,059,088 1,432,194
ROK 1 89,659 * 0 0 0
ROC 0 0 73,380 61,283 54,031 43,357
Thailand 87,626 328,686 253,987 317,219 423,893 379,559
Burma 40,113 145,098 161,508 126,005 199,739 326,914
PRC 0 18,584 6,838 * 0 75,213
Pakistan 0 0 * 6,694 54,361 23,535
Indo-China 0 0 0 0 37,918 46,231
USA 1,136 51,156 40,595 215,536 177,672 345,718
Spain 0 0 0 46,805 38,143 48,635
Italy 0 0 8,414 108,374 6,170 67,356
Egypt 0 24,344 176,422 0 0 0
Note: (*) connotes negligible units
Source: MITI(ed.), Nihon Boeki no Tenkai: Sengo 10 nen no Ayumikara 
[Development ofJapan's trade: A Review o f the Postwar Decade] (Tokyo: 
Shokoshuppan, 1956) pp. 344-345.
Table 1.3
Percentage of Japan's rice imports from Burma. 1949-1954
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Burma 31.1 21.6 20.2 12.8 18.5 22.8
Source: MITI(ed.), Nihon Boeki no Tenkai: Sengo 10 nen no Ayumikara 
[Development ofJapan's trade: A Review o f the Postwar Decade] (Tokyo: 
Shokoshuppan, 1956) pp. 344-345.
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Table 1.4
Estimated Purchases bv Source and Savings per year bv Membership in IWA
Unconditional Membership 
Purchases Savings 
(1,000 M/T)
Conditional Membership 
Purchases Savings 
(1,000 M/T)
Australian Wheat 400 $2,800,000 100* $ 700,000
Canadian Wheat 100 $ 400,000 100 $ 400,000
US Wheat 400 - 700
Total 900 $3,200,000 900 $1,100,000
Note: (*) There was no assurance that even 100,000 metric tons of wheat could be 
purchased from Australia in view of her other sales commitments. Therefore, the actual 
savings would likely be less than $700,000.
Source: Memorandum to Chief o f ESS from Whittington, 27 May 1950, SCAP Files, 
RG331 Box 5979, NA.
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Chapter Two: On the Eve of Independence: Britain's Sterling Policy
towards Japan in 1951
Introduction
If the division between the East and West had taken shape at first in Europe, it was the 
Korean war of June 1950 that woke western policymakers up to the communist threat 
in East Asia. Although there is still little conclusive evidence to back the argument, it 
has been suggested that Moscow used the Calcutta Youth Conference of February 1948 
and the Congress of the Indian Communist Party to instruct the attending communist 
representatives to instigate insurrections in their respective countries.1 The period 
thereafter saw the start of the Malayan emergency, while the French were already 
involved in a war in Indochina. There was also a communist presence in Burma and the 
Dutch East Indies. If some of these conflicts were initially perceived to be wars of 
national liberation,2 this perception changed with the Chinese victory over mainland 
China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean war followed by China's entry in the war 
in October 1950.3
The events of 1950 had several consequences on the US outlook on the region. First, 
the United States' perception of a communist threat shifted from a Soviet threat to that 
of a Chinese threat. Second, there was a growing conviction that if the United States 
did not intervene in the various wars in the region, all of Southeast and East Asia would 
be overrun by Chinese communists. Other consequences of the Korean war were the 
signing of a liberal peace treaty with Japan in September 1951 and the introduction of 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of October 1951. The Battle Act, as it was 
commonly known, stated that if any of America's allies were found to be exporting 
strategic materials to the Soviet bloc at any time, their economic and military aid from 
the United States would be terminated.4 The act made it increasingly difficult for Japan 
to resume its trade with mainland China, and it therefore became even more important 
for Japan to explore other markets. Thus, there were attempts made in 1951 to explore 
Japan's trade potential with Southeast Asia, through missions such as the joint SCAP- 
Japan mission of July, which incidentally was unsuccessful because the British 
officials in the colonies refused Japanese citizens' entry into their territories.5
It is incidents such as the above that have endorsed the view that Britain's policy was to 
protect its trading interests in Southeast Asia against Japanese competition. This 
argument has been accepted so widely that no-one has ventured to examine the different 
strands of Britain's policy towards Japan. This chapter, therefore, examines Britain's 
sterling policy towards Japan in order to elucidate Japan's importance to the sterling 
area in 1951. Conversely, the negotiations towards sterling area-Japan trade, and the
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aftermath are examined to highlight Japan's perception of Britain as the banker to the 
sterling area. As the negotiations unfolded, it became obvious that Japan mistakenly 
feared British manipulation of Japanese supplies in the sterling area. The other issues 
examined in this chapter are the peace treaty and its aftermath; Japan's entry into the 
IWA and the ILO; as well as the lead-up to Japan's observer status to the GATT.
Japan 's Entry into International Organizations
In 1951 Japan entered several international organizations, among them the ILO and the 
IWA, and gained observer status in the GATT. Britain was particularly anxious for 
Japan to re-join the ILO as soon as possible. It saw Japan's 'bad labour conditions' as 
the one single factor which caused menace to 'more progressive nations' in the pre-war 
period.6 Japan, which had been an observer at the ILO since 1948, became a member at 
the 34th session in June, with 177 members voting for and only 11 voting against its 
admission.7
Japan was also successful in its application to enter the IWA in 1951. On 28 May, 
Yoshida sent a letter to the Secretary of the IWC expressing Japan's wish to enter the 
IWA unconditionally. On 29 May, the Executive Committee of the IWC met to discuss 
Japan's application. At the meeting, the Canadian representative expressed his 
government's support for Japan's membership, while the Australian representative 
stated that his country would agree to Japan's application if the United States could 
supply Japan's quota of 50,000 tons of wheat. With America's affirmative reply, 
Australian support was confirmed. The year also saw a reversal o f British position 
towards Japan's accession.8 There were several reasons why Britain decided to support 
Japan's application. First, the outbreak of the Korean war increased free market wheat 
prices thereby nullifying Britain's argument that Japan did not have to join the IWA 
because o f its access to low wheat prices outside of the agreement. Second, Britain 
wished to avoid at all cost any public disagreement with the United States during the 
peace treaty discussions and the sterling payments negotiations. Moreover, by agreeing 
to Japan's unconditional accession to the IWA, Britain hoped that Japan would be more 
cooperative in regard to the distribution of rice supplies in Southeast Asia.9 Finally, 
Britain had to take into account the fact that the distribution of votes in the IWA had 
changed since the issue was raised the previous year. As a result, there was little 
likelihood of Britain successfully opposing Japan's accession.10 On 14 June, therefore, 
with the support of the United States, Canada, Australia, and Britain, Japan became a 
signatory to the IWA.11
As for Japan's entry to the GATT, the United States did not seek MFN treatment 
Japan at the sixth session of the GATT in Geneva in September because it did
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expect to collect enough votes and in addition there was the fact that SCAP's signature 
ensured that even if Japan was granted MFN treatment, it would only be for an interim 
period until the ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Finally, the United States 
believed that Japan was better advised to apply for GATT membership through the 
supplementary arrangement which the United States was proposing at the sixth session. 
The arrangement, if accepted, would enable countries to conduct bilateral tariff 
negotiations in the absence of a general tariff conference. This procedure was therefore 
thought to enable Japan to enter the GATT far quicker than if it waited for a general 
tariff conference.12 Instead of seeking an MFN agreement, Japan requested to send an 
observer to the sixth session.13 Britain was against this, as it feared that once Japan 
became an observer, it would lead inevitably to Japan's membership of the GATT. 
British delegates were therefore, instructed to defer the issue, and if it failed, to take the 
issue to a vote. After receiving instructions, Britain tried to canvass the Europeans and 
Americans to vote against Japan, but found little support. Therefore, they received 
revised instructions not to vote if they were likely to be left in a small minority, as it 
was thought unwise to oppose Japan's entry openly and thus damage its relations with 
the latter.14 Japan's observer status was discussed at the 18th meeting of the 
contracting parties on 9 October. At the meeting, the contracting parties were divided 
between those who wished to defer the issue until the next session, such as the United 
Kingdom, and others like India believed that the observer status was purely a 
procedural matter and therefore supported Japan's request as it was clear to all that 
inviting a non-member country to observe did not lead to full membership. Britain was 
supported by Australia, South Rhodesia and Czechoslovakia; while India was 
supported by many more countries as most believed that the invitation was merely 
procedural. There were those such as France and Belgium who on record, were not 
against inviting Japan, but sympathized with countries, such as Britain, who feared a 
repeat of Japan's pre-war practice of 'dumping'.15 After three hours of negotiations, 
however, J. Leckie, the British representative, indicated that he would accept the 
majority view that Japan be invited as an observer in order to prevent a serious division 
within the contracting parties. With the British compromise on the issue, Japan was 
invited as an observer from the sixth session. Although Japan was no nearer to joining 
the GATT, the invitation was still interpreted by Japan as a foot in the door.
The most important day for Japan in 1951 was the signing of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, because it paved the way for Japan's lenient passage to sovereignty in the post­
war period. There was, however, another important event which has been over­
shadowed in the past, namely, the sterling payments agreement of August 1951. The 
next section examines the lead up to the agreement which set the scene for sterling area- 
Japan trade relations in the post-war period.
50
Long-Term Relations between the Sterling Area and Japan
In July 1950 a working party was set up under the ONC to undertake a study on the 
long-term relations between the sterling area and Japan. The study became necessary 
due to rising criticism among traders and participants alike at the restrictive nature of the 
open payments arrangement with Japan. The study was, therefore, undertaken with the 
hope of correcting the problematic aspects of the trade arrangement, and establishing a 
long-term approach to trade with Japan. The working party set up under the ONC was 
made up of a central group of officials which consisted of the representatives of the 
Central Economic Planning staff within the Economic Intelligence Department of the 
Foreign Office, the Overseas Finance Division of the Treasury and the Economic 
Section of the Cabinet Office. They were instructed to write a joint report demonstrating 
probable sterling area-Japan trade relations in 1953 basing their predictions on Japan's 
balance of payments and earnings. They used reports and digests sent by the 
Commercial Counsellor in Tokyo, various ministerial reports and the Commonwealth 
report on the proposed Peace Treaty with Japan.16
On 27 July, an interim report was discussed by the working party.17 The report was 
considered of doubtful validity because it was mainly based on the long-term plan of 
the Japanese ESB which had recently been rejected by the Japanese government.18 
Therefore, it was agreed that further work should be carried out on the three following 
issues: the 'impact of Japanese competition on the United Kingdom; the question of 
granting MFN treatment to Japan; and the possible contribution of Japan to Southeast 
Asian development'.19 One noteworthy point arose from the fact that the Board of 
Trade was instructed to produce a paper on the unfair practices of the Japanese. The 
Board of Trade representative, AE Percival, replied that there was very little to be said 
on the subject as the 'majority of "unfair trade practices" were merely a biased 
description of ordinary competition',20 which indicates that the nature of Japan’s trade 
practices were not in themselves ‘unfair’ but were only perceived to be so on the part of 
the threatened industries.
One of the main issues discussed by the working party was how to conduct future trade 
relations with Japan, because the recommendations by the working party would have 
implications for future trade patterns between the sterling area and Japan. There were 
two solutions advanced by the working party and compiled by AK Ogilvy-Webb of the 
Treasury.21 The first was to end the trade arrangement and remove the distinction 
between participants and non-participants. Japan would be induced to hold sterling and 
while it would be given the right to liberal sterling transfers, it would not be able to 
convert sterling into dollars until general sterling convertibility was introduced. This 
solution did not provide for ways to protect the sterling area from Japanese products,
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but advocates of this solution believed that British exports were not seriously threatened 
by Japan except for textiles, for which there was no ultimate protection. Furthermore, 
the flexibility of this approach would enable Japan to hold more sterling, and trade in 
sterling which would then lead to a general expansion of the use of sterling in East Asia 
as a whole.22 The second option was to continue the British-controlled managed trade 
and to continue granting convertibility rights to Japan. This option would enable the 
sterling area to limit trade relations between the sterling area and Japan through trade 
quotas.
The recommendation put forward by the Treasury was to implement the more flexible 
approach. It was heavily influenced by the Bank of England, which was pushing for 
the extension of the use of sterling for international trade in East Asia.23 The more 
flexible basis of trade was also supported by the Foreign Office because many countries 
within the sterling area were already disgruntled with the trade agreement. There were 
fears that the status quo would lead to a major sterling area crisis as both India and 
Pakistan wanted to see Japan treated as ’soft' by the sterling area, and countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand who were both frustrated by limits on trade with Japan.24 
Furthermore, the Bank of England, which sought a reduction of the different kinds of 
sterling around the world, wished to see 'maximum possible freedom of movement of 
sterling throughout the non-dollar world'.25 There were also fears expressed by the 
UKLM in Japan that further restrictions on trade would be considered unfavourably by 
the United States and influence the Japanese into thinking that sterling was a weak, 
second-rate currency.26 The two options were discussed at the seventh meeting of the 
working party on 4 December, where there was majority support for the flexible 
solution. The only visible dissension was from the Board of Trade which regarded 
neither solution to be viable, but did not present an alternative proposal.27
In its final version, the report submitted by the working party to the Cabinet’s 
Economic Steering Committee on 6 February 1951 considered future patterns of trade 
and payments arrangements between Japan and the sterling area under the following 
points:
(i) The sterling area balance of payments with Japan: the United Kingdom’s 
overall balance of payments; and the general position of sterling as an 
international currency in the Far East;
(ii) Competition between the United Kingdom and Japanese exports;
(iii) The impact on our political and economic interests of Japanese purchases of 
rice in Burma and Thailand and of cotton and possibly raw materials in the 
sterling area.
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(iv) The interest of the underdeveloped countries in cheap imports of 
consumption and capital goods from Japan.28
With regard to the first point, the report identified Britain’s long-term financial policy as 
one in which the goal should be to restore and encourage the widest possible use of 
sterling in East Asia. In order to achieve this aim, the report recommended Japan’s 
eventual inclusion in the transferable account area, which meant that Japan would 
eventually be able to receive sterling automatically from any third country and use the 
sterling to buy goods from a third country, whereas they were unable to do so while 
they belonged in the bilateral account group.
The report identified several points which precluded Japan from joining the transferable 
account area immediately. First, there was the possibility that Japan might accumulate 
an uncontrollable amount of sterling as a result of the demands for Japanese goods 
from the Commonwealth countries. Second, there was the uncertainty over whether 
automatic transferability would lead to a net inflow or outflow of sterling from Japan 
over a period of time. The report thus recommended that Japan’s convertibility rights 
should be forfeited, and while Japan would be given freedom to use its sterling with 
third countries it would be restricted to administrative transferability which meant that 
transfers had first to have the permission of the Bank of England.29 Therefore, despite 
plans for the eventual inclusion of Japan in the transferable account area, Japan was to 
be relegated to the bilateral account area for the foreseeable future.
Concerning competition between the United Kingdom and Japanese exports in point 
two, the report observed that British textiles manufacturers would not be able to 
compete with Japanese cotton and rayon manufacturers in the long run because of two 
reasons; first, Japan’s labour costs were a fraction of those of Britain, and second, 
Japan was being allocated American raw cotton on a more favourable basis than 
Britain. The report was unsure of the future position of British industries such as 
pottery and steel, and therefore, concluded that more information on Japan’s main 
industries was needed and that they should be monitored carefully. In the meantime, the 
report saw little reason for Britain to block Japan from the GATT or to refuse MFN 
rights to Japan in order to protect British trade, as it had been doing since 1948 and 
1950 respectively, as neither measure would be of any use in the protection of British 
goods in third markets. Instead, the report recommended that British industries should 
improve their technical and commercial lead over Japan in the sectors where they were 
ahead, as the chances of British industries protecting their market share by persuading 
sterling area countries against importing Japanese goods were very slim,30 although
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Britain hoped that the Commonwealth countries would follow the British example and 
'reserve their right to discriminate against Japan'.31
The report’s recommendation concerning point three was that unless an agreed 
allocation system was implemented, it would be difficult for rice producers in Southeast 
Asia to provide for Japan’s rice demands, as well as the demands of British colonies in 
the area. The report concluded, however, that it was unable to find a solution for the 
rice issue within a trade arrangement because Britain did not have the power to dissuade 
SCAP from heavy purchases of raw materials in the interests of Southeast Asian 
stability, or to persuade Thailand and Burma to revive the rice allocation system. It 
reached the conclusion that the colonies and Ceylon would have to simply outbid Japan 
in its rice purchases from Thailand and Burma.32
The final point explored by the report concerned the issue of 'underdeveloped' 
countries. The report outlined the difficulty of dissuading 'underdeveloped' countries 
within the sterling area from purchasing cheap Japanese goods when the United 
Kingdom had already publicized their policy of assisting the development of those areas 
through the Colombo Plan.33 Therefore, the report recommended that the colonies be 
allowed to purchase cheap Japanese goods.
On 15 February a note on the above prepared by the Chief Planning Officer was 
considered by both the Economic Planning Board and the Economic Steering 
Committee.34 Both committees endorsed the recommendations prepared by the 
working party that Britain's long-term aim should be to put the sterling area-Japan 
payments relations on a non-dollar basis. This meant that Japan would no longer be 
given the right to convert its sterling on a bi-annual basis. It was also recommended that 
Britain should seek to negotiate a new sterling payments agreement with Japan while 
SCAP was still in control. Third, there should be full consultations between all 
interested members of the sterling area before the beginning of each trade year. 
Furthermore, they recommended that consultations between the sterling area countries 
should be followed by a balance of payments exercise with Japan in order to reach an 
agreement on the probable level of trade between Japan and the sterling area.35 The 
Economic Planning Board's recommendations were, however, subject to several 
points, for example, consultations with various key British industrial representatives 
such as the Cotton Board.36 Furthermore, the Economic Planning Board recommended 
that, despite Britain’s weakened power to discriminate against Japanese goods both for 
its own domestic market and the Commonwealth, it should not totally relinquish its 
limited powers. Moreover, the Board recommended that Japan should not be informed 
of Britain's proposal not to rely on such powers of discrimination in the future.37
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Lastly, the Economic Planning Board recommended that further investigations should 
be made into Japanese industries other than textiles38 which were likely to affect 
Britain's export interests.39
The Economic Steering Committee invited EA Hitchman of the Treasury to arrange for 
the ONC to consider what necessary steps should be taken to carry out the 
recommendations of the working party. On 23 February, the ninth meeting of the ONC 
endorsed the note prepared by the Treasury.40 It recommended that Britain should 
denounce the current OPA with SCAP by 30 June, subject to affirmative replies from 
the Commonwealth countries. Moreover, the note recommended that Britain should 
seek to negotiate a sterling payments agreement on normal lines (without convertibility 
rights) with Japan 41 It was agreed, however, that as a peace treaty was being drafted at 
this time, the agreement should be signed by Japan rather than SCAP. It was also 
agreed that sterling area countries wouldnot be represented in the negotiations. Instead, 
they were to be informed of the progress through the CLC (Commonwealth Liaison 
Committee) in London. The ONC’s endorsements were then sent to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer for his approval.
The report prepared by the working party between July 1950 and February 1951 
indicates the British decision to sign the sterling payments agreement in place of the 
OPA, and to end Japan’s rights to convertibility. The main reason for this British 
decision was the desire to expand the use of sterling in East Asia. This was an 
extension of Britain's sterling policy in the early 1950s, when British policymakers still 
thought that sterling could still provide a viable alternative to the dollar bloc. If one 
looks at Britain’s overall sterling policy, it is understandable that with mainland China 
lost to western trade after 1950, it was obvious for Britain to look for another anchor in 
East Asia to help the expansion of sterling in the post-war world. A country like Japan 
was also important as expanded trade relations between Japan and sterling countries in 
the region would facilitate a reduction in the sterling balances of countries such as 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Therefore, the main reason for the signing of the sterling 
payments agreement was to facilitate sterling area-Japan trade.
Furthermore, the conclusions of the report indicate that Treasury and Foreign Office 
officials outnumbered the Board of Trade officials in the committee. Minutes indicate 
that only one or two Board of Trade officials were present at the meetings, whereas the 
chair of the long-term study was a Treasury official, and the meetings were always 
attended by two or more Treasury and Foreign Office representatives.42 The 
conclusions which particularly emphasize the dominance of the two ministries were 
those that sought a relaxation in British trade controls towards Japan.
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After the Cabinet had reached a conclusion over future economic relations between the 
sterling area and Japan, British representatives in the United States and Japan 
approached the State, Treasury and Defense Departments in Washington, the Economic 
and Scientific Section of SCAP in Japan, as well as members of the Japanese Cabinet, 
in order to give them an idea of what Britain was hoping to achieve in the payment 
talks. In the United States, Christopher Steel, the Minister in Washington, and the 
Treasury representative, Allan Christelow, met in March 1951 with members of the 
State, Treasury and Defense Departments.43 A telegram from Washington to the FO 
indicated that none of the above departments had taken a firm decision with regard to 
the future of the SCAP-sterling area payments agreement. The State and Treasury 
Departments both held the view that there might be considerable advantage in Japan 
entering the transferable account group,44 but members of the Defense Department 
strongly believed that SCAP should denounce the OPA and put all Japanese trade on a 
dollar basis. The underlying reason for this, as understood by Steel, was that on an 
emotional level they believed that closer links between the sterling area and Japan might 
lead to a corresponding loss of control by the United States 45 On an economic level, 
they believed that it was feasible to put Japan on a dollar basis as it had enough 
reserves, as a result of the Korean War, to trade entirely in dollars. Therefore it was 
thought that if Japan traded on a dollar basis it would greatly improve Japan's ability to 
obtain food and raw materials, while at the same time, Britain’s influence on Japan 
would recede.46 For the Defense Department, Britain's negative attitude towards 
Japan’s accession to the IWA in the previous year was enough evidence to suggest that 
if Japan joined the sterling bloc, Britain would manipulate Japan's use of sterling in 
order to deprive it of necessary food supplies and raw materials 47
In his correspondence with David Serpell of the Treasury, Hugh Thomas, the Financial 
Advisor to UKLM in Tokyo, indicated that neither the representatives of SCAP48 nor 
the Japanese Finance Minister, Ikeda Hayato,49 were enthusiastic about the possible 
exclusion of convertibility in future payments agreement between Japan and the sterling 
area. Thomas identified Mr. McDermott, the Director of Trade and Services of the 
Economic and Scientific Section, as one of those who was working towards tying 
Japan to the dollar. With regard to John Allison, the Director of Finance, Thomas 
believed that he, unlike McDermott, would be more likely to work towards the best 
interests of Japan, but felt that Allison might also be motivated by 'an anti-sterling area 
complex'.50
In fact the Economic Counselor to SCAP, Carl H Boehringer, sent a report to the State 
Department on 6 April after he received a formal letter from Thomas requesting the
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opening of new payments negotiations between SCAP and the British Government.51 
The note by Boehringer indicated that they were not certain of the exact arrangement 
Britain would be proposing but SCAP was aware that Britain wished to obtain a new 
agreement which could continue without alteration in the post-treaty period. The report 
suggested that 'instead of close integration with the sterling area, Japan might find it 
feasible and possibly more advantageous to assume American Account Status'.52
The arguments for shifting Japanese trade to a dollar basis were:
-maximum transferability both within and without the sterling area and 
convertibility to dollars.
-Optimum competitive advantage in selecting and obtaining imports of critical 
raw materials from sterling area countries several of which have direct or 
indirect preferential arrangements to maximize the export of desirable goods to 
hard currency areas.
-If Japan's trade shifted to a dollar basis, the United Kingdom would find it 
most difficult to influence Japan's trade with other areas and would have only 
limited ability to influence her trade with the sterling area.
-Close mutual defence arrangements with the necessary concomitant economic 
arrangements would be strengthened by having Japan a member of the dollar 
area. Japan's over-all trade situation could be more effectively planned and 
directed in such manner as to best complement the US military aid program.
-With Japan a member of the dollar area, American ability to free Japanese trade 
from the numerous restrictions currently imposed by the UK would be directly 
enhanced. Furthermore, the US would be able to encourage progressive freeing 
of world trade and approximation of multilateral trade.53
The arguments put forth by the Economic Counselor were indicative of SCAP's view 
that the existing payments agreement between SCAP and the sterling area was one 
which deliberately limited Japanese access to raw materials and food supplies. SCAP's 
view was not entirely incorrect, as its right to convert sterling to dollars placed Japan in 
a hard currency category. Conversely, as Japan was unable to provide dollar payments 
for raw material purchases from the sterling area, it was not given priority as a trade 
outlet for the sterling area. Therefore, trade with Japan was severely limited with the net 
effect of a double disadvantage for Japan.54
Meanwhile, Britain's apparent decision to abolish the dollar convertibility in the next 
sterling area-Japan payments agreement spurred the Japanese government to undertake 
a number of studies on Japan's negotiating position. The view in Japan was that the 
abolition of the dollar clause would lead to a greater trade increase with the sterling 
area, thus placing Japan in a dilemma over which currency bloc to base its exchange 
rate on, the sterling area or the dollar area. For example, the report compiled by
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Ichimada Hisato, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, entitled '(s)hould Japan in the 
future belong to the dollar area or the sterling area?' examined the pros and cons of the 
two blocs by posing the question of the stability of the dollar and sterling; the 
convertibility of the two currencies; the possible induction of foreign capital; the 
possibilities for Japanese trade with the two areas; and the prospects of acquiring 
foreign funds through invisible trade.55 In an answer to the above questions, Ichimada 
acknowledged the improvement in the pound’s position since the start of the Korean 
war. He realized, however, that this was due to a world-wide increase in the value of 
raw materials which subsequently helped to increase the sterling area's dollar reserves. 
Furthermore, Ichimada noted that Japan would attain greater stability by placing 
Japan's exchange base on the dollar than the pound due to the dollar's stability. 
Moreover, Japan was assured of raw materials from the United States, whereas there 
was uncertainty over whether the sterling area would relax its trade restrictions with 
Japan. In the case of sterling trade restrictions, Ichimada foresaw difficulties in running 
down Japan's sterling reserves because sterling was not convertible. Another 
consideration was foreign capital for Japan's economic reconstruction and 
development. Ichimada knew that Japan could not rely on Britain and the sterling area 
to inject foreign capital into Japan, therefore, he thought that it would be wiser for 
Japan to place its foreign exchange base on the dollar. In conclusion, Ichimada outlined 
that it was necessary for Japan to acquire dollars first by expanding exports to the 
United States; second, by increasing its exports to the open account countries in the 
area as settlements were made in dollars;56 third, by expanding exports to countries 
within the dollar area; and lastly, by securing American credit from banks.57
The report elucidates Japan's dilemma about which bloc it should enter. The advantages 
to Japan in joining the dollar area were that the dollar was more stable, and that the 
dollar area could provide the capital and foodstuffs necessary for Japan's economic 
development. Ichimada, however, expressed concern over the future of South and 
Southeast Asia. He was particularly anxious that if the Colombo Plan succeeded, the 
whole of Asia might base its exchange on sterling, whereby Japan would be restricted 
severely as the only dollar-based country surrounded by sterling-based countries. 
Therefore, he hoped that Truman's Point IV programme would succeed in encouraging 
Southeast Asia more towards the dollar bloc.58
Another report prepared jointly by the FECB (Foreign Exchange Control Board), the 
ESB, the MITI, the MOF (Ministry of Finance) and the MOFA for submission to the 
Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru, indicated the extent to which the Japanese side was 
preparing for the negotiations.59 The report went into some detail about the merits and 
demerits of each of the sterling area account groups and research was conducted into
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the amount of trade Japan could be expected to carry out with the dollar and sterling 
areas in each respective account group. The purpose of the study was to establish 
Japan's negotiating position under every possible circumstance. The report clearly 
favoured Japan entering the American account (as encouraged by SCAP) or the 
transferable account group because they would either encourage a closer economic 
relationship between Japan and the United States or enable Japan to trade with other 
sterling countries. The least favourable option was to remain in the bilateral group 
without convertibility because of the uncertainty over whether Japan would be 
guaranteed the sterling area's raw materials, and the fear that Japan might be forced to 
take the sterling area's non-essential surplus instead of essentials. Moreover, the report 
indicated that if Japan were to remain in the bilateral group, they should press for a rise 
in the ceiling of the non-conversion limit instead of an end to convertibility.60
By early April, the ONC had compiled a set of instructions for the British negotiators, 
Hugh Thomas and JB Loynes, a representative from the Bank of England.61 They 
were instructed to sign a sterling payments agreement without a convertibility 
provision. Although the new agreement would enable Japan to increase its trade with 
the sterling area, it was to remain in the bilateral accounts group, and third country 
transfers were to be processed through administrative transferability. The working 
party on Hong Kong, had by this time, decided to include Hong Kong in the 
agreement.62 Therefore, the British line was to end convertibility and include Hong 
Kong in the payments agreement. Initially, the negotiations were to start on 1 May and 
end by 30 June, so that a new agreement between Japan and the sterling area could be 
in place at the same time that the existing OPA, which ran from June of 1950 to June 
1951 came to its natural endi
British negotiators were, however, faced with various difficulties first, in starting the 
talks and second, reaching an agreement with their Japanese counterparts. The talks 
were delayed partly because SCAP, who was to chair the conference, was faced with a 
change in the Supreme Commander from MacArthur to General Matthew Ridgway, and 
also because of the imminence of the peace treaty which made detailed consultations 
with Washington in various fields necessary. The talks finally began on 24 May and 
lasted until 31 August. There were several reasons why the negotiations dragged on for 
so long. First and foremost was the convertibility issue. Many dollar proponents in the 
Japanese Cabinet believed that the convertibility clause should be retained in order to 
prevent an uncontrollable amount of sterling reserves accruing in Japan. They were 
especially anxious that without a convertibility clause they would be unable to get rid of 
their excess sterling, especially after the termination of the agreement.63 The other 
obstacle was opposition to the inclusion of Hong Kong in the sterling payments
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agreement. The argument raised by Japan was that the inclusion of Hong Kong might 
increase Japan's sterling holdings and damage Japan's future trade with China via 
Hong Kong.64 In short, Japan opposed the 'reining in' of Hong Kong within the 
payments agreement as it could potentially affect Hong Kong's role as an entrepot 
trading centre.
An added complication arose due to Ikeda's public announcement on 21 April that the 
government would not abolish the 'dollar clause' in the Japan-sterling payments 
agreement.65 This announcement was not taken seriously by Thomas or the FEC (Far 
Eastern Commission) as the Kyodo News Agency's press release was not substantiated 
by the Japanese government. It was nevertheless a personal view expressed by Ikeda, 
and the convertibility issue became more complicated as it took on political importance 
to save Ikeda's face.
Third, at the same time, the British and the Americans were drafting the Japanese peace 
treaty. By May 1951 considerable progress was made in the formation of a draft treaty 
and all the outstanding differences were ironed out during John Foster Dulles' visit to 
London in June.66 Although Britain was unable to persuade the United States to adopt 
a stiff peace treaty, Britain was able to remain firm on some issues such as 
compensation for allied POWs, the renunciation by Japan of its rights under the Congo 
Basin Treaty of 1919 and its removal from the Board of Directors of the Bank for 
International Settlement.67 Soon after the Anglo-American differences over the peace 
treaty were settled, there were statements made in Britain about the peace treaty being a 
form of protection against Japanese competition. These statements were 
counterproductive to the British mission in Japan because it was nullifying their efforts 
to persuade the Japanese that the British harboured no sinister intentions towards Japan 
in the post-war world.68 Japan's main anxiety stemmed from the fact that Britain as the 
chief negotiator for the sterling area might restrict Japan's trade with the sterling bloc. 
Therefore the statements emanating from Britain fuelled Japanese fears.69
The Sterling Financial Conference
The first sterling financial conference between Japan and Britain was convened on 24 
May.70 The negotiators on the Japanese side were Takeuchi Ryuji, International Trade 
Administrator, Ishida Tadachi, Director of the Financial Bureau of MOF, Yukawa 
Morio, Director of the Trade Bureau of the ESB, Kiuchi Nobutane, Chairman of the 
FECB and Shirasu Jiro, Adviser to ESB. Takeuchi of the MITI was chosen as a 
compromise candidate to head the talks in order to deflect any jealous rivalry between 
the MOF and the FECB.71 The importance of the sterling payments agreement to Japan 
could perhaps be understood by the presence of Shirasu, who was known to have
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considerable influence over Yoshida on economic matters and was regarded as 
Yoshida's personal emissary to the conference.72 On the American side was the 
Chairman of the Conference, RW Hale, Chief of the Foreign and Commerce Division, 
SM Fine, the Director of Economic Planning and WW Diehl, the Director of Finance. 
All were from the Economic and Scientific Section. The United Kingdom was 
represented by Hugh Thomas and John Loynes.
The first six meetings held between 28 May and 8 June consisted of the Japanese side 
asking questions about the sterling area and the British side answering them. The issue 
that most concerned the Japanese side was the consequence of abolishing the dollar 
clause, and, in particular, whether it would lead to a significant accumulation of 
sterling, and if so, how the sterling reserves could be reduced. Furthermore, the 
Japanese delegates were concerned with whether trade relations between the sterling 
area and Japan would expand as a result of the abolition of the dollar clause, and if so, 
to what extent. Moreover, Japan was anxious over whether it would become a soft- 
currency country, and whether the Commonwealth's imperial preferences would 
prejudice Japan's attempts to export to the sterling area.73 Difficulties arose because the 
British side was unable to give specific assurances to Japan that it would not 
accumulate an over-supply of sterling, nor could they give an approximation of trade 
flows as they were entering a payments agreement with Japan for the first time after the 
return of its exchange controls from SCAP. Therefore, they recommended a laissez- 
faire approach to trade. Conversely, the Japanese side wished to have a specific 
agreement with an agreed quota which would clearly identify the amount of trade Japan 
could expect from each of the sterling area countries, as they could not see how it could 
trade with the sterling area without an agreed estimate.
In order to break the stalemate, John Loynes, the Bank of England representative, 
began secret talks with Kiuchi and Takeuchi. One of the reasons for the initiative was to 
reach a quick conclusion to the negotiations. Another reason was that Japan and Britain 
wanted to present the Americans with a fait accompli. This procedure was necessary 
because, despite American assurances that Japan would be given the freedom to 
negotiate without SCAP influence,74 the Japanese negotiators were under 'some 
pressure' from the American side.75 Although George Clutton, the interim head of the 
UKLM, was briefed on the contents of the private talks, and reports were sent to the 
Foreign Office, they were held without Thomas' knowledge for the most part. There 
was no apparent reason why Thomas should have been kept in the dark, except that 
Loynes tended to think that Thomas was a poor negotiator and possibly a hindrance in 
the private meetings.76
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Loynes held his first private meeting with Kiuchi on 11 June and explained the 
mechanics of the sterling payments arrangements to him. It was also learnt at this 
private meeting that the Americans wished to keep Japan in the dollar sphere. Kiuchi 
thought that 'acceptance o f a sterling payments agreement without strings would 
inevitably be regarded as a step away from the dollar and one which might have 
political repercussions'.77 Kiuchi's view was substantiated by a telegram from Steel in 
Washington. According to the telegram, neither the US Treasury nor the State 
Department were happy with the British proposal, and it noted that if the Anglo- 
Japanese financial conference was placed on the NAC (National Advisory Council) 
agenda,78 then Washington was confident that SCAP would be given instructions to 
place Japan's trade firmly on a dollar basis.79 Officials in Whitehall were therefore 
worried that Washington's position would harden Japan's opposition to the UK 
proposal.
At the time of the two private meetings between Loynes and Kiuchi on 11 June and 
with Takeuchi on 13 June, the two Japanese officials told Loynes that the Japanese 
Cabinet was strongly in favour of convertibility because they were concerned about a 
sharp rise in sterling balances and there was a need for some sort of mechanism to keep 
their sterling reserves at a manageable level.80 Another reason for keeping the dollar 
convertibility, however, was political rather than economic, as the Japanese delegation 
needed to explore ways of solving the convertibility issue without any loss of prestige 
for Ikeda, who had publicly committed himself to dollar convertibility, allegedly as a 
result of strong American influence.81 Takeuchi, therefore, proposed a secret exchange 
o f letters concerning convertibility.82 Loynes dismissed such an idea as he did not think 
that would help 'save' Ikeda's face; moreover, he was concerned that it would 
inevitably become the subject of parliamentary questions which would not place either 
party in a favourable light.83
The conclusion that can be derived from the political issue was that although the 
Japanese were seeking some form of mechanism to prevent the accumulation of 
sterling, and was- strongly in favour o f maintaining the convertibility clause, there were 
strong indications that deadlock in the talks could be lifted if Ikeda's face was saved.
On 20 June, Clutton met with Yoshida to discuss the negotiations and explain the 
reasons why the British representatives could not give convertibility to Japan. He 
explained that not even the closest o f Britain's friends were given the right to 
convertibility, and therefore, it was not considered politically feasible to grant the right 
to Japan.84 Yoshida understood this and told Clutton that he would be approached by 
Shirasu with a possible solution to the talks.85 Clutton's report of the conversation
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indicates that Yoshida was willing to intervene in order to break the deadlock to the 
talks and that the meeting between Clutton and Shirasu, and meetings between 
Takeuchi and Loynes were endorsed by Yoshida. The next night Shirasu proposed to 
Clutton that both sides should shelve the dollar clause question in order to save Ikeda's 
face, and that instead the Japanese should estimate the size of sterling balances they 
wished to hold by a given date (i.e. 30 June, 1952) and that both parties should agree 
to bring down sterling holdings to that level by that date.86 It was agreed at the meeting 
that Takeuchi would send Thomas a letter putting forward Shirasu's personal 
suggestion as a basis for further negotiations.87
On 25 June, Loynes was approached by Takeuchi who wished to go through Shirasu's 
draft proposal before presenting it to the financial conference. They met privately at the 
house of Mr. Pollock of Jardine Mathesons where they discussed the draft for some 
two and a half hours.88 The main contents of the draft proposal were that Japan should 
state a working balance for the trade year and that Britain should assist in preventing the 
working balance from exceeding the agreed amount. Japan would be given the freedom 
to raise the ceiling if it was necessary, and the United Kingdom could also propose to 
raise the ceiling, although the final decision would rest with Japan. Furthermore, the 
United Kingdom would not discriminate against Japanese exports to the sterling area, 
and that Japan's sterling balances would be able to be transferred freely within the 
sterling area. Japan would be extended financial facilities if it faced sterling shortage 
during seasonal purchases. Moreover, Japan would be given the right to abrogate the 
agreement, and it would be entitled to use its sterling balances after the abrogation of 
the agreement. Finally, the readoption of a dollar clause could be reconsidered when 
negotiating a new agreement.89 Loynes spent the next day again at Pollock's house 
going over the draft this time with both Takeuchi and Kiuchi. Loynes suggested 
various alterations which he thought would make it easier for Japan and the United 
Kingdom to reach an agreement, albeit emphasizing that the draft was not entirely 
acceptable to the British. The main changes to the draft were the omission of the dollar 
clause from the draft, and that the section on Japan's right to abrogate the agreement 
was replaced by '(t)he Japanese government reserves its right to give notice of 
termination of the agreement'.90 Loynes also changed the section on Japan's 
entitlement to use its sterling freely after the expiry of the agreement to 'holding early 
consultations with a view to negotiating a new agreement'.91 Takeuchi was not very 
happy with the proposed changes put forward by Loynes, because he did not think that 
ministers such as Ikeda would agree to them. Therefore, despite the two lengthy 
conversations he held with Loynes, he presented the original text with very minor 
changes at the ninth meeting of the sterling financial conference as a basis for the 
exchange of notes to the agreement.92 Takeuchi later explained to Loynes privately that
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the original text had to be used in order to get the approval of his ministers. Therefore, 
although Loynes was disappointed with the text, it did have the effect of bringing the 
Japanese ministers to look upon the payment negotiations more favourably.
The British negotiators and their Japanese counterparts discussed the terms of the 
exchange of letters between 10 July and the last meeting of the sterling financial 
conference on 26 July. The agreed exchange of notes between the United Kingdom and 
Japan comprised of the following points. That both sides would be responsible for 
keeping 'Japan's sterling balances within reasonable limits', and that both sides would 
take reasonable measures to correct 'any chronic imbalance of payments in either 
direction'.93 It was proposed that the responsibility should be a mutual one, and in 
addition it was agreed that Britain could not accept guarantees for Japan's use of 
sterling after the termination of the agreement.94 Furthermore, the British remained firm 
that they would not be committed to credit facilities and refused to give any undertaking 
that the question of the dollar clause would be reconsidered.95 Furthermore, it was 
agreed that both sides could meet at 'short notice' to discuss any aspects of the 
agreement, and a payments review was scheduled to take place in six months time. 
Finally, it was agreed that Japan would be allowed to transfer sterling to any country in 
the transferable account country with the approval of the Bank of England.96 
Therefore, although Japan was considered a bilateral account country, it was given 
approval to trade with transferable account countries 97
It was understood that the Japanese and the British negotiators had been able to reach 
an agreement because Yoshida had given Takeuchi the authority to agree with the 
British on all basic points. It was also revealed that Yoshida was ready to overrule 
Ikeda if he 'showed fight',98 and that he had endorsed the British position because he 
thought that Britain could obstruct Japanese trade with the sterling area if it did not 
accede to British proposals.99 Furthermore, it indicated, contrary to popular belief, 
Yoshida's own interest in trade, and Japan's trade expansion in the post-war period.100
The other issue that delayed the signing of the agreement was Hong Kong. Although 
British negotiators made it quite clear that Hong Kong would be included in the new 
payments agreement from the start, the issue was not discussed during the main 
negotiations. It was agreed at the last meeting of the sterling financial conference that 
Hong Kong would be discussed by the drafting committee, which consisted of Kiuchi, 
Ishida and Yukawa101 on the Japanese side, Thomas and Loynes on the British side 
and a SCAP observer.102 There was a delay in bringing the issue to the negotiating 
table on the British side because British officials in Hong Kong were themselves 
reluctant to include the colony in the sterling payments agreement with Japan. Under
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the OPA, Hong Kong had been an entrepot trading port, where goods originating in 
China, Taiwan and Thailand would pass through Hong Kong on their way to Japan. 
The argument put forward by the Governor of Hong Kong, Alexander Grantham, was 
that if Hong Kong was included in the sterling payments agreement, third countries 
would either barter directly with Japan or use another open account country to conduct 
trade, thereby reducing the goods which passed through Hong Kong.103 It was only 
after the Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, had assured Hong Kong that everything 
would be done to enable free trade transactions between Japan and Hong Kong that 
officials agreed to their inclusion in the sterling payments agreement.
Conversely, Japan opposed the inclusion of Hong Kong in the agreement because of 
fears that Japan would accumulate an even larger supply of sterling through its trade 
with Hong Kong. Furthermore, the Japanese side feared that Japan's trade within the 
region would be syphoned off if Hong Kong was included in the trade agreement.104 
The Japanese side felt that it had a strong negotiating position because of the uncertainty 
voiced by Hong Kong officials, and also because they had the backing of US officials 
in Tokyo and Washington.105 US officials were especially concerned about Hong 
Kong's inclusion in the payments agreement because it would undoubtedly change the 
trade patterns to the detriment of Japan's overall trade.106 Moreover, although it can 
only be speculative, there is reason to believe that Kiuchi might have viewed Hong 
Kong as a personal issue after losing over Japan's claim for convertibility.107 Kiuchi's 
actions throughout the negotiations, from his lateness to meetings to his acrimonious 
views towards the negotiations in the press, and his sullen countenance during 
discussions suggest that he was personally in favour of excluding Hong Kong.
The Japanese side finally agreed to include Hong Kong in the sterling payments 
agreement after a two-week stalemate. The Japanese position was overturned at a 
Cabinet meeting because the ministers wished to settle the negotiations before the 
opening of the San Francisco Peace Conference. Furthermore, provisions in the 
payments agreement such as a ninety-day notice of abrogation meant that Japan could 
opt out in case Japan became dissatisfied with it.108 Although Clutton's visit with 
Iguchi and Shirasu during the deadlock speeded up the process,109 it was clear to the 
British side that Yoshida had intervened to 'knock Kiuchi off his perch', and to reach 
an agreement with Britain.110
The sterling payments agreement was signed on 31 August 1951.111 On the same day, 
Britain and SCAP abrogated the OPA. The payments agreement was initially a one year 
agreement with the option of extension or renewal by mutual agreement. There was a 
provision of a three months' notice of termination by either side. The two sides also
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agreed to a payments review in six months time. Although Japan was included in the 
bilateral account, it was permitted to transfer sterling to the transferable account group 
with the permission of the Bank of England. Its special features were the exchange of 
notes, which was the outcome of the prolonged wrangling between the Japanese and 
British delegates. 112
Although Britain saw the payments agreement as a success, as almost all its negotiating 
positions were fulfilled, the optimism was not to last for long. In fact, by the end of the 
year, there was much gloom due to Japan's misinterpretation of the agreement.
Anglo-Japanese Differences over the Sterling Payments Agreement
When the sterling payments agreement was signed on 31 August 1951, the Japanese 
side believed it had gained one important concession for giving up its dollar clause; the 
recognition of Japan as a soft currency country with all the trade advantage that would 
with that status. The main reason why Japan was considered hard until the signing of 
the agreement was that under the OPA with SCAP, surplus sterling was exchangeable 
into dollars. With the gradual withdrawal of SCAP from trade and economic affairs, 
and the return of trade and financial responsibilities to Japanese officials, however, 
Britain no longer deemed it appropriate that Japan be able to exchange its sterling into 
dollars. During the negotiations, it was agreed that neither Japan nor Britain would 
agree to a maximum or minimum limit to their trade, and that they would establish new 
trade relations according to the supply and demand of commodities traded during the 
first six months of trade under the new arrangement.113
The British side, however, did not view the sterling payments agreement in the same 
way as the Japanese. Although Britain agreed to the expansion of trade with Japan and 
agreed to Japan's transfer of sterling to third countries through an administrative 
process,114 the British representatives in Tokyo did not believe that they had given any 
'hard and fast assurance'115 regarding the transformation of Japan from a hard to soft 
currency status.
The Japanese side, in particular the MITI, either misinterpreted or overlooked the UK 
representatives' point. The problem can clearly be seen in a note of 27 September from 
Ushiba Nobuhiko, the Chief of International Trade Bureau of MITI, to NS Roberts, 
Commercial Minister to the UKLM in Japan, in which he wrote:
With the recent conclusion of a new Payment Agreement between the UK and 
Japan, Japan has become a soft currency country . . .  we are looking to the UK 
government to recognise Japan's new status as a soft-currency country and to 
relax licensing both for imports and exports.116
66
Despite Ushiba's specific reference to Japan as a soft-currency country, there is no 
documentation which indicates that Roberts or any other UKLM official corrected 
Ushiba or any other MITI representative on Japan's misinterpretation. This was 
probably due to the fact that the primary focus of discussion between Roberts and 
Ushiba was on whether to set a hypothetical upper limit on trade between the sterling 
area and Japan. Initially, Ushiba proposed a limit of £230 million each way for the 
coming trade year. This was to cause problems for the sterling area, as all the countries 
wishing to purchase goods from Japan had increased their estimates. The figure for the 
ex-participants alone came to £225.5 million. Therefore, the total sterling area estimates 
including the ex-non-participant figures would have exceeded Ushiba's proposed limit. 
The setting of an upper limit was, therefore, already leading to arguments among the 
sterling area countries about who would prune their essential licenses.117 Therefore, on 
2 October, Roberts returned an unsigned note to Ushiba proposing that trade between 
Japan and the sterling area be 'allowed to flow freely in each direction without any 
fixed upper limit'.118 What he meant by this, and what was understood by MITI 
officials was that although both sides would import essentials freely, both sides must 
retain their freedom of action to decide what were essentials and to exercise great 
caution as regards less essential goods.119 
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At this juncture, both sides were satisfied with the recently signed sterling payments 
agreement and the expected trade flow between the two sides. Problems arose, 
however, during Kiuchi's visit to the Treasury in London in October. Kiuchi, who was 
the head of the FECB, embarked on an extended visit to Europe to familiarize himself 
with the workings of European central banks.120 His trip was endorsed by SCAP, and 
it was mainly exploratory, therefore, he was not authorized to make decisions on behalf 
of the Japanese government. However, despite the exploratory nature of his visit, when 
Kiuchi and Kitahara Hideo of MITI visited the Treasury on 12 October, the former 
asked Treasury officials to clarify in writing the meaning of the 'free flow of trade' in 
Roberts' note to Ushiba. The Treasury officials were unaware of Ushiba's 
correspondence to Roberts of 27 September or of Roberts' note to Ushiba of 2 
October. As the Treasury officials could not supply answers to Kiuchi's questions, the 
issue had to be referred to Tokyo. The other issue which was raised during the 
discussion was Kiuchi's proposal to the Bank of England that Japan limit its sterling 
holdings after the trading season to £30 million instead of the £50 million previously 
agreed during the negotiations. Eventually in an exchange of letters between Kiuchi and 
David Serpell of the Treasury on 25 October, both sides agreed that the 'free flow of 
trade' meant a free flow of essential items for the Japanese side, and it was also agreed 
that the sterling area countries would remain 'free to interpret the relaxation in similar
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terms1.121 Furthermore, it was agreed that if Japan's sterling balances exceeded £30 
million at the end of Japan's principal purchasing season, representatives of the two 
sides would enter into consultation as envisaged in points one and two of the exchange 
of notes.122
The significance of the exchange of notes between Kiuchi and Serpell was first that 
Kiuchi had over-stepped his mark while he was in Britain, which was probably not 
well-received in Japan.123 More important, was the Anglo-Japanese misunderstanding 
which became apparent during Serpell and Kiuchi's talks. The first and foremost was 
the difference over Japan's currency status, and whether Japan had become a soft- 
currency country or not. The other points of difference which came to light during the 
talks were the issue of third country sterling transfers, and of Hong Kong. The 
Japanese side believed that third country transfers had been introduced to the sterling 
area-Japan trade as a measure to keep down Japan's sterling balances from reaching an 
unmanageable level. They had not imagined that Japan would have to accept sterling 
from a third country. It was only on arrival in the UK that Kiuchi and Kitahara found 
out that Japan would have to accept two-way sterling transfers into and out of Japan. 
They remained adamant that third country transfers were strongly pressed on them as a 
means of keeping down Japan's sterling balances and that 'there had been no question 
of necessary reciprocity'.124 This was another blow to Britain's efforts of the summer. 
Britain's idea behind introducing third country transfers in its trade with Japan was to 
introduce Japan gradually to the sterling area trade, with a view to changing Japan's 
status from the bilateral bloc to the transferable bloc in the future. The end motive was 
to expand the use of sterling in East Asia, and as China was largely cut off from trade 
with the west, Japan was considered the 'main point of attack'.125 Over Hong Kong, 
Kiuchi asked for all trade to be settled in Hong Kong dollars, in order to keep trade 
with Hong Kong separate within the payments agreement.126 Britain refused Kiuchi's 
request as it was contrary to what was agreed in Tokyo.
Back in Japan, the government convened an inter-ministerial meeting on 30 October in
order to clarify whether Japan had been guaranteed soft currency status during the
recent payments negotiations.127 The Japanese remained convinced that Britain had
gone back on its word after they had got the 'financial agreement safely in the bag',128
as India announced that it would be treating Japan as a soft currency country from
October.129 Despite agreement on the above point, no specific policy was hammered
out because the issue soon developed into an inter-ministerial confrontation between the
MITI and the MOF, in which the MITI refused to accept the interpretation given to the
agreement between Ushiba and Roberts that the relaxation of trade would be based on
essentials only, and advocated an expansion of trade with the sterling area; while the
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MOF on the other hand argued for a campaign of reducing Japan's trade with the 
sterling area.130
The MITTs support for the sterling payments agreement was probably based on their 
realization that Japan could not count on dollar earnings in the long run, and that as a 
consequence, it was essential for Japan to expand its trade with the non-dollar 
w orld.131 Conversely, one cannot totally preclude the idea that officials were 
supporting the idea of liberalized trade because they had persuaded the anti-sterling 
officials into supporting the agreement on the condition that Japan would be able to 
export non-essentials to the sterling area, and felt a sense of responsibility for the 
position they had taken earlier. This would explain why the MITI could not be 
persuaded to accept the exchange of letters between Serpell and Kiuchi.132
The MOF on the other hand, was against an expansion of trade with the sterling area 
because imports from the dollar area were cheaper than sterling imports. They were 
also reluctant to trade in sterling because they wished to continue to earn dollars from 
Indonesia and Thailand. Moreover, the MOF was hoping to see the reversion of Hong 
Kong to the open account basis and to re-write the dollar clause back into the sterling 
payments agreement.133
In early November, the Japanese government decided not to ratify the exchange of 
letters signed between Kiuchi and Serpell.134 Therefore, sterling area-Japan relations 
began hesitantly. Matters did not seem bright on the trade front either, as Japan was not 
purchasing the same amount of goods from the sterling area as sterling area countries 
did from Japan. At the end of August, Japan held £38 million sterling balance, but by 
the beginning of November that had risen to £50 million.135 Japan's rising sterling 
balance only confirmed Japan's fears that without a dollar convertibility clause, Japan 
would accumulate an unnecessary amount of sterling. Furthermore, Britain's problems 
at Suez and Abadan, the drain on Britain's dollar and sterling reserves and the growth 
of Britain's debtor position within the EPU (European Payments Union)136 all led to 
Japan's fears that Britain's multiple problems would result in another pound 
devaluation.137 Fearful of holding on to too much sterling, Yoshida instructed the 
implementation of the following six points on 1 December in order to increase Japan's 
trade with the sterling area.
1. Priority foreign exchange allocations to importers wanting to buy goods from
the sterling area.
2. Dollar imports to be limited to goods that cannot be obtained elsewhere.
3. Bank preference on loans to importers wanting to buy from the sterling area.
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4. Imports of raw cotton, wheat, phosphorus and iron ore from the sterling area 
to be encouraged. Big raw cotton imports from the dollar area to be 
discouraged.
5. No attempt should be made to limit sterling balances by withholding exports 
to the sterling area but all round trade should be expanded.
6. Complicated domestic banking procedures should be revised to simplify 
buying from the sterling area.138
The telegram from Tokyo which referred to the above indicated the unlikely possibility 
of all six points being implemented,139 but the significance of Yoshida's instruction 
was that it was a step toward a solution of the domestic dispute. While the MOF and 
MITI argued over whether to expand or contract trade with the sterling area, it did not 
change the fact that Japan was accumulating sterling. Although Yoshida's action might 
on the surface indicate his support for the sterling area and MITI's position in the 
domestic wrangle, his action was probably a result of practical politics; namely, to keep 
sterling reserves to a manageable level.
For the British, the controversy which arose as a result of the exchange of letters 
between Serpell and Kiuchi revealed a huge misunderstanding between Japan and 
Britain over the payments agreement. The British side was adamant that there had been 
'no bad faith'140 on their part, and refused to allow the Japanese side to withdraw the 
exchange of letters of 25 October or accept Japan as a soft currency country. One can 
see from the minutes of the sterling payments negotiations in Japan in the summer of 
1951 that British negotiators repeatedly stressed 'orderly' and 'steady' development 
after the new arrangements took effect.141 Therefore, the British were justified in their 
claim that there was no bad faith on their part, and that they were not attempting to 
mislead their Japanese counterparts deliberately. The British side, however, should 
accept some responsibility for the misunderstanding on two accounts. First, the 
ambiguity of the wording of the minutes of the negotiations, and second, the lack of 
communication between the UKLM in Tokyo and the Treasury, which led to the 
exchange of letters between Kiuchi and Serpell. One cannot blame Serpell of the 
Treasury for the fact that he was not aware of the letter from Ushiba to Roberts of 27 
September or the unofficial memorandum written by Roberts in reply to Ushiba's letter. 
The misunderstanding, however, points to the fact that there was a lack of 
communication between the UKLM in Tokyo, the Foreign Office and the Treasury. It 
is puzzling that the UKLM did not send back all the information concerning their 
interaction with Japanese officials, especially in the light of the fact that Kiuchi was 
going to London to talk to Treasury officials in charge of the sterling area-Japan trade.
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The effect of the misunderstanding, however, was not just limited to the financial 
sphere. The Yoshida Letter of December 1951 would soon indicate that differences in 
one aspect of the relations could lead to misunderstandings in another.
The Peace Treaty and the China Issue
Japan's road to independence entailed the signing of a treaty with its war-time 
belligerents. The treaty signed on 8 September 1951 was very different from the one 
that was envisaged at the end of the war due to the changed circumstances in East Asia. 
Before the outbreak of the Korean war, a rivalry existed between the State Department 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a peace treaty with Japan, but with the intensification 
of the war in Japan's neighbouring peninsula, the State Department's treaty was 
adopted. In its final form, Japan was asked to rearm, while the separate US-Japan 
Security Treaty enabled the United States to secure base rights in Japan. In return for 
Japan's industrial rearmament and the establishment of armed forces, however, the 
United States had to give guarantees to Australia and New Zealand against a possible 
attack from Japan. This led to the signing of the ANZUS pact between the United 
States, Australia and New Zealand on 1 September 1951. The other defence treaty 
signed in the same period was the US-Philippines mutual defence treaty. The former 
was a cause of great humiliation for Britain which was excluded from the pact.142
In the lead up to the Peace Treaty, the United States and Britain worked together very 
closely to reach an agreement over the text. Of particular interest to Britain was the 
inclusion of provisions which prohibited a repeat of Japan's pre-war trade practices, 
but the United States rejected these as inappropriate in a treaty.143 Therefore, various 
indirect safeguards were placed; such as a declaration attached to the treaty which 
specified Japan's intention to accede to the agreement for the prevention of false 
indications of origins of goods. This was to prevent Japan from copying British textile 
patterns.144 More importantly, there was Japan's renunciation of the 1919 Congo 
Basin Treaties (article 8b).
The Congo Basin Treaties were a series of treaties supporting the open door policy in 
the Congo basin area. They consisted of the Berlin General Act of 1885, the Brussels 
General Act of 1895, and the main Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye of 10 
September 1919. Although Japan was not a signatory to the first two acts, it had 
become a signatory of the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye due to its involvement 
on the allied side in the first world war.145 The reason why the Board of Trade insisted 
on Japan's renunciation of the treaty was to prevent Japan from equal commercial rights 
in the Congo Basin region, thereby, enabling Britain to protect its exports against 
Japanese competition.146 Textiles exporters were particularly concerned about Japanese
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competition in Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar, Tanganyika and Nyasaland, part of the 
Sudan and Northern Rhodesia, due to Japan's pre-war exports to the area.147 Tables 
2.1 to 2.6 clearly show that Japan out-exported Britain in all the above countries from 
1937 to 1939, except in Northern Rhodesia. The statistics, therefore, indicate the 
underlying reason for British fears.
In reality, however, Japan's renunciation of the Congo Basin Treaties did not safeguard 
British textiles industries. This was due to the complexity of the treaties, which made it 
possible for Japan to press for their rights under the Berlin Act, which stipulated 
freedom of trade and equality of treatment for the goods, ships, persons and companies 
of all nations.148 The exclusion of Japan, therefore, merely gave Britain the freedom to 
revise the St. Germain Convention without Japan's intervention. Even revising the 
treaties was to prove difficult, as any introduction of tariffs which were aimed at 
protection of British goods would have been opposed by other signatories, as the 
purpose of the treaties was to 'further the welfare of the inhabitants of the Congo 
territories, not of the parties to the Treaties'.149 Moreover, there was only a small 
chance that Britain could bring together the signatories of all three treaties to revise them 
in order to safeguard British interests against Japanese competition. Therefore, Japan's 
renunciation of the Congo Basin Treaties only served as a psychological rather than a 
real safeguard. British industries were aware of this as was evident in the meeting of 
the Japanese panel of the Overseas Trade policy Committee of the Federation of British 
Industries. The minutes of the meeting of 23 July, indicate that the consensus was that 
the only hope for individual United Kingdom industries was to 'endeavour to come to 
an understanding with their Japanese counterparts so that they might discover where 
Japanese exports were likely to conflict with those of United Kingdom manufacturers, 
and make their plans accordingly'.150
The issue which had the most far-reaching consequences for Japan, however, was the 
China issue. The problem arose as a result of the dilemma faced by Britain and the 
United States over which China to invite to the peace conference. The question was a 
difficult one for one very good reason: Britain and the United States had recognized 
different Chinas. Britain had decided soon after the establishment of the PRC that it 
would recognize the mainland, as it did not want to jeopardize its financial foothold 
there, while the United States had decided to continue to recognize the nationalist 
government, now located on Taiwan as the legitimate 'China' as a result of various 
factors such as the Angus Ward case, the PRC's decision to confiscate foreign 
properties and the outbreak of the Korean war.151 Inviting one China to the conference 
and not the other had serious implications. If the PRC was invited, the issue of Taiwan 
and its return to mainland China would have been raised; while an invitation to Taiwan
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would have caused protests from the Soviet Union and raised concerns about such an 
act strengthening the Sino-Soviet alliance.
Therefore, at a meeting on 19 June, Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary, 
and John Foster Dulles, the Consultant to the Secretary of State in charge o f the 
Japanese Peace Treaty, agreed to invite neither China to the peace conference and in a 
joint statement, they agreed that:
Japan's future attitude towards China must necessarily be for determination by 
Japan itself in the exercise of the sovereign and independent status contemplated 
by the treaty. The treaty has been framed so as not to prejudice that important 
principle.152
Despite the Dulles-Morrison agreement, and a verbal assurance from Yoshida that 
Japan would not sign a peace treaty with the PRC, Dulles felt the need for a more 
concrete assurance from Yoshida. This was due to two contradicting statements made 
by Yoshida in diet interpellations in October after the signing o f the treaty and prior to 
its ratification. In one statement, he rejected a treaty with China, and in another, he 
expressed his desire to sign a treaty with both the Soviet Union and the PRC.153 Dulles 
was particularly concerned with the difficulties he might have in seeing the Peace Treaty 
ratified in the Senate if Japan seemed equivocal about its relations with the two Chinas. 
The underlying reason was his fear that he would suffer the same fate that befell 
Woodrow Wilson at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.
Before getting a written assurance from Yoshida, however, Dulles decided to consult 
the British government about his plans. Dulles hoped that the Conservative government 
which came into office on 26 October, would release the United States from its 
obligation under the Dulles-Morrison agreement, and enable Japan to make at least a 
limited peace treaty with the Nationalist government.154 Livingston Merchant, the 
Assistant Under Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs, who was then on holiday but familiar 
with the China issue, was instructed to go to London and discuss the problem with the 
Foreign Office. During the discussions on 13 and 14 November, Robert H Scott, the 
Under-Secretary o f the Far Eastern Department gave three reasons why Britain could 
not endorse the American request. First, it would 'expose His Majesty's Government 
to the charge of conniving to a breach o f a fundamental agreement in regard to 
China'155 on which the Peace Treaty had been based. Second, he thought that in the 
long term it was unwise to influence Japan's future policy towards China, and wanted 
to avoid a situation where it 'would enable Japan to claim at a future date that her 
attitude to China had been determined for her by irresistible foreign pressure, while she 
remained an occupied country.'156 Scott thought it was crucial that the allies should not
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be placed in a situation where they could be blamed for Japan's failed China policy. 
Finally, he believed the United States should not be influencing Japan's policy for a 
short-term objective such as ratification of the treaty in the Senate because it might be 
'laying up considerable trouble for the future'.157
On 14 November two meetings were held in order to write a draft agreement of the joint 
Anglo-American approach to Sino-Japanese relations. The agreement was then passed 
on to Anthony Eden, the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, and Sir Esler Dening, 
the new head of UKLM in Tokyo. The reaction of Dening was adverse, but for Eden 
the memorandum came as a 'bomb-shell'158 as he was unaware that Scott and 
Merchant had 'gone so far and so fast'.159 What Eden objected to was point four of the 
agreement below:
If in view of the importance to Japan of regularising her relations with the 
authorities in Formosa, the Japanese Government wish, before the Peace Treaty 
comes into force, to engage in preliminary discussions with the Chinese 
Nationalist Government for this purpose, the US Government and His 
Majesty's Government in the UK would have no objection to such action on the 
part of the Government of Japan providing that any Treaty or Agreement arising 
from such preliminary discussions were not concluded until after the 
Multilateral Peace Treaty had come into force.160
Eden, therefore, supported Morrison's position and refused to unbind America from its 
commitment. Due to the failure of the talks in London, Eden raised the issue with 
Acheson in Paris, where they were both attending the sixth regular session of the UN 
General Assembly.161 Neither Acheson nor Eden was able to settle the issue in Paris, 
therefore the final decision on the Japan-Taiwan issue was to be settled by Dulles and 
Dening during Dulles' forthcoming visit to Tokyo162 with Senators John Sparkman 
(Democrat-Alabama) and H. Alexander Smith (Republican-New Jersey) of the Far 
Eastern Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.163
By the end of November, it was clear that the United States needed more than a verbal 
reassurance from Japan that it would open relations with the Nationalists in Taiwan. In 
fact, what the Americans wanted was the start of peace negotiations between Japan and 
the Nationalists so that Sparkman and Smith, the two Senators who had been appointed 
to defend the treaty, would be able to pass it through the Senate. The British, were, 
however, opposed to any de jure recognition of the Nationalists by Japan because of 
the various implications it would have on future relations between mainland China and 
Japan, and in the long run, possible strains between the western allies and Japan. 
Nothing conclusive was decided in London and Paris; therefore, it was up to Dulles 
and Dening to come to a decision in Tokyo. By this time, however, there was a
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growing belief amongst American officials that Dening was working behind the scenes 
to prevent Japan from recognizing the Nationalists. In a memorandum to Dulles on the 
Anglo-American discussions held in London and Paris, Merchant wrote his 
observations of the British position. With regard to Dening in Tokyo, he wrote:
I believe Dening is the real fly in the ointment and that he has been actively 
attempting to influence the Japanese, not to a postponement of a choice on their 
part of which China, but actually to an ultimate choice of the Peiping (Beijing) 
government.164
This view was supported by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 
Dean Rusk, who together with Sebald, met Yoshida on 27 November.165 The US 
officials quickly tied Dening's alleged actions with the difficulties they encountered in 
drafting an Anglo-American peace treaty with Japan.166 They perceived that the 
Foreign Office was against Japan's recognition of Nationalist China lest it led to a 
renewal of Japanese competition in Southeast Asia and other areas of British 
interest.167 Therefore, Britain was perceived to be encouraging Japan towards the 
recognition of mainland China in order to protect British interests in Southeast Asia. In 
his memorandum to Acheson, Sebald wrote:
. . .  It is my impression, however, that he (Dening) strongly shares (the) belief 
(that) increased Japanese trade with South East Asia must necessarily be at 
British expense, from which he may deduce that any diversion of Japanese 
economic pressure toward continental China would be to UK's advantage, even 
though to detriment US political objectives.168
The increased suspicion towards Dening made the probability of a successful meeting 
between Dulles and Dening difficult. It can be deduced from the memoranda and 
telegrams being exchanged between the key US officials on this matter that they 
thought Dening was not being entirely straightforward with them. Conversely, British 
officials became concerned that the United States was intent on forcing a policy upon 
Japan based on short-term domestic problems.
On their first meeting in Tokyo on 13 December, Dulles handed Dening a memorandum 
which reiterated the American position.169 Dening objected to the memorandum and 
explained the view which Eden had expressed on previous occasions. After the meeting 
Dening observed in a telegram that:
It looks as if the Americans are going to go ahead with this whether we like it or 
not. The Japanese certainly will not like it but they may well give in under 
pressure.170
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In the same telegram he thought of three possible courses of action for the British. First 
was to 'refuse even to discuss Dulles' proposal which would inevitably lead to a strain 
in Anglo-American relations.171 The second course was to examine the US proposal 
and 'to devise a formula which would enable Japan to make peace with Chiang Kai- 
shek (Jiang Jieshi) without irrevocably prejudicing her future relations with China'.172 
The third was to persuade America to drop the whole idea. At the end of the telegram, 
Dening asked the Foreign Office for instructions concerning the issue.
The Foreign Office, perceiving that the matter would be more successfully handled in 
Washington, sent a telegram to Sir Oliver Franks asking him to try to 'persuade Mr. 
Acheson not to press the Japanese to take any action ... before the Peace Treaty comes 
into force'.173 In the meanwhile, the Foreign Office instructed Dening not to continue 
the talks until Franks had had an opportunity to meet Acheson to convey British 
concerns over Dulles' action in Japan.174 Acheson and Franks met on 18 December, 
and on concluding the meeting, Acheson sent Dulles a telegram informing him of the 
details of the meeting. As Franks had stressed that Britain was opposed to business 
arrangements between Taiwan and Japan transforming into a peace treaty under 
pressure from the United States, Acheson asked Dulles to begin negotiations on an 
agreement but which 'did not in preamble appear as 'Treaty of Peace'.175 Moreover, to 
keep Tokyo-Taiwan negotiations in progress until the Treaty was ratified.176
Unfortunately, by the time the telegram was written177 and sent to Tokyo, Dulles had 
departed for Honolulu,178 secure in the knowledge that Yoshida would write a letter 
confirming his desire to sign a peace treaty with Nationalist China.179 What had led 
Dulles to ask Yoshida to write the letter was probably as follows.
Dulles, who flew to Korea on 13 December, returned hoping to continue discussing the 
Japan-Taiwan problem with Dening in order to reach a compromise solution between 
the two countries before his departure on 20 December. However, at an Anglo- 
American party on the evening of 17 December, Dening told Dulles that he was under 
instruction not to discuss the problem with him, and that the issue was.being raised 
instead in Washington.180 Dulles must have felt frustrated by Dening's message. He 
was at the time already convinced that Dening had been 'advising the Japanese 
government against any form of recognition of the Chinese Nationalists, and doing so 
without any notification to us'.181 Furthermore, Dening's message contradicted the 
agreement between Eden and Acheson of November that the issue would be discussed 
between Dulles and Dening in Tokyo. Dulles probably concluded that Dening and the 
British in London were being unreasonable as the instructions given to Dening made it
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'impossible to take advantage of my (Dulles) presence in Tokyo to arrive at a joint 
position with the Japanese government'.182
These 'assumptions', together with Smith and Sparkman's view that a letter from 
Yoshida was necessary to get the treaty ratified, led Dulles to decide that a letter needed 
to be drafted by him, and signed by Yoshida.183 At a meeting between Dulles, Sebald, 
Yoshida and Iguchi on 18 December, Yoshida agreed to write a letter, and it was 
decided that the letter would be given to Sebald at a later date.184 It was also agreed that 
the letter would not be published until after it was made known to Churchill and Eden 
during their visit to Washington in early January.185
Dulles left Dening with the impression that nothing had been decided during his stay in 
Tokyo.186 Unbeknown to Dening, however, Yoshida handed a copy of the letter to 
Sebald on 26 December, which was later despatched by diplomatic pouch, to arrive in 
Dulles' hand on 7 January.187 The question that one must ask is why were Churchill 
and Eden not informed about the letter when it was in Dulles' hands by 7 January?
The issue of Japan and Taiwan was discussed between the heads of state and the 
Foreign Secretaries on 5 January during a dinner meeting aboard the S. S. 
Williamsburg. It was agreed at the meeting that the differences should be ironed out 
between Acheson and Eden.188 The letter was shown to Franks on 9 January at the 
preparatory meeting between Franks, Dulles and Allison, prior to the meeting between 
Acheson and Eden on 10 January.189 A copy of the letter, however, was not given to 
Franks to show to Eden, and the letter was only referred to indirectly on 10 January, 
when Dulles informed the British side that 'he had now received a direct 
communication from Mr. Yoshida, stating the intentions of the Japanese government, 
and that it would probably be necessary to make this known during the course of the 
Senate's consideration of the peace treaty with Japan'.190
It was apparent from the meeting that although Eden understood and sympathized with 
the American situation, he could not compromise his position by reversing his stance. 
In the course of the meeting, Eden reiterated the view that nothing should be done to 
give Japan the opportunity in the future to say that it had been forced to recognize 
Nationalist China against their own free will, and after further discussion, it was agreed 
that the British side would instruct Dening, if approached by Yoshida, to say that:
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the exchange between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden was full and cordial and there 
was complete mutual understanding. Though in this respect the result was an 
agreement to disagree this in no way affected the existing broad area of 
agreement between the two governments on all other matters relating to 
Japan.191
It now appears that two assumptions were made by the American side during the course 
of the two meetings. First, the US officials assumed that Franks had informed Eden 
about the existence of the note; and second, that Eden had acquiesced to the note and 
was stating the British case on 10 January with the note in mind. Therefore, Acheson 
sent a telegram to Sebald on the following day, instructing him to tell Yoshida to release 
the letter.192 Yoshida agreed to publish the letter after he had received a telegram from 
Dulles stating that the letter had been shown to Eden in Washington and that 'there had 
been a general Anglo-American understanding on the China problem'.193
When the Yoshida Letter was released simultaneously by the Americans and the 
Japanese on 16 January, it came as a great surprise to the British. It was especially 
embarrassing for Eden, as the letter was published on the day he returned to England. 
The publication led to speculations that there was a strain in Anglo-American relations 
over the China issue, but as emphasized by Eden and Acheson in their memoirs, the 
incident did not affect the relations between the two ministers.194
When Dulles heard of Britain's adverse reaction to the Yoshida Letter, he asked 
Acheson to say at the next press conference that, '...whatever was done in this matter 
was done not by me (Dulles) personally but by the United States government and that, 
in your (Acheson) opinion, there is no basis whatever for any imputation of bad faith or 
breach of agreement by the United States government or any of its officials'.195
Later, Dulles justified his action in a memorandum. He wrote that, 'the Dulles- 
Morrison Agreement of June 1951 never undertook that Japan would have a vacuum 
within which to decide its China policy. That would have been an unfulfillable 
undertaking. It did promise that Japan would have the right to reach its own decision as 
to what was in its best national interest, taking into account all the surrounding 
circumstances'.196
The issue that has seldom been researched in regard to the Yoshida Letter is Dening's 
role in the whole incident. Were the allegations against him true that he was working 
behind the Americans to persuade Japan from recognizing the Nationalists? 
Furthermore, was he being instructed by the British government to act in such a manner
78
because their interests in Southeast Asia were being threatened by Japanese 
competition?
There are two sources for American suspicions of Dening's actions in Japan. First, 
Sebald became suspicious with Dening's activities in October.197 Sebald went as far as 
to ask Yoshida, whether there had been any pressure from the British. Although 
Yoshida negated this idea, Sebald seemed to persist with it, based on the assumption 
that Britain was against Japan recognizing the Nationalists for their own ends. Second, 
Dulles, who was already of the view that Britain was acting out of fear of Japanese 
competition,198 came to the conclusion that Dening was working behind America's 
back after reading a message written by Eden to Acheson on the British stance towards 
the Japan-Taiwan issue. He seems to have taken the following sentence as evidence 
against Dening:
It would be quite another thing for Jap(an) to embark on any form of 
recognition of the Chi(nese) Nationalists, and if need arose I sh(ou)ld feel 
bound to endorse the advice already given the Jap(anese) Gov(emmen)t by Sir 
E. Dening against this action.199
Dening tried to clear his name a year after the incident on hearing of Dulles' 
appointment as the Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration. In order to 
prevent an Anglo-American strain over Japan, he asked Scott to look over the 
documents to clarify his innocence. In a note to Christopher Steel, Scott stressed that 
Dening did not advise Yoshida against recognizing the Nationalist government, and 
explained the misunderstanding in the following words:
The wording of the secretary of state's message was, however, taken by Mr. 
Dulles and the US government to mean that Sir. E. Dening, against Mr. 
Morrison's understanding with the Americans and without informing them, had 
advised Mr. Yoshida not to recognise Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi).200
Therefore, Dening maintained his position that he had not worked behind the American 
official's backs, and that he was following the Dulles-Morrison agreement reached in 
June 1951.
The question then is what were the motivations behind Britain's decision to remain 
committed to the Dulles-Morrison agreement. It has often been argued by historians 
such as Schonberger, Hosoya and Dower that Britain took a literal stance on the Dulles- 
Morrison agreement because Japan's recognition of Taiwan would have closed off 
Japan's future trade relations with mainland China thereby increasing the probability of 
Anglo-Japanese trade competition in Southeast Asia.201 It should, however, be
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emphasized that this was only one of the reasons why British officials remained 
committed to the Dulles-Morrison agreement. The other two reasons were Britain's 
opposition to a Japan-Taiwan agreement motivated solely by American concerns for the 
passage of the peace treaty through the Senate. Furthermore, Britain was perturbed by 
any American action which Japan could later denounce as having being enforced upon 
them before their independence. The British concern was well-justified, for the day 
after the publication of the Yoshida Letter a critical editorial was published in the Asahi 
Shimbun, claiming the issue of the two Chinas was forced upon the Japanese without 
any consideration for public sentiment.202 Later at a House of Councillors plenary 
session, there were attacks on Yoshida about why it had been necessary for him to keep 
the letter a secret.203 By May 1952, there were already claims that the Yoshida Letter 
was not binding because it was only a representation of Yoshida's personal opinion.204
Moreover, Dening, whose actions came under great American scrutiny was ironically 
encouraging greater economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. Dening, 
who was appointed to become the head of the UKLM in August and subsequently 
became the first Ambassador to Japan, was formerly the Assistant Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office and before that he had been the political adviser to the Supreme 
Allied Commander for Southeast Asia. As such he had been the leading architect of 
British regional policies in Southeast Asia and the main author of the British Cabinet 
paper that led to the Colombo Conference.205 Dening believed that British prestige in 
the region could be re-established through strong regional cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, and by the end of the year, he had arrived at the view that Japan could play an 
important role in this region, by providing goods that were in demand by Southeast 
Asian residents. He also realized that Japan's economic viability would lead to the 
strengthening of the strategic defensive parameter in Asia and therefore be of benefit to 
Southeast Asian defence as well.206 He was influenced towards this view by the 
Commissioner-General of the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia, Malcolm 
MacDonald, who had his residence in Singapore.207 MacDonald presided over the 
annual Bukit Serene Conference in Singapore, where British High Commissioners and 
Governors of British colonies in Southeast Asia gathered to discuss regional issues. At 
the meeting in November 1951, MacDonald encouraged Japan's return to Southeast 
Asia as he thought it could prove to be the most important factor in the stability of 
Southeast Asia.208 MacDonald and Dening's positions were still considered marginal at 
this time,209 but they eventually became mainstream views within the Colonial Office 
and the Foreign Office. Therefore, if Britain originally decided to stand by the Dulles- 
Morrison agreement of June 1951 to protect its interests in Southeast Asia, this reason 
became void by the end of the year, as Britain became more concerned with Japan's
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right to make its decision without intereference from the United States or the United 
Kingdom.
This then leads to the question of why so many researchers have concluded in the past 
that Britain's underlying motives were based largely on economic fears. The main 
reason for the misinterpretation has been the acceptance of the American perception 
over the issue. Moreover, there has been an element of misunderstanding concerning 
Yoshida's anxiety over the whole debacle. Yoshida's concern over the British position 
has often been interpreted as due to his personal attachment to Britain, but in fact 
Yoshida's anxiety was directly related to Japan's relations with the sterling area. As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, at the end of 1951, Japan and Britain were at odds over 
their respective interpretation of the recently signed payments agreement. There was a 
strong feeling among Japanese officials that Britain had not kept its promise to 
recognize Japan as a soft currency country. Moreover, Japan was starting to accumulate 
an excessive amount of sterling which it was unable to convert into dollars. Japan 
therefore thought that, Britain, as the banker for the sterling area, was capable of 
restricting and channelling Japan's trade with sterling and transferable account areas.210 
In reality, however, Britain only had the power to restrict Japan's trade on balance of 
payments grounds, but this was not entirely clear to the Japanese side, as evident in the 
confusion during and after the sterling payments negotiations. Yoshida was therefore 
worried that if Japan tied its policy with the United States against Britain, the latter 
might try to manipulate sterling trade to Japan's disadvantage.211 Conversely, Yoshida 
realized that tying Japan's policy to that of Britain would have caused friction with the 
United States. Therefore, Yoshida hoped for a united Anglo-American policy towards 
China. In short, the Anglo-American debacle over the China issue vis-a-vis Japan 
boiled down to perceptions. The British perceived American policy as short-sighted and 
based entirely on passing the treaty through the Senate. The Americans perceived 
Britain as being motivated by protectionism. Conversely, the Japanese saw pitfalls in 
leaning towards either Britain or the United States, thus, it sought to accommodate both 
which led to suspicions that Yoshida was playing one off the other.
Until now the American perception of events has taken precedence over that of British 
and Japanese perspectives, but an understanding of all sides elucidates a far more 
complex picture. The two points that stand out are Dening's growing belief in the 
importance of greater trade links between Japan and Southeast Asia, and Yoshida's 
concern over Japan's relations with the sterling area. Contrary to current 
understanding, they highlight the fact that Anglo-Japanese economic relations were not 
entirely governed by mutual fears of competition, and that they saw benefit in 
establishing stronger trade links.
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Conclusion
1951 saw Japan become an observer to the GATT, and a signatory of the IWA and 
ILO. Although on the surface, Japan's entry to the IWA seemed to indicate Britain's 
acceptance of Japan, the entry was made possible by America's commitment to provide 
Japan's wheat quota. Moreover, Japan's observer status to the GATT, although seen as 
slight progress, was only procedural. The two cases indicate an overall British 
reluctance towards Japan's re-entry to the western comity of nations on an equal 
footing. The underlying fear was economic. This was evident in Britain's attempts to 
include a provision in the peace treaty which would prevent Japan from repeating its 
pre-war trade practices. Britain was unsuccessful in its attempt, therefore, it had to rely 
on Japan's adherence to the rules of the ILO, and other international agreements. On the 
surface, Britain seemed to have gained from Japan's exclusion from the Congo Basin 
treaties, but the complexity of the treaties prevented Britain from taking discriminatory 
action against Japan. Therefore, Britain's embattled industries were left to march 
forward on their own.
Although Britain's policy towards Japan seemed on the defensive, this was not entirely 
true. A clear example was the sterling payments agreement with Japan. Britain's policy 
objectives behind the sterling payments agreement indicate that Japan could play an 
important role for Britain. Although most literature on Japan's economic recovery has 
argued that Japan's trade expansion into Southeast Asia was at Britain's expense, the 
study compiled by the inter-ministerial group elucidates the government's attempt to use 
Japan's industrial potential to expand sterling usage in East Asia. Furthermore, there 
was growing British acceptance of Japan's presence in Asia as indicated by Dening and 
MacDonald's conviction that Japan could play a useful role in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, by 1951, the government was resigned to the fact that Southeast Asian rice 
supplies would have to be shared with Japan.212
Unfortunately for the sterling policymakers, Japan misunderstood Britain's intentions 
and feared possible British discrimination against Japan in the sterling bloc. Japan's 
view derived from the assumption that as the banker to the sterling area, Britain had 
unlimited control over sterling trade. The debacle in the aftermath of the negotiations 
probably heightened this view, as Britain refused to recognize Japan as a soft currency 
country. Britain's link with the sterling area, was therefore an indicator of its 
importance to Japan in the post-war period. For this reason, Yoshida was wary of 
upsetting Britain over other issues in case it led to further repercussions on sterling 
area-Japan trade.213
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Cotton Imports into the Congo Basin
Table 2.1
Cotton Piece imports into Sudan. 1937-1939
______________________________________ Quarterly Averages -Thousand Quintals
1937 1938 1939
Total 21.89 23.24 20.50
UK .48 .48 .48
Japan 20.37 21.97 19.47
*Note: on the conversion rate between one quintal to one yard see the footnote 9 of 
Kaoru Sugihara, 'Sengo Nihon Mengyo wo meguru Kokusai Kankyo: Asia kan Kyoso 
Fukkatsu no Kozo' in Nenpd Kindai Nihon Kenkyu 19 (1997), p. 107.
Table 2.2
Cotton Piece imports into Kenva and Uganda. 1937-1939
Quarterly Averages-Million Square Yards
1937 1938 1939
Total 18.23 15.28 15.54
UK .82 .87 .78
Japan 16.69 13.72 14.21
Table 2.3
Cotton Piece Imports into Tanganyika. 1937-1939
Quarterly Averages- Million Square Yards
1937 1938 1939
Total 13.59 10.45 12.68
UK .72 .60 .40
Japan 11.21 8.35 11.14
. Table 2.4
Cotton Piece Imports into Zanzibar. 1937-1939
Quarterly Averages-Million Square Yards
1937 1938 1939
Total 1.75 1.68 1.28
UK .21 .14 .08
Japan .99 .92 .90
Table 2.5
Cotton Piece Imports into Nvasaland. 1937-1939
Quarterly Averages- Million Square Yards
1937 1938 1939
Total 3.05 3.52 3.41
UK .20 .16 .11
Japan 2.78 3.29 3.27
Table 2.6
Cotton Piece Imports into Northern Rhodesia. 1937-1939
Quarterly Averages-Million Yards
1937 1938 1939
Total 2.11 2.42 2.47
UK 1.46 1.64 1.78
Japan .33 .38 .35
Source: Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical Review no. 28 (March 1952), pp. 
24,26&27 respectively.
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Chapter Three: Britain's Policy Adrift, 1952
Introduction
On 28 April, with the US Senate's ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan 
once again became a sovereign country. In the first year of its independence, Japan was 
able to make some advances towards a return to the international comity of nations, but 
it also experienced setbacks. On 14 August 1952 for example, Japan became a member 
of the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). On the same 
day, it was accepted into the IMF, and it was allocated a $250 million quota;1 therefore, 
Japan became a signatory of two out of the three pillars of the Bretton Woods system. 
It was to have more difficulties, however, entering the GATT.
The year also established the limits to Japan's trade relations with China, through the 
American and Japanese release of the Yoshida Letter on 16 January 1952. Three 
months later, a bilateral pact was signed between the ROC and Japan.2 The signing of 
the pact precluded Japan from recognizing the People's Republic of China, but a purely 
symbolic private trade agreement was signed by China and Japan in June. Trade was to 
amount to 30 million pounds each way, and it was to be a barter arrangement with 
settlements to be made in pound sterling.3 This saw the beginning of Japan's 'seikei 
bunri' policy towards China, or the separation of politics and economics in its relations 
with China. However, despite Japan's attempts to increase gradually its trade with the 
Chinese mainland the United States made certain that such trade would be severely 
restricted.
The United States was not concerned about exports of strategic goods flowing from 
Japan to mainland China while the SCAP was in control of Japan's trade.4 However, 
with the closure of SCAP's ESS and the transfer of all trade matters, including trade 
controls, to the Japanese Government in March, the United States and the rest of the 
COCOM (Coordinating Committee) members became concerned with Japan's post­
occupation export control policy.5 The issue was resolved with the establishment of 
CHINCOM (China Committee) and Japan's membership in this new committee, but 
this resulted in the continuation of strict controls on Japan's mainland China trade 
through a secret US-Japan bilateral agreement on 5 September. Through this 
agreement, Japan was forced to embargo 280 more goods against China than other 
CHINCOM members.6 Therefore, by the end of 1952, Japan's future trade relationship 
with the PRC was predetermined by the United States. First with the pressure to 
recognize the ROC, and second, with the US-Japan bilateral agreement to maintain 
strict export controls against China.
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With Japan's trade parameters set by the United States, it became all the more important 
for Japan to find an alternative trade outlet. Japan could rely on the dollar area as long 
as the Korean war procurements sustained Japan's purchases from that area. With the 
impending end to the Korean war, Japan began to realize, however, the importance of 
non-dollar trade, in particular, its trade relations with the sterling area. Japan was less 
than satisfied with its sterling area trade, however, as it began to accumulate large 
sterling reserves almost immediately after the signing of the sterling payments 
agreement in August 1951. Therefore, 1952 saw attempts by both the United Kingdom 
and Japan to correct the imbalance.
Although there were problems in sterling area-Japan relations, there was progress in 
terms of Japan's relations with Southeast Asia. In January 1952, Hong Kong agreed to 
the opening of a Japanese Overseas Agency, and two months later, Singapore also 
acquiesced to Japan's application.7 By April, Singapore had agreed to extend visas to 
Japanese business and professional personnel for entry of up to one year. There was, 
however, wariness towards the return of Japanese business people into Malaya, as 
during the inter-war period Japanese mine employees had acted as "fifth columnists' to 
prepare for Japan's invasion.8 Therefore, there was support for a gradual return of 
Japanese business people 'conditional upon convincing evidence that the leopard has in 
fact changed its spots and that Malaya's hospitality is not in danger of being abused 
again'.9 Despite a mixed reaction in Britain's Southeast Asian colonies, relations 
improved with Malcolm MacDonald's visit to Japan in July.
This chapter focuses on two aspects of Britain's trade policy: its attitude towards the 
sterling payments agreement and Japan's entry into the GATT.
Sterling Area-Japan Payments Relations in 1952
At the end of August 1951, Japan's sterling holdings amounted to £38 million, but by 
the end of January they had increased to £82 million and were accumulating at a rate of 
£9 million a month (see table 3.1).10 There were four reasons for the increase in 
Japan's sterling holdings. First, Japan was not making its annual seasonal purchases 
from the sterling area because it had enough dollar reserves from the Korean war to 
purchase its essentials from the dollar area, and therefore, Japan's sterling reserves, 
which usually decreased between October and March, remained high. The 
unprecedented imbalance in the trade relations was exacerbated by the fact that many of 
Japan's usual purchases were unobtainable, in particular because of a crop failure in 
Australia, which prevented Japan from purchasing Australian wheat.11 Moreover, a 
shortage of yen due to Japan's internal monetary policy prevented Japanese merchants
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from selling stocks of material they had bought the year before, which meant a slump in 
purchases as a whole.12
Second, since the inclusion of Hong Kong in the sterling payments agreement with 
Japan there had been an adverse trade balance between Hong Kong and Japan. Hong 
Kong's trade imbalance which only amounted to £1.2 million between July and August 
of 1951 rose to £10.7 million between September and December of 1951.13 The 
primary cause for the imbalance was the simple reason that Hong Kong failed to sell 
goods to Japan, while it continued to buy from Japan (see table 3.2). There was 
speculation that this was due to the ban on Chinese exports to Hong Kong, which led 
to a decline in Japanese purchases.
Third, and related to the above, was the fact that despite Japan's poor purchasing 
performance, the sterling area had been increasing its overall purchases from Japan. 
Finally, part of the reason why Japan was unable to decrease its sterling reserves lay in 
Japan's opposition to the implementation of administrative transferability, because it 
was reluctant to set up a two-way sterling transfer into and out of Japan. Japanese 
officials would have been much happier implementing a one-way system that facilitated 
a decrease in Japan's sterling reserves.
Japan's rising sterling balance was so serious that it was discussed at the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting which began on 15 January in London. 
Japan was part of a wider problem facing the sterling area in early 1952. The problem 
being that the sterling area was facing an overall deficit with the rest of the world at an 
annual rate of £1,600 million. As a result, the sterling area's gold and dollar reserves 
were quickly receding to the 1949 level when sterling had devalued against the dollar. 
Table 3.3 illustrates the sharp drop in sterling area's gold and dollar reserves between 
June and December 1951. The reserves amounted to £1,381 million in June, but 
decreased to £834 million by 31 December 1951, which was a decline of close to 40 
percent. Therefore, in order to solve this serious situation, Britain's aim at the 
conference was to convince the members that it was to their advantage to remain in the 
sterling area and that the member-states should work together to 'restore the strength of 
sterling and ultimately to achieve convertibility'.14 The short-term remedy was for all 
the sterling area countries to implement overall import restrictions from the non-sterling 
area, and work towards combatting internal inflation.15
In line with the overall British policy, the British delegation distributed a memorandum 
at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' meeting, advancing the reasons why the 
sterling area should curb purchases from Japan. The memorandum outlined four
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possible developments that could arise if Japan's sterling balances continued to rise. 
The first possibility was that Japan might make vigorous efforts to find sterling 
supplies which would assist the sterling area's objective of expanding sterling usage in 
East Asia. The second was that Japan might ask the sterling area to restrict its purchases 
from Japan voluntarily. The third was the possibility of Japan imposing export 
restrictions on the sterling area. The fourth and the worst possible scenario was the 
termination of the sterling payments agreement while Japan still held huge sterling 
reserves.16 Britain's fear stemmed from not knowing how Japan would use its 
unwieldy supply of sterling reserves. The political and economic consequence could be 
that it might lead to a reduction in global confidence in sterling, and a possibility that 
Japan might use informal channels to convert sterling into dollars. In order to prevent 
this worst-case scenario from becoming a reality, the UK delegation urged the 
Commonwealth governments to prevent Japan from moving from the non-dollar to the 
dollar world, and to prepare to implement import restrictions, if necessary, following 
the conclusion of a payments review between Britain and Japan in March. Moreover, 
the member countries were encouraged to discuss their sterling area availabilities with 
Japan in order to increase their exports17 as part of the overall effort of the 
Commonwealth countries to remedy the immediate balance of payments crisis.18
In short, the sterling area faced a balance of payments crisis. Therefore, it was 
imperative that the sterling area as a whole curb imports in order to prevent another 
devaluation of the pound against the dollar. Japan was a difficult case, as Japan began 
accumulating sterling reserves almost immediately after the signing of the payments 
agreement. With the dangerous decline in dollar reserves, and rumours of an imminent 
devaluation of the pound against the dollar, it was not known what action Japan would 
take. Therefore, Britain hoped to see an immediate decrease in Japan's sterling 
reserves, either through sterling's expanded exports to Japan or through sterling area's 
import restrictions. On 3 March, however, Japan announced its decision to take 
unilateral action to restrict its exports of steel and textiles products to the sterling area.19 
These products made up sixty to seventy percent of all Japanese exports to the sterling 
area, but the MOF-initiated plan was presented and approved unanimously by the 
Cabinet as a measure to decrease Japan's sterling reserves.20 Therefore, Japan took the 
first step towards contracting its sterling reserves.
In the meantime, the British side was preparing for the March payments review in 
Tokyo. This was the first meeting of its kind and it was set up to assess the agreement 
after six months of operation as agreed. Hugh Thomas, the Treasury representative in 
Tokyo, was instructed to prevent the payments review from becoming a meeting to 
revise the payments agreement. If the Japanese side remained firm on this point, the
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UKLM was instructed to adopt the line that the negotiations in the previous year and the 
Exchange of Letters had clearly envisaged consultation to make the arrangement work. 
Furthermore, they were to press the fact that six months was not enough time to give 
the sterling payments agreement a fair chance to prove itself.21 Moreover, the UKLM 
was instructed to keep the review factual with regard to the initial expectations and the 
actual results, and discuss the broad reasons for the divergences from forecasts.22
The sterling payments review consisted of three meetings over the period spanning 18 - 
25 March 1952. Britain was represented by Thomas, and SCAP was represented by 
WW Diehl of the Economic and Scientific Section. The Japanese Government 
representatives consisted of officials from the MITI, the FECB, the MOF and the 
MOFA.23 The aim of the meeting was to find out the causes of Japanese dissatisfaction 
with the arrangement so that Thomas could report them back to Whitehall.
The Japanese representatives maintained that there were four factors behind their poor 
performance. First, the lack of availability of required goods in the sterling area. 
Second, the higher prices for goods from the sterling area in comparison to the dollar 
area. This meant that Japan's merchants naturally bought from the dollar area if the 
goods were available there; a situation which was further exacerbated by the fact that 
Japan could only buy sterling area goods at the official rate. Third, the Japanese side 
complained that Japanese merchants were having difficulties buying goods from the 
sterling area because Japanese merchants did not enjoy an equal footing in their 
business activities as the principal sterling commodities were bought up under the 
Commonwealth preferential system, thus impeding Japan from increasing its imports 
from the sterling area. Finally, the Japanese side believed that part of the problem was 
the slow recovery of Japan's economic activities in the sterling area, and the fact that 
Japan was not guaranteed MFN rights 24
Conversely, the UK side maintained that the outcome of the adverse trade imbalance 
was mainly a result of the 'failure by the Japanese authorities to plan their importing 
policy properly with a view to effecting the maximum switch from dollar to sterling 
purchase'.25 Moreover, Thomas pointed out that it was not only Japan which was 
facing discrepancies in dollar and sterling price differences, but it was a problem faced 
by the rest of the world due to the general scarcity in dollars. As for the point that Japan 
was not being given an equal footing in trade, Thomas declined to discuss 
Commonwealth preferential treatment, but did explain that it would take time to open up 
relations with the rest of the sterling area because many of the areas with which Japan 
wished to trade did not have Japanese diplomatic and consular establishments. 
Moreover, Thomas believed that it would take time for some regions to overcome
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prejudices, especially in countries which had been overrun by the Japanese military. 
Thomas also argued that as long as Japan was being given MFN treatment for goods, 
the MFN issue was not a major hurdle.26
Other issues discussed included Japan's disappointment at not being able to reduce its 
sterling holdings through the administrative transferability, and Japan's apprehension 
that the inclusion of Hong Kong into the sterling payments agreement had had a 
negative effect on its trade with Indonesia and Thailand; namely, that Indonesia and 
Thailand were purchasing Japanese goods from Hong Kong and Singapore instead of 
buying them direct from Japan. Thomas maintained the view that Japan could not hope 
to conduct a 'one-way traffic outwards'27 on its administrative transferability and 
insisted that if Japan wanted a successful implementation, it would have to accept 
sterling from third countries as well as use its sterling with third countries.28 Thomas 
did not consider Japan's complaints concerning the Hong Kong issue fair, as on the 
one hand, Japan complained that Hong Kong's inclusion in the payments agreement led 
to a decline in Japan's trade with its open account trading partners in the region, while 
on the other, it refused to use Hong Kong's entrepot status to its advantage by buying 
open account goods via Hong Kong.
As a measure to remedy the situation, Japan agreed to increase its purchases, but in 
return it asked Britain to help make goods available to Japan.29 Despite Britain's 
assurance that it would continue to cooperate through the UK mission, it was made 
clear to Japan that Britain could not discriminate in their favour.30 Furthermore, both 
sides put on record their dissatisfaction at the decision by the other to implement 
controls on their trade. The British side complained that Japan had imposed export 
controls before it had availed itself of the machinery of consultation provided under the 
payments agreement, while the Japanese side believed that the export restrictions by 
Japan were considered to be preferable to import restrictions by the sterling area.31
Britain was able to carry out the sterling payments review exercise according to its 
original aims. It excluded trade issues and amendments, and concentrated on discussing 
the progress of the agreement to date. To a certain extent it was correct that Britain did 
not get embroiled in trade questions or matters of policy because it would have opened 
up a pandora's box of issues that would have led to another long-winded discussion on 
the payments agreement. However, one can conclude from the documents that the 
payments review was far from satisfactory for the Japanese, as it resulted in an exercise 
in recording one's complaints without any definite assurance of whether such views 
were going to be addressed.
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In the meantime, Britain notified the Commonwealth countries of the results of the 
sterling payments review. Furthermore, the Commonwealth High Commissioners were 
instructed to ask the Commonwealth to stimulate their exports to Japan.32 It was also 
reported that with the exception of Hong Kong, there was little scope for increases in 
colonial exports to Japan, and that therefore, the colonies were asked to 'observe the 
strictest practicable standards of essentiality' with regard to their imports from Japan 
from 30 September.33 Moreover, Hong Kong was instructed to restrict its imports 
from Japan to the lowest possible figure, while Singapore and the Federation of Malaya 
were asked to take necessary steps to balance their trade with Japan.34 Other sterling 
area countries were also asked to restrict their imports from Japan, and the effects of the 
import restrictions is illustrated in table 3.2. Clearly imports from Japan between 1951- 
1953 went into a substantial decline. Therefore, by April, both Japan and the sterling 
area had implemented policies in an attempt to reduce Japan's sterling balances.
Despite the above initiative, Japan's sterling holdings continued to rise steadily, and by 
3 June, they had exceeded £121 million and amounted to £126 million by the end of 
June. This increasing problem did not trigger much reaction from the Japanese 
officials in the aftermath of the sterling payments review, however, as the Japanese 
government was busy renewing diplomatic contacts and agreements with the United 
States as a result of the US ratification of the peace treaty.36 The Japanese departments 
concerned with the payments agreement, therefore, did not begin meeting to discuss the 
matter until early June.37
When the relevant ministries did meet to discuss the matter, the ministries reverted back 
to the anti-sterling and pro-sterling factions. Kiuchi of the FECB continued to expound 
his anti-sterling views in public. His position was first, to see a revival of the dollar 
clause in the sterling payments agreement; second, for trade to be conducted at the 
'actual' rate of exchange rather than the official rate; third to negotiate a separate trade 
agreement with Hong Kong.38
The MITI on the other hand supported an extension of the 1951 payments agreement 
for another year on the basis of £200 million trade each way. MITI's views on the 
cause of the trade imbalance differed from the FECB in that they believed the 
fundamental problem lay in the low quantity of goods available for export to Japan 
rather than the problem of the over-valuation of the sterling.
The MOF was not airing its views to the same extent as the FECB, but it was common 
knowledge that it was anti-sterling, and that it supported the FECB proposal. On 25 
July, Japan's Supreme Economic Advisory Council met and discussed the various
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ministerial proposals, and endorsed the MOF and FECB plan to press for a revision of 
the pound-yen cross-rate from the official to the real rate.39 Furthermore, the Council 
approved an import certificate system and an export-import price adjustment fund. The 
import certificate system was to operate so that exports to the sterling area were 
possible only after traders produced a certificate proving that they had imported a 
certain amount of goods from the sterling area. The export-import price adjustment 
fund was a system whereby a tax or a levy was placed on sterling exports on the one 
side and grants or subsidies for sterling imports. Both were approved by the 
government to encourage the expansion of Japan's purchases from the sterling area.40 
The plan became the FECB's last piece of sterling-related legislation before it was 
abolished on 1 August.41
Although 30 August was approaching, neither the British nor the Japanese sides had 
made a move in regard to the future of the payments agreement. Therefore, both EL 
Hampson and NS Roberts of the British Embassy in Tokyo proposed the extension of 
the agreement for a few months to Kitahara of MITI and Ihara Takashi, a financial 
counsellor at the Japanese Embassy in Britain.42 The proposal was passed on to the 
intra-ministerial meeting, and although it met with little enthusiasm, with the most 
reluctant again being Kiuchi, the British idea was accepted.43
Japan's inactivity was not due to lack of preparation on the Japanese side so much as it 
was the political turmoil within the Liberal Party between Yoshida and the former party 
leader, Hatoyama Ichiro. The situation arose from the fact that Yoshida refused to 
relinquish the leadership of the Jiyuto as he had promised in 1946 prior to Hatoyama's 
purge.44 Due to the factional contest, and the possibility of elections in September, it 
was thought that no minister would be available in August to take up the payments 
issue as they would be busy consolidating their positions in their constituencies; and 
second, there was little likelihood of ministers taking up a controversial issue before the 
elections 45 The intra-ministerial differences and the political turmoil within the Liberal 
Party strongly indicated that negotiations were impossible at that time.
On 5 August, a note verbale dated 1 August was handed to Roberts by a MOFA 
official, expressing Japan's readiness to extend the payments agreement until 31 
December 1952. Roberts tried to lengthen the agreement for a full twelve month period, 
but to no avail. Four days later the Foreign Office instructed the British Embassy in 
Tokyo to accept the note verbale and on 15 August the extension of the payments 
agreement was signed by Esler Dening and Okazaki Katsuo, the Foreign Minister for 
Japan.
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The agreement to extend the payments agreement for four months meant that there were 
no new developments between January and August 1952. The payments review was 
inconclusive, as both sides expressed dissatisfaction with the agreement, but neither 
side would accept that they were to blame for the imbalance in the sterling area-Japan 
trade relations. Furthermore, the resumption of talks concerning the payments 
agreement only led to a renewal of intra-ministerial fighting in Japan. This was further 
exacerbated by the political turmoil within the Liberal Party. Therefore, it was up to 
Britain and Japan to find an acceptable remedy by the end of the year.
When Britain received the note verbale from the Japanese side, it also received a note 
titled 'Japanese observations on the Anglo-Japanese sterling payments agreement'. The 
content of the note was similar to that voiced by Japan during the payments review in 
March. It stated that Japan's reasons for its imbalance with the sterling area were the 
higher commodity prices in the sterling area in comparison to the dollar area, the limited 
supply of raw materials and foodstuffs available, the discrimination against Japanese 
traders in the sterling market, and the rising practice of indirect purchases of goods by 
Thailand and Indonesia through Hong Kong. In order to alleviate these problems, the 
Japanese side made the following proposals: the return of a dollar point in the 
agreement so that Japan would be able to use its sterling balances freely, and an end to 
the sterling area's unilateral implementation of import restrictions to balance trade.46
Britain, therefore, faced two tasks. First, to write a reply to the Japanese observation 
which would satisfy Japan, and also to devise a policy before the four-month renewal 
expired. In September and October the Japan working party in Whitehall held several 
meetings but these were inconclusive. The one decision reached was to exclude Japan 
from the agenda of the Commonwealth Economic Conference in November. Japan was 
dropped from the conference agenda as it was considered unwise to present Japan 
separately, thus giving it undue significance; second, it seemed unlikely that the 
Commonwealth countries would be 'indulging in a spending spree' in Japan as a result 
of their decision to restrict their purchases from the so-called 'three-nons', the non­
sterling, non-dollar and non-EPU countries, therefore they did not feel that there was 
any urgency in discussing Japan at an intra-Commonwealth conference. Lastly, Japan 
was excluded because Britain was unsure of the line to take in its negotiations with 
Japan at the end of the year 47
Britain's policy towards its payments agreement with Japan was adrift. Although the 
working party had decided not to discuss the matter at the Commonwealth Economic 
Conference, they had not come any nearer to deciding what action Britain should take 
concerning imports from Japan, nor on the line they should take in a payments
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negotiations at the end of the year.48 Furthermore, it was becoming embarrassing for 
the representatives of the British Embassy in Tokyo because of the delay in Whitehall's 
reply to the Japanese note verbale of 1 August49
On 30 October, close to three months after Japan had presented its note verbale to 
Britain, Thomas handed the British reply to Oda Takeo, the Director of the Economic 
Affairs Bureau of the MOFA.50 The reply was basically a recapitulation of the British 
position at the March review, and nothing new was initiated by the British side. In the 
note, Britain recognized that sterling area commodities were higher in price than dollar 
commodities, but indicated that it had not inhibited other countries from buying sterling 
area goods; therefore, the implication was that Japan should not be deterred from 
purchasing sterling goods either. Britain recognized Japan's disappointment with the 
lack of available commodities in the sterling area, but it was optimistic that Japan would 
find the sterling area an increasingly important source of supplies. On the matter of 
discriminatory practices by traders, Britain was unable to identify any such practices. 
Britain considered the on-sale of Japanese goods by Hong Kong to Thailand and 
Indonesia as part of the normal entrepot function of Hong Kong, therefore, the remedy 
lay in ensuring that the shipments reached the destinations declared. Furthermore, 
Britain justified the import restrictions placed by sterling area countries as the only way 
to correct the trade imbalance, and hoped that the Japanese government would 
understand Britain's remedial action. Finally, Britain found the sterling payments 
agreement to be the soundest basis on which to continue the trade and hoped for a 
renewal of the agreement.51 It should be noted, however, that there was no mention of 
the dollar point in the British reply as there were still uncertainties about whether to 
reintroduce it into the payments agreement.
On receiving the British reply, Oda remarked that it was as much as the Japanese had 
expected as there was nothing new in it. He particularly expressed disappointment over 
Britain's inability to provide concrete suggestions over the Hong Kong problem, but 
noted Japan's desire to continue the talks once Japan had studied the British reply 
carefully. There was one disagreement between Oda and Thomas during the talks, and 
that was over whether to conduct formal or informal discussions over the extension of 
the payments agreement. As far as Oda was concerned, there was little difference 
between a formal or an informal discussion as the officials representing the United 
Kingdom would be the same regardless of the discussion;52 whereas for Britain there 
was a huge difference between the two, because formal discussions would entail 
broadening the talks to include the question of the commercial treaty as well as Japan's 
membership to the GATT.
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While the Japanese were left to think over the British reply, two different proposals 
were being formulated on the British side; one by Thomas and the other by George 
Bolton of the Bank of England. Thomas' proposal was formulated after he had spoken 
to Kitahara Hideo of the MITI in early November. During the conversation, Kitahara 
explained to Thomas that Japan's decision to extend the payments agreement in August 
was on the condition that consultations would take place before the expiration of the 
agreement in December. Kitahara himself voiced the view that the sterling payments 
agreement would have a chance of an extension if they could establish a machinery 
which would enable a smoother trade flow. Kitahara's views seemed to have left 
Thomas with the impression that it was up to Britain to initiate smoother trade relations, 
as he drafted a note to the MOFA which he telegrammed to the Foreign Office for 
approval.53 In it he envisaged a trade agreement in which Britain and the sterling area 
would limit their import licenses to a certain fixed amount, and if the trade levels were 
either conspicuously higher or lower than the amount agreed, a consultative machinery 
would be activated to correct the imbalance.54
Conversely, the Bank of England was already resigned to the fact that Britain would 
have to reintroduce convertibility in the sterling payments agreement with Japan. 
Therefore, Sir George Bolton of the Bank of England wrote to Sir Leslie Rowan of the 
Treasury on 26 November, with a proposal that any sum in excess of £10 million held 
on a central Japanese account at the Bank of England would be converted into dollars, 
provided that most of the existing balance would be tied down over a ten-year period so 
that Japan would be unable to convert all its reserves into dollars immediately.55
What neither proposal took into full account was the growing anxiety in Japan over the 
import restrictions placed by the sterling area countries against Japanese products. 
Furthermore, the Japanese were anxious over the easily foreseeable end to the Korean 
war boom, which indicated an end to their dollar surplus. Moreover, Japan's import 
and export figures from the sterling area for 1951 and 1952 on the basis of 1/c's (letter 
of credit) attested to their worries. For example, import 1/c's which dropped to as low 
as £4.2 million in August of 1951 climbed back up to the £16 million mark by the end 
of the year, shot up to £19.9 million in July 1952 and by October had reached £22.2 
million.56 On the other hand, its exports which were over £20 million from October 
1951 to March 1952 dropped to £14 million in April 1952 and continued to decrease 
until in October the 1/c's amounted to only £8.1 million.57 A comparison of the import 
and export 1/c's by month clearly illustrates a gradual Japanese sterling deficit.58
AK Ogilvy-Webb of the Treasury had his finger on the pulse as he realized that Japan's 
position with the sterling area was weakening. Therefore, he suggested a renewal of the
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payments agreement without concessions. Ogilvy-Webb's view was confirmed when 
on 27 November a MOFA note verbale was delivered to British officials in Tokyo. The 
note drew attention to the marked alteration in the trend of sterling payments from a 
surplus of £29.359 million during the first five months of the year to a deficit of 
£35.428 million during the five months from June to October on the basis of 1/c's.59 
Although the note did not mention the dollar point, it was clear that the reinstatement of 
the dollar point was the thing furthest from the Japanese officials' minds as they now 
needed sterling reserves to pay for sterling commodities as well as to pay for their pre­
war bonded indebtedness which had recently been settled in New York.60 It was also 
declared in the note that Japan would no longer adhere to the standard limit referred to 
in Kiuchi's letter of 4 October 1951, and hoped that the sterling area would also lift 
their restrictions against Japan. Furthermore, they expressed a desire to hold an Anglo- 
Japanese conference in order to discuss various trade and payments issues.61 On the 
same day that the note verbale was handed to the British officials in Tokyo, Ihara rang 
Serpell at the Treasury to warn him unofficially that the Japanese government would be 
approaching the British Embassy with a proposal to open Anglo-Japanese payments 
talks in Tokyo. Therefore, Britain had to act quickly if it wished to present the 
Treasury's own proposal.
On 29 November, the Foreign Office instructed Thomas to propose formally to the 
Japanese Government a prolongation of the payments agreement for another year 
without any changes, and that if the Japanese side refused, he was instructed to invite 
the Japanese to discuss the relevant issues after the payments agreement was signed.62 
On 2 December, Thomas met with Oda and conveyed the formal proposal to prolong 
the payments agreement for another year. Oda was shocked that he could be presented 
with the extension of the agreement without a preliminary discussion, and told Thomas 
that the Japanese negotiating line was to refuse a renewal if the sterling area refused to 
lift trade restrictions.63 The issue was discussed by Japan's Cabinet, and an agreement 
to support a one-year extension was reached with the backing of the MOFA, the MITI 
and the MOF, as they thought an extension of the agreement would enable the sterling 
area-Japan trade to reach stability.64
On 12 December, Oda told Thomas that the Japanese government had decided to extend 
the payments agreement for another year,65 and two note verbales followed seven days 
later. One confirmed Japan's extension of the agreement, while the other was a note 
proposing an early discussion between Britain and Japan over various outstanding 
issues such as setting an equilibrium in trade levels, trade relations between Japan and 
Hong Kong, and other matters 'deemed necessary for the smooth operation’ of the 
payments agreement.66 An exchange of notes was carried out on 27 December, and
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Japanese officials attempted to persuade Thomas to agree to the inclusion of a phrase in 
an accompanying press release which implied that both parties had agreed to an opening 
of talks in the immediate future. Despite the British refusal, the Japanese government 
went ahead, and released their own version of the agreement announcing that Britain 
and Japan had decided on trade talks. Without it, the government would have been 
severely criticized.67
The four months between August and December 1952 saw a clear reversal of the 
sterling area and Japan's positions. Japan's sterling reserves had risen to over £100 
million between July 1951 to June 1952 because of an expansion of Japan's exports to 
the sterling area. More importantly, Japan's accumulation of sterling had been due to 
the fact that Japan had established a pattern where it imported from the dollar area, and 
exported to the sterling area, which meant that Japan was not reliant on sterling area 
goods. It was possible for Japan to trade in this way as long as it was earning dollars 
through the Korean war boom.68 Japan's sterling reserves began to decrease because 
Japan's steel and textiles export restrictions and the sterling area's import restrictions 
were beginning to take effect from the middle of the year. The gradual decline in 
Japan's sterling reserves should have been a relief to the Japanese side, but the sterling 
area's decision to restrict purchases of Japanese goods came at a time when the Japan 
was beginning to realize the short-sightedness of their policy to import from the dollar 
area and export to the sterling area as the impending end to the Korean war meant a 
decline in Japan's dollar surplus. Japan therefore had to rely more on importing from 
the sterling area, but in order to do so, it had to maintain a healthy balance of payments 
with the sterling area. It was for this reason that the note verbale of 26 November was 
handed to Thomas. The note verbale indicated Japan's interest in extending the 
payments agreement, but more importantly, it indicated Japan's hopes for the lifting of 
sterling area's import restrictions. Japan itself had lifted its own steel and textiles export 
restrictions from October,69 and to ensure that the sterling area's import restrictions 
would be lifted at the Commonwealth Economic Conference, the note verbale was 
drawn up hastily by the Japanese government with the inclusion of a paragraph stating 
that Japan would no longer subject trade to the standard limit established in October 
1951.70 It was obvious to British officials that the paragraph concerning the lifting of 
the standard limit was included to appease the sterling area, because the letter written by 
Kiuchi in the previous year, and the subsequent exchange of letters between Kiuchi and 
Serpell had never been ratified by the Japanese government. Furthermore, they had 
never referred to the letter when Japan's sterling reserves exceeded £70 million, the 
maximum standard limit stipulated by Kiuchi.
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The Japanese note verbale of 26 November was delivered at a time when Britain was 
in a dilemma as to how to conduct future talks with the Japanese. There were fears that 
if negotiations were carried out before the end of the year, Japan would expect a major 
revision of the agreement. The proposals approved by the Japanese government were 
not attractive to the sterling area, as they involved not only amending sterling's official 
rate to the real rate, but a proposal to transfer Hong Kong out of the sterling account. 
Proposals had been forwarded by Thomas on 14 November, and by Bolton on 26 
November in regard to a compromise approach towards Japan. However, the note 
verb a le  of 26 November indicated Japan’s interest in extending the payments 
agreement, and therefore, Ogilvy-Webb and other Treasury officials at Whitehall, who 
had already perceived the reversal in Japan's position vis-a-vis the sterling area, became 
convinced that Britain could offer a one-year extension of the payments agreement 
without concessions and without a preliminary conference.
At the end of the year, Britain was able to carry off a one-year renewal of the payments 
agreement with Japan. It was not a satisfactory agreement for Japan, as the renewal 
was not conditional on preliminary talks. Matters were becoming grave for the Japanese 
side because of the worsening deficit with the sterling area. Therefore it was important 
for Japan that talks should be held early in 1953.
The MFN Issue
On top of the fact that the sterling payments agreement was developing unsatisfactorily, 
the UK was also having to address the issue of whether to renew its commercial treaty 
with Japan. It was inevitable that Japan would approach the UK about this issue, as 
article seven of the San. Francisco Peace Treaty stipulated that within one year of the
ratification allied powers would have to notify Japan which of its 'pre-war bilateral
71treaties or conventions' it wished to continue or revive. On 26 April, the MOFA 
handed a note verbale to the UKLM in Tokyo in which they inquired whether Britain 
intended to renew its Commerce and Navigation Treaty of 1911; if this was not the 
case, they inquired whether the British government was intending to carry out trade 
according to article 12 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which stipulated that Japan 
was ready to enter negotiations for trading, maritime and other commercial relations
72with each of the Allied Powers. If neither of the above were to be implemented, the 
MOFA wished to know to what extent Britain would accord MFN treatment to Japan's
73goods and nationals.
In a letter to the Foreign Office dated 6 May 1952, Esler Dening, who had become the 
British Ambassador to Japan, wrote, 'this note puts us fairly and squarely on the 
spot'.74 The note was discomforting to Britain as no specific policy had been
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formulated vis-a-vis Japan except that they had decided against giving MFN treatment 
to Japanese goods at the 21st meeting of the Cabinet’s EPC in September 1950. 
Foreign officials were also aware that a revival of the 1911 commercial treaty would
75evoke great consternation among British manufacturers and the Board of Trade. 
Moreover, Britain was less than willing to sign a commercial treaty when it was 
uncertain about whether Japan would revert to the ’unfair1 competition of the pre-war 
period, and while they were unsure of the future of sterling area-Japan trade relations. 
Two months after the receipt of the note, the British government was still unable to 
reach a decision. This was partially because the Foreign Office needed responses from 
interested ministries, such as the Board of Trade, the Treasury and the Ministry of 
Transport, but difficulties also arose from the fact that the question of granting MFN 
treatment to Japanese goods was closely connected to the GATT. Therefore, the British 
government delayed replying to the Japanese note. By 22 September 1952, however, 
the government had decided that they would dispatch a note to the Japanese government 
indicating their desire to 'continue to accord to the nationals, products and vessels of 
Japan most-favoured-nation treatment or national treatment as provided under article 12 
of the Treaty of Peace'.76
Japan's note verbale placed Britain in a difficult position as it arrived when there was a 
strong likelihood of Japan applying for GATT membership. Britain had been able to 
stall US attempts to bring Japan into the GATT since 1948, but after Japan had signed 
the Peace Treaty in September, and was granted observer status in the GATT in 
October 1951, Britain knew that it was only a matter of time before Japan, with the 
encouragement of the United States, was accepted into the GATT.77 Britain's problem 
stemmed from two related issues. First, was the fear that if Japan became a GATT 
member, Britain would have to give MFN rights to Japan including equal tariff 
treatment for Japanese goods, which would lead to strong opposition from the 
Lancashire textiles industry. Furthermore, Britain opposed Japan's entry because under 
the GATT rules, no contracting party was able to increase preferential tariffs. 
Therefore, if Japan became a GATT member, Britain and the Commonwealth would be 
unable to protect intra-Commonwealth trade by raising imperial preferential tariffs 
against non-Commonwealth countries. Britain saw this as a serious problem as most of
* JO
the preferences were in the form of specific duties rather than on an ad valorem basis. 
By the 1950s inflation had eroded the value of much of the preferential tariffs that were 
still in place, and the average percentage margin of preference on all UK trade with the 
Commonwealth had been reduced to around six percent.79 Furthermore, the rules 
against preferential tariffs stipulated that if tariffs were raised against one country, they 
would have to be raised against all other contracting members. Therefore, Britain was 
in a 'catch-22' situation where they were unable to increase preferential tariffs and
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unable to discriminate against Japanese goods without having to increase tariffs across 
the board.80 The GATT's restrictive nature even led to the question of whether Britain 
should remain in the GATT or whether it should set up an alternative organization to 
regulate trade.
If Britain decided to remain in the GATT, the immediate issue at hand was to find some 
way to protect British interests in case of Japanese membership. The proposals put 
forward at this time were to invoke one of the GATT treaty articles against Japan, such 
as articles 6, 12 or 35.81 Article six stipulated that contracting parties had the right to 
apply 'counter-vailing duties against dumping'.82 The only problem with this article 
was the difficulty of substantiating dumping charges. Furthermore, article 12 which 
stipulated the balance of payments escape clause was not considered entirely effective 
as the clause was limited to use against the world in general or in favour of a country or 
an area, while discrimination directed against specific countries was seen as 'highly 
suspect', and it was generally believed that this would lead to opposition from other 
GATT signatories.84 Article 35 enabled a GATT signatory to withhold from another 
contracting party 'either all the provisions of the agreement or MFN rates in respect of 
goods appearing in negotiated tariff schedules'.85 The drawback behind this article was 
that it was tantamount to signifying the contracting party's unwillingness to see the 
other contracting party become a member.86
In the meantime, the Japanese side was preparing for GATT membership through the 
intersessional tariff negotiations procedure, which was established at the sixth session 
of the GATT. The procedure was designed to enable minor countries to accede to the 
general agreement without having to wait for a large-scale tariff conference.87 Once a 
country asked to negotiate tariffs through the intersessional procedure, the contracting 
parties were to make their views known within thirty days, and at the latest sixty days, 
by postal vote. If three or more contracting parties objected to the procedure, the agenda 
was postponed until the following general session. This was a far shorter time period 
than if Japan opted for the regular article 33 entry into the GATT. According to this 
procedure, Japan would have had to communicate its wish to enter into, negotiations 
with a view to acceding to the agreement. Once the letter reached the GATT, a working 
party was established to examine the application. The working party then submitted to 
the GATT Council its recommendation including a draft protocol of the applicant's 
accession. This was followed by tariff negotiations, and when this was completed, the 
report of the working party, together with the draft tariff decision and the protocol of 
accession was submitted to the Council for approval. This was followed by a decision 
on accession by two-thirds majority of the contracting parties. Once an affirmative
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decision was reached, the protocol came into effect thirty days after it was signed by the 
applicant government.88
The prospect of Japan's application through the intersessional tariff negotiations 
procedure ironically did not have the full support of the United States because they 
wished to avoid a controversy over Japan's admittance to the GATT during an election 
year. Furthermore, the United States wished to avoid any entanglements over the 
GATT when the Reciprocal Trade Agreement was coming up for renewal in June 
1953.89 The United States inability to support Japan's accession actively was 
communicated to the Japanese side on 4 July. Japan was also cautioned, that Canada, 
France and Britain would most probably oppose Japan's application through the above 
procedure. Japan accepted that there would be three or more votes against it, but stuck 
to its decision to apply due to the strong public and parliamentary support for Japan's 
membership to the GATT. On 13 July, Peyton Kerr, the first secretary of the US 
Embassy, sent a note to the MOFA in which it conveyed that 'the inclusion of the 
United States (as one of the countries which Japan wished to conduct tariff 
negotiations) would not be objectionable provided Japan does not state or imply that it 
has obtained the agreement of the United States'.90 Japan was also reassured that the 
US delegates at the October GATT session would be instructed to 'oppose the outright 
rejection of Japan's application'.91 Therefore, on 18 July, the Japanese government 
notified the Executive Secretary of the GATT, Eric Wyndham White, of its wish to 
enter into negotiations with 28 countries including the United States, Australia, New 
Zealand and the UK 92
The GATT contracting parties were immediately notified of Japan's application and 
asked to make their views known to the GATT Executive Secretary by 19 August. In 
order to decide on the British position, the issue was discussed at the 23rd meeting of 
the Cabinet's EPC on 30 July. A Board of Trade memorandum strongly pressed for 
British opposition to Japan's application on the grounds that Japan was too significant a 
country to discuss at an intersessional gathering of the contracting parties. Therefore, it 
was agreed at the EPC that Britain would oppose Japan's application, and the 
committee also decided that Britain should canvass enough votes to ensure the rejection 
of the application.93 Britain subsequently approached various Commonwealth and 
European countries in order to canvass votes against Japan, and as a result, Australia, 
New Zealand, France, the Benelux countries, and Norway voted against the 
intersessional procedure.94
Britain's next hurdle was to persuade the other contracting parties to postpone tariff 
negotiations with Japan during the seventh session in Geneva. This proved to be more
106
difficult because, despite the opposition to Japan’s accession through the intersessional 
procedure, many countries were not opposed to Japan's accession in principle. On 22 
August, Truman approved a report by Carl D. Corse, the Chairman of the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, that the United States should enter 
into tariff negotiations with Japan. Furthermore, Truman agreed to the 'full discussion 
of the question at the seventh session of the contracting parties'.95
On 2 September, the British government was informed by its Washington embassy that 
the United States did not object to the Japanese question being raised at the seventh 
session.96 The US reversal of its position from reluctance to support meant that Britain 
had to arrive at a persuasive argument to delay Japan's application. A week later, the 
British stance towards the seventh session was discussed at the Cabinet's Far East 
(Official) Committee on 9 September and at the Cabinet's CPEC (Committee on 
Preparations for the Commonwealth Economic Conference) on 11 September. At the 
Far East Committee meeting, David Serpell of the Treasury stated very clearly that 
Britain would have to come to a clear decision on whether to accept Japan into the 
GATT or oppose its entry, and warned against a compromise between the two. Britain 
was placed in a difficult position as it wished to discourage Japan from playing a 'lone 
hand in international trade' as Japan's economic isolation in the 1930s had led to the 
Pacific war. Britain was also aware that its rejection of Japan's membership in the 
GATT would be met with strong American disapproval with a potential strain in Anglo- 
American relations over other economic matters. The Board of Trade explained that it 
would recommend a delay in Japan's entry to the GATT at present, as the current 
GATT rules did not provide an effective mechanism for the protection of British goods 
in its traditional trading areas against Japanese competition.97
At the Cabinet's CPEC, the Board of Trade presented a memorandum recommending 
that Britain put forward a resolution deferring Japan's application until a later session 
'on the grounds that the UK was currently reviewing its whole commercial policy and 
that the question of Japan's accession presented special difficulties'.98 During the 
meeting, Eden opposed any action which would offend the United States and Japan. 
Conversely, Viscount Swinton, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, warned that 
Japan's entry would lead to a great pressure on the government to 'disown the 
GATT'.99 RA Butler, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, expressed the need for extreme 
caution as a wrong step either way would lead to international repercussions. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the issue, and the inability of the CPEC to decide whether to support 
Britain's domestic and Commonwealth interests over its international ones, the 
Committee decided to raise the discussion to the Cabinet level.100
107
Two memoranda were submitted for discussion at the Cabinet meeting on 18 
September. One by the Board of Trade, which recommended Britain's deferment of the 
issue, and an approach to the US government for its support. The other by the Foreign 
Office which supported Japan's accession to the GATT for political and economic 
reasons. Politically, the Foreign Office was against any possible deterioration of 
relations with Japan and the United States, and moreover, felt that Japan's entry into 
the GATT would guarantee Japan's economic allegiance with the western sphere. 
Economically, the Foreign Office argued that Japan's accession to the GATT was 
desirable as it contained a number of 'useful safeguards against the sort of trade 
malpractices which caused such bitterness between Japan and the United Kingdom 
before the war'.101 The Foreign Office thought that there would be less damage to its 
position vis-a-vis Japan if it invited the latter to participate.102 In discussion, however, 
the Board of Trade's views were accepted as the 'logical sequel to an expression of Her 
Majesty's Government's views',103 and it was agreed that Britain should approach the 
US government with the Board of Trade's proposal.104
Therefore, Christopher Steel, the British Amffa&iador to Washington, was instructed to 
meet with relevant members of the State Department in order to get the British view 
across to the United States. On 22 September, he met Willard Thorp, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who sympathized with the British position and 
explained that although the United States supported Japan's accession, it was by no 
means anxious or intending to 'make rapid progress in getting down to tariff 
negotiations with Japan'.105 Moreover Thorp explained that the United States did not 
envisage tariff negotiations with Japan for another twelve to fifteen months, and that 
they were thinking of putting forward the idea that the timing of Japan's tariff 
negotiations should be discussed at an intersessional committee of GATT after the 
seventh session.106 Britain and the United States, therefore, agreed to collaborate on a 
text which recognized Japan's desire to enter tariff negotiations with the contracting 
parties, but remained reserved in its invitation to Japan. This was distributed to the 
contracting parties, and as a result, Britain and the United States were able to delay 
Japan's tariff negotiations at the seventh session.
Japan's accession was discussed at the sixth meeting of the seventh session on 10 
October where Thorp proposed the establishment of an intersessional committee to 
discuss Japan’s application. The United States' proposal was supported by John Leckie 
of the United Kingdom who emphasized that Britain's intention was not to be 
unfriendly to Japan, and explained that the United Kingdom's reservations in regard to 
Japan's immediate membership were due to uncertainties over Japan's future trade 
practices, and concern over whether Britain could extend GATT concessions to new
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acceders (i.e. Japan). The other contracting parties which supported the US proposal 
were Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Brazil and Haiti. Pakistan, India and Turkey 
supported Japan's early accession but also understood the need of some countries to 
discuss the issue at an intersessional committee. Conversely, Germany, Sweden and 
Indonesia supported early tariff negotiations with Japan. The only country to abstain on 
the formation of an intersessional committee and the start of tariff negotiations was 
Czechoslovakia. In the light of the fact that the majority of the countries favoured the 
establishment of an intersessional committee meeting, it was decided that an 
intersessional committee would meet from 2 February 1953.107
Japan was aware that its attempts to enter tariff negotiations with the GATT members 
through the intersessional procedure would be difficult, but it felt that some action had 
to be initiated given the strong, domestic public opinion in favour of Japan's 
membership into the GATT. As expected, more than three countries had opposed 
conducting tariff negotiations through the intersessional procedure. Japan had, 
however, been more optimistic about its chance of discussing tariff negotiations at the 
seventh session, but here the two most influential countries in the GATT, Britain and 
the United States, were against conducting tariff negotiations with Japan at that time. 
Britain could not accept Japan's membership unless certain revisions had been made to 
the GATT rules to safeguard Britain's trading interests. Conversely, the United States 
wished to avoid complications during an election year, and before the renewal of the 
reciprocal trade agreement in 1953. What was most interesting was that Britain did not 
wish to oppose Japan's application outright because of the possible repercussion on its 
relations with the United States and Japan respectively. The United States was also 
most concerned not to press for Japan's tariff negotiations at the seventh session in case 
of any repercussion on its relations with Britain and the Commonwealth.108 Therefore, 
1952 saw Anglo-American collaboration to postpone Japan's tariff negotiations at the 
seventh session. The United States had, however, guaranteed Japan that it would 
oppose any outright rejection of Japan's application, therefore, the United States 
formulated a compromise whereby Japan's application would be discussed at an 
intersessional committee. The Anglo-American cooperation to defer Japan's application 
was successful. The next challenge for Britain was to formulate a government policy 
towards Japan in the extra months it was granted.
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Conclusion
1952 saw the independence of Japan, and its gradual return to the western comity of 
nations. Although Japan gained sovereignty, it was nominal in that its trade parameters 
were set by the United States through a US-Japan bilateral agreement signed in 
September. The United States forced the agreement upon Japan due to its inability to 
establish a separate export control group in East Asia.
The creation of CHINCOM and Japan's affiliation with western export controls against 
the communist bloc meant that Japan's chances of expanded trade relations with China 
diminished drastically. This increased the pressure for Japan to expand its exports 
outlet in the west, and increase trade with the sterling area. Although Britain's Treasury 
and the Bank of England were not opposed to increased trade relations between the 
sterling area and Japan, they were anxious about Japan's rising sterling reserves. 
Attempts were made through the Anglo-Japanese payments review to reach the heart of 
the problem but Britain and Japan refused to take responsibility for the trade imbalance. 
Instead, both sides applied trade controls in order to reduce Japan's reserves which led 
to increased ill-feeling. In the latter half of the year, the Foreign Office, the Bank of 
England and the Treasury began examining ways to improve the situation, but the 
reversal in Japan's exports to the sterling area meant that no drastic revision was 
necessary, and the sterling payments agreement was extended for twelve months. 
Although the Japanese side was also anxious about developments in sterling area-Japan 
trade, domestic political turmoil prevented decisive action. The October elections were 
held to end the political stalemate, but Yoshida's slim victory meant continuing 
domestic instability.
The trade imbalance between the sterling area and Japan frustrated the goals of both 
signatories of the payments agreement. Britain's aim was to expand sterling usage in 
East Asia with Japan as the regional axis, but it faced obstacles due to numerous 
problems which beset Anglo-Japanese trade relations. Conversely, Japan's aim in 
signing the sterling payments agreement was to increase its imports from the sterling 
area, but it was impeded by its inability to gain equal access to sterling area goods. 
Therefore, Japan interpreted this as a British discriminatory policy towards Japan. The 
view that Britain had control over Japan's sterling area trade was further exacerbated by 
Britain's instructions to the Commonwealth to restrict imports from Japan. Ironically, 
unbeknown to Japan, Britain was attempting to reach sterling convertibility. The year 
saw two proposals towards sterling convertibility; the Robot Plan109 and the collective 
approach110 to sterling convertibility. Although neither came to fruition, by the end of 
the year, the issue of coordinated import controls was 'pushed firmly into the
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background of sterling area trade policy' which enabled sterling area countries to relax 
gradually their trade controls with non-sterling-area countries.111
Lastly, Japan's attempts to enter the GATT was obstructed by Britain. In 1952, 
however, the impediment came not only from Britain, but from Japan's mentor, the 
United States. This was because an issue like Japan's GATT entry was considered 
untimely during an election year and also before the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement. The solution to the problem was, therefore, a postponement of the issue. 
For Britain, Japan's GATT application was ill-timed because it was still uncertain about 
the potential effect of Japan's trade practices in the post-war period. In order to prevent 
Japan from threatening its traditional export markets, Britain wished to put up effective 
tariff barriers before accepting Japan into the western trading system. It was, however, 
unable to discriminate against Japan outright as GATT rules prevented a contracting 
party from raising discriminatory tariffs against Japan without raising tariffs against 
other countries.
Although the British government was aware of the Japanese threat, there was a 
difference of opinion between the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office in regard to 
Britain's policy towards Japan's GATT entry. The Board of Trade preferred a 
postponement of the question of Japan's entry until Britain's commercial policy had 
been formulated. Conversely, the Foreign Office preferred to maintain good relations 
with the United States and Japan, and therefore, recommended Japan's entiy.
In conclusion, 1952 elucidates the lack of uniformity and continuity between different 
aspects of Britain's trade policy towards Japan. The Bank of England and the Treasury 
wished to see an expansion of sterling-Japan trade as a way of increasing sterling usage 
in East Asia. The Board of Trade wished to limit Japan's trade with the sterling area in 
order to protect Britain's traditional markets, while the Foreign Office wished to 
maintain amicable relations with the United States and Japan, but this was not possible 
as long as Britain was without a combined sterling and GATT policy towards Japan. 
Consequently, there was growing pressure for Britain to formulate a uniform policy 
towards Japan in 1953.
I l l
Table 3.1
Japan's Sterling Reserves. January 1950 - December 1953 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ (thousand pounds)
1950 1951 1952 1953
January 15,417 January 16,332 January 82,152 January 78,228
February 14,653 February 15,542 February 91,738 February 66,856
March 15,024 March 15,650 March 99,668 March 50,500
April 17,687 April 30,366 April 109,784 April 40,821
May 17,181 May 41,797 May 120,644 May 35,856
June 16,991 June 43,643 June 126,889 June 33,025
July 17,612 July 38,173 July 126,124 July 32,690
August 20,969 August 38,054 August 120,987 August 28,030
September 20,930 September 40,573 September 120,302 September 32,829
October 21,796 October 49,148 October 113,979 October 31,375
November 20,714 November 61,892 November 103,970 November 30,554
December 19,442 December 75,455 December 88,992 December 42,523
Source: Ministry o f Finance (ed.), Showa Zaiseishi: Shusen kara Kowa made vol. 19 (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpdsha, 1978), p. 127.
Table 3.2
Annual Trade with Japan (Select Sterling Area Countries^ 1950-1958 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ million dollars
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Australia M 23.3 90 27.7 9 28.2 55.1 30.9 42.1 62.6
X 76.4 126 132.6 172.3 117.1 177.7 248.4 362.8 225.6
Burma M 16.2 18.2 21.2 33 45.6 38.3 36.3 75.9 46.4
X 17.7 28.6 29.8 50.2 63.1 45.8 42.4 24.8 12.3
Ceylon M 7.1 17.3 17.3 13.8 17.3 20.4 24.3 24.7 34.6
X 0.2 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.8 3.3 6.3 7.3
Hong Kong M 61.5 80.7 62.2 77.3 88.1 134.5 130.6 100.1
X 5.7 6.8 7.9 4 6.2 18.7 26.7 11.6
India M 20.3 51.7 36.7 27.4 43.9 84.7 105.3 113.3 84.8
X 17.8 52.8 73 75.1 51.6 77.3 103.4 105 74.4
Malaya & M 18.1 68.2 63 39.4 47.6 72.8 77.9 82.3 90.4(a)
Singapore X 39.4 61.3 60.9 63.4 63.8 109.2 138.7 193.3 127.1(b)
New Zealand M . 1.2 8.6 8.1 1.3 2.6 7.9 5.9 7.6 7.4
X 2.2 11.7 9.3 9.7 4.5 6.7 9.4 27.3 18.9
Pakistan M 55.6 117 117.7 14.9 56 44 17.7 16.6 22
X 38.9 95.5 82.4 108 36.2 47.1 50.6 47.2 34.2
South Africa M 29.6 29.5 18 28.1 30.7 28.9 34.7 50.1 39.1
X 3.3 5.9 13.1 19.5 10.6 17.5 26.5 34.1 16
UK M 26 54 73.1 33.1 51.1 60.8 63.2 73.7 105.2
X 6.4 31.8 36.7 49 37.1 37.9 66.6 98.5 59.4
Sterling Area M 297 612.5 539.1 316.1 491.3 640.9 684.6 806.9 799.6
X 221.5 446.6 500.4 602.5 433.7 588.6 817.7 1121.5 791.4
Note: M=Imports; X= Exports.
Hong Kong's statistics for 1950 are excluded as it was an Open Account Country 
Malaya and Singapore became Malaya Federation and Singapore respectively from 1958.
(a) Malaya Federation: 13.1; Singapore: 77.3.
(b) Malaya Federation: 114.4; Singapore: 12.7.
Source: Direction o f International Trade, United Nations.
Table 3.3
Sterling Area’s Gold and Dollar Reserves. 1948-1954
In terms of £ million US $ million
31-Mar-48 552 2,241
30-Jun-48 473 1,920
30-Sep-48 437 1,777
31-Dec-48 457 1,856
31-Mar-49 471 1,912
30-Jun-49 406 1,651
18-Sep-49 330/479(a) 1,340
30-Sep-49 509 1,425
31-Dec-49 603 1,688
31-Mar-50 709 1,984
30-Jun-50 865 2,422
30-Sep-50 984 2,756
31-Dec-50 1,178 3,300
31-Mar-51 1,342 3,758
30-Jun-51 1,381 3,867
30-Sep-51 1,167 3,269
31-Dec-51 834 2,335
31-Mar-52 607 1,700
30-Jun-52 602 1,685
30-Sep-52 602 1,685
31-Dec-52 659 1,846
31-Mar-53 774 2,166
30-Jun-53 845 2,367
30-Sep-53 888 2,486
31-Dec-53 899 2,518
31-Mar-54 959 2,685
30-Jun-54 1,078 3,017
30-Sep-54 1,036 2,901
31-Dec-54 986 2,762
(a) Due to the devaluation of the pound, two different amounts have been logged.
All reserves thereafter are at US $2.80=£1.
Source: United Kingdom Balance o f Payments 1949 to 1952, Parliamentary Papers 
vol. 18, Cmd 8808 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), p. 55 and United 
Kingdom Balance o f Payments 1946 to 1955, Parliamentary Papers, vol. 29, Cmd 9731 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 36.
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Table 3.4
Japanese Imports based on Letters of Credit: 1951-1952
1952 1951 (£1,000)
Jan. 15,513 19,205
Feb. 14,838 22,734
Mar. 11,267 18,761
April 14,562 12,071
May 11,704 16,321
June 15,851 7,791
July 19,940 5,420
Aug. 14,725 4,237
Sept. 16,433 5,338
Oct. 22,242 11,825
Nov. 19,246 16,463
Dec. 21,292 16,346
Japanese Exports based on Letters of Credit: 1951-1952
1952 1951 (£1,000)
Jan. 23,149 13,276
Feb. 21,166 19, 447
Mar. 24,023 23,647
April 14,826 20,777
May 14,079 18,594
June 10,731 18,906
July 12,976 16,723
Aug. 10,920 12,393
Sept. 10,948 16,134
Oct. 8,188 23,742
Nov. 11,371 22,528
Dec. 9,131 27,414
Sources: Correspondence from Thomas to DR Serpell, 10 December 1952, T236/4140 
OF63/208/05N, PRO, and the import and export figures fo r  the last two months o f  
1952 are from  the Analysis o f  Balance o f  Payments Situation, 28 January 1953, 
OV16/85, BoE.
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Chapter Four: Britain at the Helm?
Introduction
If 1952 saw Japan's trade parameters set by the United States, 1953 saw western 
attempts to incorporate Japan in the western trading community. The United States set 
the example by signing a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan 
on 2 April 1953. The purpose of the agreement was to restore US-Japan bilateral 
relations, and to set a precedent for other nations to sign similar treaties with Japan.1 
Moreover, there was a change of administration in 1953 and a Republican President, 
Dwight D Eisenhower, entered the White House on 12 January. During the first few 
years of his presidency, he pushed forward the idea of a liberal foreign economic 
policy, based on 'trade not aid'.2 As part of this programme, he attempted to extend the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which subsequently led to problems for the 
administration with Congress.
Britain did not fair any better in its economic policy in 1953. Britain approached the 
United States and Western Europe with the so-called collective approach to 
convertibility in March, but the plan remained still-born. The collective approach was 
based on the principle of sterling convertibility at a flexible exchange rate between the 
dollar and sterling. Under the plan convertibility would originally be limited to non­
resident holders of sterling, and it would only apply to newly acquired sterling in 
current and capital transactions. Furthermore, according to the collective approach, the 
IMF was required to provide an extra support fund to enable a smooth system of 
operation. What was most objectionable to the United States was the fact that it would 
have to pursue good creditor policies 'to maintain reasonable equilibrium in the balance 
of payments between the United States and the rest of the world'.3 In short this meant 
that the United States would have to manage its economic policy so as to reduce its 
surplus with the rest of the world.4 Conversely, European governments were expected 
to become convertible according to the UK timetable in order to strengthen the success 
of the programme, which did not go down well with them either.5 Although Britain had 
begun to embrace pound convertibility in 1953, its attempts to promote the collective 
approach failed.
In the meantime, Japan was attempting to expand its trade with the non-dollar area as 
the armistice on 27 July 1953 signified the final end to Japan's extraordinary dollar 
earnings through Korean war procurements. Japan therefore needed to expand its trade 
relations with the non-dollar area as it could no longer rely on an indefinite dollar 
supply. Given that procurements had not eased Japan's balance of payments deficit, it 
needed to place even greater emphasis on trade expansion.
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It should be noted that 1953 also saw a continuation of Yoshida's premiership in Japan, 
but that Yoshida was seen increasingly as a caretaker Prime Minister, as his popularity 
waned. Just as Churchill lost his popularity in his post-war administration,6 Yoshida's 
star lost its lustre after Japan's independence. In fact, his fourth cabinet only lasted for 
six months, due to an incident between him and a socialist legislator.7 The last Yoshida 
cabinet began on 21 May and lasted a little more than a year and a half, until he was 
forced to step down.8 Despite increasing unpopularity at home, Yoshida did initiate 
important steps towards Japan's closer relations with Southeast Asia. In early 1953, the 
government established the Round-table on Asian Economy, as an advisory organ to 
the MOFA. In May, Yoshida set up a committee on trade promotion and Southeast 
Asian development. Furthermore, Yoshida announced that as Japan could not rely on 
China trade, it would have to turn its efforts to Southeast Asian development. 
Therefore, 1953 saw Japan increase its focus on Southeast Asia as a viable trade 
outlet.9
Amidst the backdrop described above, 1953 was also a significant year for Anglo- 
Japanese trade relations. It was the first time that Britain attempted to formulate a 
comprehensive policy towards Japan. This chapter deals with Britain's overall financial 
and trade policy towards Japan. It will trace the attempts by Britain and Japan to iron 
out their differences in regard to the sterling payments agreement. Furthermore, it 
examines Britain's policy towards Japan's GATT accession. The GATT issue has been 
examined at length in this chapter as 1953 proved to be a decisive year for Japan's 
GATT entry.
Talks in Tokyo
When the sterling payments agreement was renewed at the end of 1952, Japan 
requested that talks be convened at the beginning of the following year. Britain's initial 
plan was to hold talks in London, but officials at an ONC meeting on 10 January 
decided that the consultative review should be held in Tokyo.10 Britain's reversal was 
due to the potential political embarrassment it would face in having a Japanese 
delegation in London while Japan's GATT accession was being discussed in Geneva. 
There were also fears that if they were invited to London, the Japanese themselves 
might take advantage of the situation and put pressure on the British government in 
regard to the GATT issue.11 British officials in Tokyo were, therefore, instructed to 
hold a consultative review in Tokyo on Japan's trade relations with the UK and 
colonies.12 Moreover, the UK representatives were instructed to find out Japan's plans 
for sterling usage in 1953, and to what extent Japan was willing to implement its rights 
to third country transfers.
120
Consultative talks began on 29 January, and lasted until 3 February between the two 
British officials, Hugh Thomas, the Treasury representative, Norman Roberts, the 
Commercial Minister, and Oda Takeo from the MOFA, Kitahara Hideo from the MITI 
and Tojo Takei from the MOF. The Japanese officials asked for trade to be set at £230 
million each way, and they estimated the working capital to be between £55 to £85 
million, although the figure of £85 million was not to be regarded as the ceiling.13 
Although the Japanese side was no longer worried about Japanese goods sold-on from 
Hong Kong to Indonesia and Thailand, they were concerned with Hong Kong's newly 
placed import restrictions against Japan. Furthermore, they asked that Japanese goods 
be given equal treatment with goods from OEEC countries. Discussions on 
administrative transferability were conducted between the Japanese officials and PL 
Hogg, the Bank of England official who was in Tokyo on a different matter, but little 
progress was made. Although Roberts continued discussions with the Japanese side 
after Hogg's departure, it was to no avail. The problem lay in Japan's rationale that it 
had to earn dollars from as many countries as possible, even if it meant sacrificing 
greater trade flows using sterling as a trade medium.14
Neither Thomas nor Roberts were empowered to make decisions on behalf of the 
British government. It was apparent to both that if relations with Japan were to 
improve, the sterling area as a whole needed to relax its import restrictions towards 
Japan, because statistics in their possession indicated that Japan's exports were 
decreasing even further, while imports were increasing.15 An analysis of Japanese 
imports showed that the rise in imports from the sterling area was due to increased 
purchases of cotton, jute and coal from India (total purchases for the period January to 
June 1952 were £9.97 million and purchases in the period July to December 1952 were 
£20.91 million16); wool from Australia (total purchases for the period January to June 
1952 were £17.62 million and in the period July to December, they were £27.79 
million17), and rice from Burma (£4.80 million in the first half of the year and £7.17 
million in the second half18). It became evident to Thomas and Roberts that the rise in 
Japan's imports was not a result of seasonal purchases as originally thought, but rather 
due to Japan's decision to relax its import restrictions; therefore, they emphasized that 
Britain should reciprocate Japan's initiative of previous October and also ease its import 
restrictions. If Britain refused to relax its imports, Japan would clamp down on sterling 
area imports in their next six-monthly foreign exchange budget for the months of April 
to October which would have had a detrimental effect on sterling trade with Japan.19
Japan had laid down its offer; it was up to Whitehall officials to come up with a 
counter-proposal. The agenda was first brought up at the EPC meeting on 25 February, 
when memoranda prepared by Butler and Peter Thomeycroft, the President of the
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Board of Trade, were discussed.20 The Treasury's memorandum highlighted the 
danger of a further decrease in Japan's sterling reserves. If Japan's sterling reserves fell 
below £55 million, there was a greater probability that Japan would impose import 
restrictions on sterling area goods. Therefore, the Treasury stressed the importance of 
all sterling area countries increasing their imports from Japan by twenty percent.21 The 
Board of Trade agreed that nothing should be done to drive Japan away from the 
sterling area, and it recommended in its memorandum that the colonies should increase 
their imports from Japan by two-thirds of its 1951 imports. Furthermore, it was agreed 
that the two entrepot trading centres, Hong Kong and Singapore, should buy more 
Japanese goods for re-export to their neighbours such as Indonesia and Thailand. The 
Board of Trade, however, stressed that these relaxations should not be implemented 
without Tokyo's confirmation that it would not impose further trade restrictions.22 
Although both the Treasury and the Board of Trade agreed in principle that the sterling 
area should relax its import restrictions, they differed over which sterling area countries 
should ease them. The Treasury recommended relaxations by all sterling area countries. 
The Board of Trade, on the other hand, was against an easing of restrictions by ISA 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand, as they were already imposing import 
controls on Japanese and UK goods due to a sterling shortage. The Board of Trade, 
therefore, believed that if import relaxations were to be implemented, they should be 
made towards UK rather than Japanese imports.23
In the ensuing discussion at the EPC meeting on 25 February, Swinton, who had now 
become the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, supported the Board of 
Trade's view that nothing should be said to encourage the ISA from relaxing their 
import restrictions. Others argued over whether Japan should be singled out for special 
import restrictions and debated why Japan required £55 million minimum level of 
sterling reserves. In the end, it was agreed that the UK and colonies (including Hong 
Kong and Singapore) should ease their import restrictions, while Australia and New 
Zealand were to be discouraged from pursuing relaxations. These provisions were, 
however, conditional on Japan's assurance that they would not introduce trade 
restrictions against sterling area imports in their coming foreign exchange budget. The 
Committee, therefore, instructed the Board of Trade in consultation with the Foreign 
Office, the Colonial Office and the Treasury to draft a telegram.24 Two days later, the 
EPC met to approve the telegram. It would have been sent to Tokyo immediately, but 
was delayed because a member of the Board of Trade was not present to approve it.25 
The Board of Trade had in the meantime decided against supporting the EPC decision 
of 25 February. This caused great inconvenience for the Treasury and the Foreign 
Office, as Serpell had been informed via telegram that Japan would need some response
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from Britain immediately if it was to avoid imposing restrictions on sterling area 
imports.26
To make matters worse, Eden and Butler were both in Washington attempting to gain 
US approval for a collective approach to convertibility,27 and were therefore unable to 
exert pressure on behalf of Selwyn Lloyd and Reginald Maudling, the Economic 
Secretary of the Treasury, who were surrounded in the EPC by ministers who 
supported the Board of Trade and the Commonwealth Relations Office's position 28
At an EPC meeting on 4 March, both Maudling and Lloyd presented memoranda 
stressing the importance of relaxing Japanese imports into the sterling area.29 The 
memorandum by Lloyd in particular, emphasized the international repercussions of a 
reversal in British policy ranging from the effects on Anglo-American relations, on 
Southeast Asia's economic activity, and the damage it would have on Anglo-Japanese 
relations. Moreover, Lloyd played up the two possible consequences of Japan playing a 
lone hand in international trade. He stressed that Japan would either turn towards 
communism, or take rash action similar to that taken in the 1930s.30 Despite the strong 
arguments presented by the Treasury and the Foreign Office, Thomeycroft explained 
that 'in view of the politically explosive nature of the subject' no concessions should be 
made without Cabinet approval.31 Thomeycroft argued that the case for Japan might 
have been overstated, and he went on to criticize the earlier decision for the following 
three reasons; first, the figure of £55 million should not be accepted as the minimum 
level of Japan's sterling reserves; second that, he was sceptical of the Treasury's 
projections on the rate at which Japan's sterling balances would fall because they were 
based on the current rate of run-down; and third, he did not comprehend why the UK 
should ease its import restrictions when the amount of trade at stake with Japan was 
small. The Board of Trade was particularly opposed to the relaxations because the 
decision would lead to an extra £6 million worth of Japanese grey cloth imports to the 
United Kingdom. Thomeycroft argued that the Board of Trade had only recently 
persuaded cotton interests in Lancashire to reduce their cheap cloth prices to compete 
with Japanese cloths, and therefore, he could hardly announce a sudden increase in 
Japanese imports.32 He explained that the Board of Trade could only support an 
increase in colonial imports on the condition that it was supported by the Colonial 
Secretary. Furthermore, he agreed to an increase in Japanese imports to Hong Kong 
and Singapore as long as they were re-exported to non-sterling neighbours. 
Thomeycroft was sceptical, however, of any political decisions based on present 
projections of Japan's sterling balances, and he was also opposed to increasing 
Japanese imports into the UK and the Southern Dominions because it would directly 
affect Lancashire. At the end of the meeting, it was decided that a memorandum would
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be written by Viscount Swinton and discussed at the eighth meeting of the EPC and, if 
approved, the memorandum would then be discussed by the Cabinet on 10 March.33
Straight after the EPC meeting, MT Flett of the Treasury despatched a note to Sir Leslie 
Rowan, one of the Treasury delegates in Washington. Flett communicated the Treasury 
and the Foreign Office's anxiety at the domination of the EPC by the Board of Trade 
and the Commonwealth Relations Office and asked that RA Butler and Anthony Eden 
intervene to prevent Britain's policy towards Japan being dictated by the Board of 
Trade and its concerns over Lancashire.34 On 6 March, another EPC meeting was held 
to discuss what to recommend to the Cabinet. The differences between the Board of 
Trade, and the Foreign Office and the Treasury continued.35 Furthermore, to the 
Treasury and the Foreign Office's dismay, the majority of the EPC supported the Board 
of Trade's view. After the meeting the Foreign Office sent a telegram to Washington 
reiterating the hope that both Eden and Butler would endorse the respective ministerial 
lines and hoped that they would send a telegram to the Prime Minister, Winston 
Churchill, before the Cabinet meeting was convened.36
The ministers cabled their views from Washington before the Cabinet meeting on 10 
March, and as a result, the Foreign Office and the Treasury were able to regain some 
flexibility in Britain's policy. It was decided at the Cabinet meeting that the colonies 
should be permitted to increase their imports to 120 percent of the amount they 
imported in the second half of 1952. Second, that imports into Hong Kong and 
Singapore for re-export outside the sterling area were to be licensed freely. Third, that 
all ISA countries, except Australia and New Zealand, would be encouraged to relax 
their imports from Japan.37 Although the above policy was not drastically different 
from the Board of Trade's proposal, Butler and Eden's intervention enabled Britain to 
remain flexible if Japan refused the British offer.38 In case of Japan's refusal, UK 
representatives in Tokyo were instructed to make every effort to dissuade Japan from 
imposing restrictions, and to report back to Whitehall with Japan's minimum terms.39
Instructions were sent out on 11 March and Tojo Takei and Oda Takeo were informed 
five days later.40 On the same day, Roberts, who was still trying to increase the 
number of countries from which Japan would accept sterling, handed a note to Oda 
encouraging further Japanese relaxation 41 In a reply three days later, Japan expressed 
its wish to increase its annual rate of trade based on the months of May to October 
instead of July to December. Moreover, they considered third country transfers of little 
importance in relation to the balance of payments question 42 Roberts conveyed the 
British reply on 24 March. He proposed trade be set at £168 million.43 He also told 
Oda that Britain was ready to tell the colonies to relax Japanese imports, and if Japan
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felt dissatisfied with the arrangement, a consultation would be held in four months 
time. Furthermore, the question of third country transfers would be discussed with 
Tojo, the Finance Ministry official who was arriving in London to discuss what forms 
of financial assistance would be available to Japan in the months ahead when Japan was 
certain to face a sterling shortage. The British counter-proposal was accepted by the 
Japanese government on the following day.44 This was not the end of the issue, 
however, as the note verbale sent by the MOFA to the British Embassy on 28 March 
did not specify whether Japan would be imposing import restrictions on the sterling 
area or not, therefore, the Colonial Office was unable to send telegrams to the colonies 
asking them to relax their import restrictions. Finally on 1 April, it was confirmed that 
Japan would not be imposing new restrictions on sterling area imports until the joint 
review in four months' time.
Tojo's Visit to London
As the discussion over trade arrangement was coming to its final stage, Tojo, the Chief 
of the Foreign Exchange Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, was preparing to 
go to London to discuss ways of counteracting Japan's serious sterling position with 
Treasury and Bank of England officials.45 His visit was originally planned to last for 
just four days starting 30 March to 2 April, but he remained in London for a month 
until 28 April. The two main issues discussed between the Treasury, the Bank of 
England and Japanese officials in a series of twelve meetings were an agreement 
concerning some form of credit facilities for Japan, and an agreement on third country 
transfers. Both issues needed urgent discussion as Japan's sterling reserves were 
dwindling very fast and by the end of March had fallen to £50 million (see table 3.1). 
Prior to Tojo's visit, a meeting of the Bank of England and Treasury officials was held 
in Flett's room on 25 March to decide what sort of credit facilities should be offered to 
Japan.46 Present were Flett, Serpell and Ogilvy-Webb from the Treasury, and Watson, 
Hogg and Bugler from the Bank of England 47 Of the several facilities considered, they 
rejected the possibility of loans from the American account sterling, or asking Japan to 
sell its US dollars for sterling. The first option was rejected because it could eventually 
leave the UK with an unknown future liability to the dollar area. The second option was 
also considered inadvisable, as the pendulum in trade relations could swing back in the 
future, in which case there was a possibility that Japan might ask for dollar 
convertibility if their sterling reserves amounted to an unwieldy sum again.48 
Furthermore, Japan was expected to refuse these offers because it was unwilling to use 
dollars in the sterling area. The introduction of usance bills49 and increasing credit lines 
were also considered, but the effect of the usance bills were thought to take far too long 
to help the Japanese in the months ahead, while the idea of increasing credit lines was 
rejected because Japan had only used £27 million of the £83 million credits offered to
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it. The most feasible options were therefore, sterling/dollar swaps50 and the reduction 
of the credit cover. A sterling/dollar swap was initially opposed by the Bank of England 
but it was considered the most practical credit facility to offer to Japan because it would 
alleviate Japan's sterling shortage immediately. Furthermore, a sterling/dollar swap 
facility had recently been offered to Brazil; therefore, it would not be considered an 
anomalous British policy. Moreover, Treasury officials indicated that swaps might be 
more preferable to ministers than the idea of a further relaxation of import restrictions 
on Japanese goods, especially in the light of the difficulties the Treasury and Foreign 
Office officials faced when they had recently tried to increase Japanese imports into the 
sterling area.51 On credit cover, it was not known whether commercial banks would 
reduce Japan's credit cover from fifty percent to twenty-five percent, which was the 
percentage American banks required for dollar credits from Japan. The Bank of 
England stated that credit cover was something that was decided by each individual 
institution and that they were reluctant to interfere in the decisions of commercial 
banks.52
The series of meetings with Tojo opened on 30 March. Two meetings were held on the 
first day of the talks. There was not much progress in any of the agendas except for 
one: third country transfers. Serpell had taken the opportunity to tell the Japanese 
delegates53 that the British government could not sympathize with the Japanese position 
as long as they refused to expand the countries from which they accepted third country 
sterling. This seemed to have had some effect as the Japanese delegates offered to 
accept sterling from all countries outside the US dollar and the open account areas.54 At 
the fifth meeting on 7 April Tojo confirmed that the proposals put to Tokyo had been 
accepted, and that the Bank of England could therefore, 'resume the practice of 
approving inward transfers from transferable account countries'.55 There were further 
talks two days later between Hogg and Crawshaw of the Bank of England with Tojo, 
Murai and Ihara on third country transfers. It was decided that Japan would allow trade 
with all but the dollar area and open account countries to be financed alternatively in 
dollars and sterling.56 This meant that Japan would pay dollars for imports and receive 
sterling for exports. Furthermore, Japan asked that it be allowed to accept sterling on an 
ad hoc basis for individual transactions from the open account countries. Although this 
arrangement was not favoured by the Bank of England (especially because of 
administrative difficulties for the Bank) it was thought that the Bank might accept the 
arrangement during the difficult period.57 Furthermore, Tojo told the Bank officials that 
he was taking steps to see if Japan might be able to use sterling 'to pay for goods and 
services passing between Japan and all other countries outside the dollar area and open 
account countries whether financed intermediately by merchants or not'.58 However, 
the progress made over third country transfers in London came to nothing when on 13
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April Murai called Crawshaw to say that there was a misunderstanding over the 
agreement reached earlier, and asked for the exclusion of further countries from the 
third country transfer arrangement.59 The Japanese were embarrassed over having to 
go back on decisions already reached, and The Bank and Treasury officials made a 
great show of the Japanese reversal. As a result, on 20 April, the Japanese agreed to 
accept sterling from the Portuguese monetary area, Saudi Arabia and the French Somali 
Coast, but expressed their unwillingness to accept sterling from the Belgian monetary 
area,60 Switzerland and Liechtenstein.61
Discussions over the issue of credit facilities began in earnest at the fifth meeting on 7 
April when Tojo circulated a paper setting out Japanese views on the possible credit 
facilities open to Japan. As had been predicted by the Treasury and Bank of England 
officials, Japan was reluctant to use usance bills for imports because of the time it 
would take before the bills took effect. Furthermore; it was opposed to the outright sale 
of dollars to the sterling area, and as an extension of this principle, the Japanese 
government was not happy with the idea of sterling/dollar swaps as Japan would have 
to sell dollars at the outset.62 Conversely, the Japanese proposed a reduction in the 
margin of Japan's credit cover from fifty percent to twenty-five percent as in dollar 
transactions, and also expressed the hope that the Bank of England would extend loans 
without collateral to the MOF.63 Serpell in reply thought it was doubtful whether 
commercial banks would reduce their credit cover to Japan, but did not discourage the 
Japanese officials from meeting with commercial bank representatives. In respect to a 
loan without collateral, neither the Treasury or the Bank of England officials could 
extend such loans because there was a possibility that it would weaken the pound, and 
it was also contrary to their general credit policy.64 At the following meeting, the 
results of discussions between Murai and British commercial banks were reported. 
Unsurprisingly, the Japanese had been unable to persuade the banks to change the 
credit margin towards Japan.65 As both options favoured by Japan—the reduction of 
credit margin and a Bank of England loan without collateral—were blocked to the 
Japanese, Tojo asked for UK assistance in the light of Japan's agreement to renew the 
sterling payments agreement in December and the trade relaxations towards the sterling 
area in October. Furthermore, Tojo pointed out that Japan had come a long way to meet 
the UK on third country transfers, and they stressed that they would be disappointed if 
the talks did not lead to a satisfactory conclusion.66 Serpell acknowledged the points 
presented by the Japanese side, and fully accepted the need for an early decision on 
credit facilities. At the seventh meeting two days later, Serpell offered sterling/dollar 
swaps to Japan for a period of up to six months. If the market was unable to provide 
sufficient swap facilities or were unable to continue the swaps for the full six months, 
he stressed that the Bank of England was prepared to offer the necessary facilities on
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the same basis.67 The meetings thereafter were spent working on various drafts of the 
agreed minute. In the meantime, the government in Japan approved Britain's 
sterling/dollar swaps; and Tojo remained in London until the agreed minute was signed 
on 29 April.68 The two main decisions reached in London between the Japanese 
representatives and Treasury and the Bank of England officials were the introduction of 
limited third country transfers to and from Japan, and the offer of a six month 
sterling/dollar swap facilities of £25 million to Japan.
American Observations
During this period, the American Embassy in Tokyo was constantly keeping the State 
Department informed of the progress in the Anglo-Japanese payments talks. The most 
interesting of the reports despatched to the State Department was written by Frank A. 
Waring, Counselor for Economic Affairs in the Embassy. In his report, dated 6 May, 
he highlighted the enthusiasm expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Okazaki 
Katsuo, about sterling trade. Waring reported that Okazaki had informed a Diet 
committee which was monitoring the Anglo-Japanese discussions that Japan was 
considering the possibility of converting all of its dollar expressed open-account 
agreements with Southeast Asian countries to sterling bilateral agreements.69 
Furthermore, he identified the MITI and the MOFA as most attracted by the possibility 
of shifting Japan's trade with the dollar area to sterling-expressed payments 
arrangements.70 Waring reported that there were various government officials who 
supported such a move because of their pessimism over Japan's future dollar position. 
He also noted that several business and financial groups, who were advocating the 
establishment of an Asian payments union with settlements in sterling and an expansion 
in the use of sterling to trade with the PRC, were also supporting such a move.71 The 
second point of interest was Waring's scepticism about Britain's drive to wean Japan 
from the dollar area to the sterling area. Although he saw the inevitability of Japan 
moving towards regional trade (as advocated by the United States as well as Britain), 
he questioned Britain's motive in drawing Japan—it's most serious competitor in 
Southeast Asia—into the sterling fold. His scepticism arose from the fact that Britain 
was making promises of freer sterling area-Japan trade, but restricting imports of 
Japanese goods, and showing a reluctance to maximize sterling area exports of raw 
materials to Japan.72
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Britain's Policy towards the Intersessional Committee
In the meantime, having succeeded in postponing Japan's GATT accession until the 
beginning of 1953, Britain had to establish its position towards the February 
intersessional committee meeting. In late December 1952, the Foreign Secretary 
suggested in a letter to the Board of Trade that the two departments prepare a Cabinet 
paper on the question of Japan's GATT accession. This was agreed and a preliminary 
paper was prepared by the Board of Trade officials on 2 January.73 The paper 
recommended that Japan should be associated with the world community of trading 
nations, which was a constructive step forward for the Board of Trade as previously it 
had argued that Britain should either opt out of the GATT or defer its position towards 
Japan's membership.74 Therefore, the Board of Trade was finally agreeing in principle 
to Japan's GATT accession. The Board of Trade, however, sought to include a 
protective clause in Japan's provision of access to enable the other contracting parties to 
take '..."emergency'' action to deal with an intensification of Japanese competition in 
particular goods or in particular localities when they were deemed to be causing or 
threatening serious injury'.75 In short, the protective clause was to be inserted into 
Japan's protocol for accession to enable Britain, the Commonwealth and the colonies to 
take emergency action against Japan. The Board of Trade justified its decision on the 
ground that Japan was a low-cost producer. Britain also feared the repetition of Japan's 
commercial malpractices of the inter-war period such as copying of designs.76 This 
emergency action was to be based on article 19 of the GATT which stipulated that:
...(if) any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in 
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly 
competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such 
product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or 
remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to 
withdraw or modify the concession.77
The most conspicuous aspect of the Board of Trade's proposal was the fact that article 
19 emergency action was to be aimed at Japan alone. Not knowing how the other 
departments were going to react to the proposal, the Board of Trade decided to circulate 
its proposal to Foreign Office and Treasury officials and wait for their feedback.
On 9 January, the first inter-ministerial meeting on article 19 was held at the Board of 
Trade. The Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office, 
the Ministry of Supply and the Treasury officials all agreed to the Board of Trade's 
proposal.78 The Foreign Office agreed to the new proposal because the Board of Trade 
had finally lifted its objection to Japan's GATT accession in principle.79 If the Foreign 
Office had any reservations, it was their concern over the American reaction to the
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proposal. The Foreign Office, however, believed there was a chance that it could be 
accepted by other countries, including the United States, if it was skillfully presented.80
On 13 January Winthrop Brown of the US embassy met with CW Sanders of the 
Board of Trade at the latter's request. The objective of the meeting was to inform the 
Americans of the latest British position towards Japan and the GATT.81 Winthrop 
Brown's reaction to the new proposal was less favourable than expected. In a telegram 
to Dulles, Brown expressed his reasons for his opposition to the British proposal.82 He 
believed that the implementation of article 19(b) would be acceptable if it was to 'restore 
previously reduced duties' in the preferential markets, but he was against 'greater or 
new increases' as the British were intending.83 Second, he thought that it would be 
better to extend preferential treatment to Britain's Commonwealth countries on a case- 
by-case basis, rather than to see the emergency action implemented directly against 
Japan. Third, he thought that discriminatory action against products of a named country 
was contrary to the principles of the GATT; it could establish an 'undesirable 
precedent' among contracting parties. Moreover, Brown thought that other contracting 
parties would be shocked by such a discriminatory proposal from Britain, one of the 
chief architects of the GATT.84
While waiting for the State Department's formal views on Britain's proposal, Brown 
and his colleagues took it upon themselves to visit the Board of Trade and the Foreign 
Office to express their concern over Britain's proposed position at the intersessional 
committee meeting. On 14 January Brown visited JE Coulson, Assistant Under­
secretary of State in the Foreign Office, to express his objection to the Board of 
Trade's proposal.85 The day after that Arthur Ringwalt and Joseph Todd went to see 
Tim Marten of the Japan and Pacific Department and DAH Wright, of the Economics 
Department.86 On 17 January Brown visited Sanders of the Board of Trade to find out 
how the Board of Trade's Cabinet proposal was developing,87 perhaps, with the hope 
that the barrage of visits by US Embassy officials might change the views of the Board 
of Trade and the Foreign Office on Japan’s GATT entry. If the US officials had such 
hopes they were to be disappointed, as on 22 January Eden and Thomeycroft submitted 
a joint memorandum to the Cabinet along the lines agreed at the meeting of 9 January.
At the Cabinet meeting Thomeycroft proposed that Britain seek the support of other 
countries sympathetic to British views for a proposal that a 'special protocol of 
accession' should be inserted for Japan, which would enable countries to discriminate 
against Japanese goods along the lines of article 19, not only when Japanese products 
'caused or threatened to cause serious injury to the domestic industries of the 
contracting party, but also if they caused or threatened to cause serious injury to the
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exports of a contracting party to territories in an area within which preferential 
arrangements were permitted under GATT’.88 In discussion, there was some concern 
over the unpopularity of this proposal, especially in the United States. Butler thought 
that the ultimate solution lay in the relaxation of the 'no-new-preference' rule. Despite 
some hesitancy by other Cabinet members, it was agreed that in the first instance, the 
UK should seek the response of the other intersessional members, and it was agreed 
that Britain's line could be altered according to the preliminary consultation results.89
On the following day telegrams were despatched to UK embassies and consulates in the 
intersessional member countries, and also to Japan, to seek their views on the UK 
proposal. The meeting of the Cabinet was followed by further visits by Brown and 
Todd to the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office, while British Embassy officials in 
Washington were also asked to meet State Department officials.90 American opposition 
to the British proposal was based on two points: the political difficulty of singling out 
Japan for special discriminatory treatment, and whether article 19 was the legitimate 
article under which Britain should try and protect its trade in third countries. Their 
inclination was to break the problem into specific cases in order to determine whether 
the problem could be solved without discriminating against Japan.91 A further meeting 
was held between the officials of the UK embassy and the State Department on 28 
January, in which the Americans hinted that they might be willing to consider the 
British position as long as 'unfair competition' was defined by an objective criterion in 
the protocol of the Japanese accession to the GATT.92 They nevertheless remained 
opposed to the proposal in principle, and State Department officials proposed other 
possibilities such as a recourse to article 25 which would enable the contracting parties 
to waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party provided that it was approved 
by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast.93 American officials decided that an Anglo- 
American agreement should be reached before the discussion transferred to the public 
arena and therefore US delegates to the intersessional meeting decided to stop in 
London to meet Whitehall officials before the start of the intersessional committee 
meeting in Geneva on 2 February.94
The Anglo-American meeting in London ended without any meeting of minds due to 
American dissatisfaction with the British proposal.95 JA Snellgrove of the Economics 
Department, who attended the meeting came to the conclusion that Britain had five 
courses open to them; to go ahead with the original proposal despite American 
opposition; to revert to article 25 or 35, in which case, Britain would be assured of 
American support at the intersessional committee meeting; to announce the British 
decision to invoke article 35, and simultaneously conclude an exchange of notes with 
Japan which would enable Japan to have MFN rights subject to an escape clause; to
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reserve Britain's position; to accept Japan's accession on the condition that Britain's 
preferential markets in the Commonwealth and the colonies were protected.96 The first 
three solutions were considered retrograde, because they would lead to a deterioration 
in relations with Japan and therefore were ruled out. The fourth was considered as a 
stalling tactic. The last proposal was considered by Snellgrove as the most realistic step 
for Britain. Snellgrove, therefore, proposed with the Japan and the Pacific 
Department's approval that Britain should attempt to persuade the GATT officials that 
the article 19 proposal was the best solution, and if this failed, the Foreign Office 
should support the fifth proposal, and if that failed, Britain should resort to the 
fourth.97
Meanwhile telegrams were arriving back from various UK embassies and consulates 
with regard to other contracting parties' views on the British proposal. Many, such as 
Norway, expressed sympathy with the British position;98 some gave unconditional 
support to Japan in its bid to accede such as Chile;99 while others such as Cuba and 
Italy remained unsure about what course they would take with regard to Japan's 
accession to the GATT.100 Those who were opposed to Japan's GATT accession 
outright were Australia and South Africa.101 The response from the UK embassy in 
Tokyo, was as expected very critical of the British proposal. The telegram indicated the 
strong government and business desire for Japan to accede to the GATT and warned 
Britain of the consequences of their action. If the article 19 protocol was introduced, 
Dening thought that Japan might consider themselves 'fully justified in taking any and 
every action open to them to get their own back, whether legitimate or not'.102 Dening 
also thought that many of the nations were going to follow the US lead, therefore, he 
suggested that if the United States opposed the protocol, Britain should back down.103
By the start of the intersessional committee meeting, the view in Britain was that most 
of the contracting parties were sympathetic to the British position, but many were 
unwilling to make any decision until the American position became clearer. Therefore, 
the British position was to attempt to get the delegates' approval on an informal basis. 
If its suggestions were rejected, Britain was to ascertain the best alternative proposal 
from the delegates. The British delegation in Geneva was instructed against accepting 
an alternative solution itself, and instead asked to report back to London. The Cabinet 
could then 'consider whether the solution was acceptable', and if so, take steps to 
canvass industry and the parliamentary committees concerned.104 Although the United 
States view was to play a dominant role at the intersessional committee meeting, the 
American position was not well defined, partly because the new administration had 
only recently taken office and policy towards the intersessional committee meeting was 
slow in forming. More importantly, although the United States was in favour of
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Japan's eventual GATT accession, they were unable to grant a quick accession while 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was still being discussed in Congress.105
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and its significance on the first year of the 
Eisenhower administration can only be understood by the fact that Eisenhower's 
platform for the presidency had included an emphasis on the need for a liberal foreign 
economic policy, and this was opposed by a protectionist minority of the Republican 
party who held key positions in Congress. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was 
first passed by Congress in 1934. It did not repeal the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 
1930, but it had authorized the President to negotiate agreements with other countries 
for mutual reductions in tariff rates of up to 50 percent of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.106 
Therefore, the power over tariffs passed from Congress to the President in the 1930s. 
Eisenhower faced opposition to the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as 
a small Republican minority believed that freer trade through lower tariffs was a 
'Democratic-inspired program that challenged the nation's economic interests by 
fostering increased foreign competition'.107 The protectionist elements within the 
Republican Party held key positions in the congressional committees which the 
Reciprocal Trade Bill had to pass through, such as the Senate Finance Committee and 
the Committee on Ways and Means. Moreover, a conservative Republican, Richard 
Simpson of Pennsylvania, introduced a bill (HR 4294), which aimed at a rise in 
existing tariff levels and import quotas. The Chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Daniel A. Reed of New York, who was an old guard Republican, chose to hold 
hearings on the Simpson Bill while ignoring the administration's trade bill.108 By June, 
it became apparent that neither sides of the Republican Party were going to win. The 
Simpson Bill was defeated, and Eisenhower realized that it was impossible to reverse 
the historic Republican protectionist position within the short time before the expiration 
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Therefore Eisenhower asked Congress for a 
one-year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and dropped his request for 
additional rate cutting powers. Moreover, he promised not to negotiate new trade deals 
during that year, thereby preventing America from conducting tariff negotiations with 
Japan in 1953. Meanwhile the administration concentrated on the study of a 
comprehensive economic programme, in order to rally support for freer trade policies. 
This study became known as the Randall Report.109
In the meantime, Japan was not sitting idly by. Its representatives were busy seeking 
information concerning the respective positions of the GATT intersessional committee 
members. Most interesting were the records of meetings between Hagiwara Torn, the 
head of Japan's GATT observer delegation, and the Executive Secretary of the GATT, 
Eric Wyndham White, due to the latter's optimism in regard to Japan's GATT
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accession. Hagiwara was reassured on 23 January that every effort would be made by 
Wyndham White to enable Japan to complete tariff negotiations by September.110 He 
also received Wyndham White's assurance that none of the intersessional committee 
members were intending to postpone Japan's application or take a negative attitude 
towards Japan's accession. Furthermore, Hagiwara was told that Britain's proposed 
safeguard clause should be acceptable to Japan.111 Hagiwara thought Wyndham 
White's timetable for Japan's GATT entry was too optimistic, and his view was 
supported by Matsumoto Shunichi, the Japanese Ambassador to Britain112
The Intersessional Committee Meeting
The intersessional committee meeting to discuss Japan's accession to the GATT began 
on 2 February in Geneva. The members of the intersessional committee were Australia, 
Cuba, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Pakistan, Brazil, France, South Africa, Canada, 
Germany, Chile, India, the United States and Britain. The meeting was chaired by 
Johan Melander, the Director of Commercial Policy in the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.113 There was very little progress on the first day. The British 
delegation tried to canvass the American and Canadian delegations but they made little 
headway, and Snellgrove reported back to the Foreign Office in London that North 
America's final position on the British proposal was likely to be unfavourable.114 
Meanwhile, an alternative proposal was put forward by Wyndham White during an 
informal discussion between the delegates of the United States, Canada, Australia and 
Britain on 3 February. The proposal was to include article 23 in the protocol of 
accession rather than article 19.115 Article 23 stipulated that if a contracting party 
experienced problems in regard to another member, the matter could be brought to the 
attention of the GATT, and the contracting parties would promptly investigate the 
matter and make appropriate recommendations. According to Snellgrove, the article 23 
formula prevented Japan from being singled out as the 'only possible sinner', thus 
avoiding any appearance of discrimination and would therefore be more acceptable to 
Japan and the GATT members.116 Conversely, there were disadvantages, such as the 
inclusion of a paragraph in the actual text of the GATT laws which restricted the injured 
party from taking action until after consultations with the contracting parties; 
furthermore, as the new proposal was not targeted at any one particular country there 
was a danger of a wider application of article 23, especially in the event of currency 
depreciation; moreover, Britain would still have to resort to article 19 until a situation 
developed where it clearly justified a resort to article 23.117 The Foreign Office was far 
from satisfied with this new proposal. It was against the possible inclusion of a 
paragraph in the GATT regulations enabling contracting parties to undertake 
discriminatory action against another member; furthermore, it was afraid that it might 
lead to the use of article 23 against Britain, which might expose British exports to 'all
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manner of discriminatory action1.118 Therefore, the Foreign Office instructed British 
delegates to participate in the amendment of the text, so that any discriminatory action 
would be confined to certain situations, and instructed the delegates to communicate to 
the rest of the delegates that the new proposal was far from acceptable to Britain.119
Meanwhile, in Geneva, a working party-made up of the representatives of Australia, 
Canada, Cuba, France, Germany, India, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States—was established under the Chairman in order to discuss the possible 
escape clauses available to the contracting parties. The British delegation argued for the 
British approach, but none of the delegates, especially the United States, supported a 
clause that singled out Japan. Therefore, it became clear that the British line would have 
to be dropped. The next best safeguard available to Britain was to support the proposal 
based on article 23.120 On 6 February, a drafting committee consisting of Britain, the 
United States, Canada, France, Pakistan and the Executive Secretary was created in 
order to draft a proposal based on article 23.121
In Britain, the Cabinet met on 10 February to decide what line the British delegates 
should take in Geneva.122 It was decided that Britain should support the new proposal 
but that every attempt should be made to amend it to enable a contracting party to 
undertake discriminatory action without having to seek the other members' prior 
approval. If this approach failed, the British delegates were to accept the original 
proposal on the condition that the contracting parties' approval could be sought after 
emergency action had been undertaken by the member. If this also proved to be 
unsatisfactory, they were to reserve their position.123
Back in Geneva, the question of 'prior approval' was discussed by working party 
members on 11 February. The British delegates argued for a contracting party to be 
able to take unilateral emergency action before seeking GATT approval, but both the 
Americans and the Canadians opposed the British position, as they thought it unlikely 
that a serious situation would arise overnight. Moreover, they thought that it was 
against the spirit of the GATT for a member to take unilateral action.124 The Americans 
had a further problem with the wording of any protocol which specified 'serious injury1 
as the new Eisenhower administration was attempting to tighten emergency provisions 
in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement in order to reduce the number of applications for 
tariff increases by inefficient domestic producers.125 For this reason, the Americans 
were against the use of the words 'serious injury' in the declaration which could be 
cited by domestic producers to protect their business against foreign competition. This 
was acknowledged and the words 'violent disruption of trading conditions' were 
inserted instead of 'serious injury'. Therefore, the only problem to be ironed out by the
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drafting committee was the issue of 'prior approval'. This issue was finally resolved 
when the drafting committee decided that the contracting party would be able to take 
provisional, emergency action if the other members were unable to reach a decision 
within thirty days after the situation was reported.126
The report of the intersessional committee was finalized and adopted on 13 February. 
The main points of the report were first that, Japan should be admitted into the GATT. 
Second, it was agreed that emergency action based on article 23 could be taken against 
any member if it produced or threatened violent disruption of trading conditions 
through its export practices so as to affect a significant sector or sectors of production 
of one or more contracting parties.127 Under this emergency action, the injured party 
was to report the situation to the GATT, and if after thirty days no decision was reached 
among the contracting parties, the injured party was eligible to take interim emergency 
action. It was agreed that this emergency action would be a declaration which could be 
authorized by any member under paragraph two of Article 23; therefore, it was 
unnecessary to revise the GATT laws.128 Third, it was agreed that Japan's tariff 
negotiations should be handled at a single general tariff conference, and last of all, the 
report recommended that a special session should be convened to enable the contracting 
parties to reach a decision concerning the nature and the timing of tariff negotiations 
with Japan.129A number of delegates including those from Brazil, Denmark, Belgium, 
France and Italy emphasized that they were adopting the report ad referendum.130 The 
United States made it known that it was unable to make a commitment to enter tariff 
negotiations with Japan while the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was being 
discussed in Congress. The next step, therefore, was for the contracting parties to 
endorse the report. This would be done by postal vote to the Secretariat, indicating 
whether they were ready to open tariff negotiations with Japan on the terms outlined in 
the report.131
Japan had a group of ten Japanese representatives in Geneva.132 After the completion 
of the intersessional committee meeting, a telegram was sent to the MOFA, in which the 
delegates reported that they had no objections to the intersessional report, as Japan did 
not have to fulfill any criteria to join the GATT, nor did Japan's condition for entry 
include any drawbacks.133 What was interesting was Hagiwara's report on the 
intersessional meeting, and his report on Britain’s attitude towards Japan. Hagiwara 
was on the whole favourable towards Britain, as it had for the first time lifted its 
objection against Japan's GATT entry. Moreover, he wrote that British officials had 
stressed the fact that Britain was not against Japan's long-term trade recovery, and that 
the safeguards were proposed in order to ensure Britain against unforeseen trade
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practices.134 Therefore, Japan was made aware of Britain's attempts to maintain 
amicable relations with Japan.
British officials had cause to be satisfied with the outcome of the intersessional 
committee meeting. Although they were unable to persuade other members to agree to 
the British proposal of an escape clause based on article 19 of the GATT, they were 
able to safeguard their position by retaining the right to take action in case of 'violent 
disruption of trading conditions'.135 Although the delegates had not solved the question 
of the 'timing' of Japan's accession, they were able to reach a decision on the 
'conditions' which was considered a significant step forward by all the participants of 
the February meeting. The minutes in the Foreign Office indicate that there was overall 
relief at the outcome of the meeting, and it was recognized that the bulk of the work 
would not have been completed without the joint efforts of the American, Canadian and 
British delegates in Geneva.136
The initial euphoria in Britain was short-lived, however, as the general feeling in the 
Foreign Office grew that Britain might have made too many compromises in order to 
reach an agreed settlement with the Americans and the Canadians. In a matter of a few 
months, the British position had changed from their declared intent not to confer MFN 
rights to Japan to accepting Japan's GATT membership without strong safeguards to 
protect British industries.137 The Foreign Office initially became concerned when the 
US suggested extending the discussion period from thirty to sixty days. If the United 
States' proposal was accepted it would have meant a further weakening of safeguards 
in case of a threat to British industry. The Foreign Office also realized that the Board of 
Trade was sceptical of the agreement reached in Geneva, because of the need for 'prior 
approval' from the contracting parties. Therefore, the dilemma faced by the Foreign 
Office was whether to approach the United States first, to inform them that they would 
go no further than the thirty-day discussion period, or to approach the Board of Trade 
and persuade them that the thirty-day period should be accepted in order to reach an 
agreement with the rest of the contracting parties. It was decided that the Board of 
Trade should be approached first, although the Foreign Office was resigned to the fact 
that it would have to 'bolster up the Board of Trade with very strong arguments' to 
force them to accept the agreed period.138 A month later, Snellgrove was informed that 
the Board of Trade had rejected the report reached by the intersessional committee in 
Geneva and was proposing that Britain should invoke article 35 against Japan should it 
be admitted to the GATT.139 The Foreign Office, therefore, were placed in the 
undesirable position of having to 'revive all the arguments' they had used on previous 
occasions.140
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The issue was discussed by the Cabinet on 14 May. Three memoranda were submitted 
for discussion.141 One by the Board of Trade, one by the Foreign Office and one by 
the Treasury. The Board of Trade's position on the issue of Japan's GATT accession 
was to reject the intersessional committee report based on article 23 as Britain's 
freedom to act against unfavourable competition would be dependent on the majority 
vote of the GATT. What the Board of Trade wished to protect was the freedom for 
British industries to discriminate against 'violent and disruptive competition' 
unilaterally. Therefore, they proposed that Britain should abstain from voting on the 
principle of Japan's accession and inform the contracting parties that Britain might 
resort to invoking article 35 at the next session of the GATT. Furthermore, the Board 
of Trade proposed that Britain should not extend MFN rights to Japan until there was 
time to see how Britain would fare in competition with Japan in more 'normal' 
circumstances, and until they were more certain of America's overall commercial 
policy. The Board of Trade also placed great importance on the fact that South Africa, 
Australia, New Zealand and possibly France appeared determined to invoke article 35. 
In order to prevent political difficulties with the Southern Dominions, they argued that it 
was better for Britain to stand together with them and invoke article 35.142
The Foreign Office put forward the argument, as in the past, that Japan should have 
access to markets if it was to make a living in the 'free' world. Furthermore, they 
argued that Britain should vote for Japanese accession in order to enable the latter to 
take the road of international cooperation. The Board of Trade's proposal of abstention 
would have various consequences, such as the fact that it would be contradictory to the 
basic principles of a collective approach to freer world trade; it would be going against 
the policy of increasing trade between the sterling area and Japan and against increasing 
Japan's confidence in the use of sterling; it would jeopardize good relations between 
Britain and Japan; it would add one additional difference between the United States and 
the United Kingdom in East Asia; it would give Japan an excuse to go back to its 
malpractices; it would be helping communist propaganda in Asia; and the British 
position would cause surprise and disappointment among the intersessional committee 
members of the GATT, especially as the recent report had been drafted largely to meet 
Britain's difficulties.143
The Treasury submitted a memorandum which was sympathetic to the Foreign Office's 
views. Highlighted in the memorandum was the view that Britain had no firm policy 
towards Japan concerning economic matters. It was concerned that Britain was on the 
one hand encouraging expanded trade relations between the sterling area and Japan, 
while on the other hand it was finding arguments to restrict purchases from Japan. 
Furthermore, the memorandum referred to Britain's attempts to restrict Japan's GATT
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entry. The Treasury indicated that Britain could not go on much longer along these lines 
and proposed a similar study to that undertaken by an inter-ministerial working party in 
1951 to examine Britain's economic policy towards Japan.144
At the Cabinet meeting, Thomeycroft agreed with Butler that the issues should be fully 
examined before any decision was taken. He emphasized, however, that he would 
rather this issue be examined by ministers than officials. Therefore, the Cabinet decided 
to establish a Cabinet committee on tariff policy towards Japan chaired by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, consisting of the Commonwealth Secretary, the Colonial 
Secretary, the President of the Board of Trade, the Paymaster-General and the Minister 
of State at the Foreign Office.145
The decision to undertake an inter-ministerial study on British economic policy towards 
Japan was supported by most ministries. In fact, there had been a call for such a study 
as early as 1952, after Malcolm MacDonald's visit to Japan between 29 June and 8 July 
1952.146 In his correspondence to Anthony Eden on his return to Singapore, 
MacDonald had indicated his desire to see the establishment of such a committee. There 
were some, such as TH Sinclair of the Board of Trade, however, who saw the 
establishment of an inter-ministerial committee as an attempt by 'other ministers to 
make sure that full weight is given to the external consequences of policy as opposed to 
the President's emphasis on the internal political difficulties of accepting Japan into the 
GATT'.147
The Report
The first meeting of the tariff policy on Japan committee was held on 5 June 1953. At 
the meeting, it was decided that a more 'consistent economic policy' towards Japan was 
needed, and it was decided that preliminary studies on the following questions should 
be undertaken:
(D Japanese Competition with the United Kingdom
How far is Japan competitive with the United Kingdom both now, and 
potentially, in the main fields of industry (e.g. textiles, engineering, etc.)? This 
should include a study of the colonial markets.
How far, and for what reasons, is Japan to be feared more than other competing 
countries in these fields?
In what countries is Japanese competition most to be feared?
(ii) Japan's Economic Relationship with the Sterling Area
How far is Japan dependent on the sterling area as a source of supplies and for 
markets for her exports? In this connection, the prospects for United States aid
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and of a cessation of procurement for the war in Korea, together with the 
prospects for a re-opening of trade with China should be taken into account.
How far does the sterling area need to look to Japan as a source of supplies, 
and as a market for exports, including invisibles? In particular, what is the 
position as between Japan and the United Kingdom itself?
(iii) Balance of Payments
What are the sterling area/Japan balance of payments prospects, and their 
implications in the short term (i.e. 1953/1954), and in the long term?
(iv) GATE
What forms could Japanese disruptive competition, unfair practices, etc., take? 
What safeguards against them exist, and what safeguards would exist if Japan 
were in the GATT?
What are the likely reactions of the colonies, Japan, Commonwealth countries, 
the United States and other contracting parties, to a decision by the United 
Kingdom to invoke Article 35 against Japan?
What action by these countries is likely if Japan is admitted to the GATT?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of a United Kingdom-Japan 
Commercial Treaty?148
Although Thomeycroft had asked for the establishment of an inter-ministerial 
committee, the committee on the tariff policy on Japan did very little work, and met 
only three times. The actual work was carried out by an inter-ministerial working party, 
and the report was discussed by the ONC. After the framework of the study was 
decided on 5 June, the working party set out to amass facts from various sources 
including the Washington and Tokyo embassies, and the High Commissioners in 
Commonwealth countries. A month later, on 7 July, a meeting of the ONC was held to 
discuss the report. The meeting concluded that the report was too lengthy and that it 
should be divided into four reports.149 Another meeting was held on 14 July to make 
further amendments to the report which was finalized on 16 July.150
The report attempted to answer the eleven questions above. Concerning Japanese 
competition with the United Kingdom, the report specified that the industries vulnerable 
to 'disruptive' competition from Japan were cotton textiles, rayon textiles, pottery, 
toys, finished steel, textile and other machinery, bicycles, cables, clocks, cameras and 
glassware.151 The amount of trade at risk was considered to be £70 million a year, or 
three percent of British total exports or 18 percent of British exports to East Asia 
(excluding Australia and New Zealand). Although these figures seemed low on the 
whole, in terms of the various industries the threat was larger. For example, the threat 
to cotton textiles and rayon textiles industries amounted to around thirty percent
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respectively. Other potentially threatening countries were also examined in the report, 
such as Germany, India and the United States. Germany was considered a greater 
threat in European markets, and a more dangerous competitor than Japan in specialized 
products such as in engineering. The report, however, identified the seriousness of 
Japanese competition in comparison to that of Germany and the United States, as it 
concentrated on 'particular industries and particular regions of the world'.152 India was 
identified as a potential threat, because of its low-cost textiles production, but the low 
wages paid in India were offset by a low rate of productivity. Furthermore, India 
concentrated on low-grade cottons which Lancashire no longer exported in large 
quantities. The United States was also considered a potential threat, but the general 
restrictions on dollar expenditure prevented America from becoming a greater threat to 
British industries. The markets which were considered most vulnerable to Japanese 
goods were those areas where cheapness was a decisive factor. Furthermore, there 
were worries that if East Asia was unable to absorb Japanese exports, then its goods 
might expand into South America, the Near East, the Middle East and Canada. British 
fears also arose from the fact that, even if the China market were reopened, it would not 
alleviate British problems as China was expected to concentrate on capital goods rather 
than consumer goods.
On Japan's economic relationship with the sterling area, the report indicated that neither 
Japan nor the sterling area were dependent on the other for materials except for Japan's 
purchases of wool. Japan's need for sterling area products was less a direct supply 
problem and more a function of its foreign exchange position. Japan's import 
programme was based on the reserves and expected earnings of the different 
currencies, and the bargaining strength of other countries with whom it had bilateral 
agreements. The peculiarity of Japan's foreign exchange budget rested on the strict 
division between dollar, sterling and open account expenditures (see table 4.1). 
Therefore, as long as Japan had ample dollar reserves, it was not expected to be over- 
reliant on the sterling area (Japan was not expected to be short of dollars for another 
two years). However, the 'underdeveloped' territories of the sterling area looked to 
Japanese goods as a valuable source of cheap manufactures (especially textiles and light 
metal products). Japanese goods were deemed important as a means of preventing 
inflation in those countries. In view of the poverty of the inhabitants of the new 
Dominions and colonies, it was politically impracticable for them to do without 
Japanese goods. Furthermore, Japan was dependent on its ability to sell to the sterling 
area. Japan was considered likely to become more reliant on the sterling area in the 
future, as its ability to expand to the dollar area was not bright, while the prospects of 
expansion into the open account countries were not good either (Japan conducted 
bilateral trade agreements with the open account countries which meant that Japan had
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to balance trade on a bilateral basis. The disadvantage of this system was that Japan had 
to buy products regardless of the price or quality in order to balance trade). The report 
indicated that the loss of Japan as an outlet would be a serious matter for a number of 
sterling area countries (see tables 4.2 and 4.3 for the breakdown of Japan's trade with 
the sterling area). This was most evident on examining the percentage of some of the 
commodities (see table 4.4). Visible trade between the United Kingdom and Japan 
remained low and there was very little United Kingdom interest in expanding its visible 
exports to Japan. Visible exports amounted to £9 million a year, whereas sterling area 
invisible exports to Japan, such as oil sales, shipping, banking, merchanting, 
insurance, interest and royalties were much larger at £30 million in 1952. UK imports 
from Japan fluctuated in the £10 to £20 million range per year. Goods imported from 
Japan included hardwood, raw silk, white-beans, silver and limited quantities of grey 
cloth for re-processing. Japan's access to UK markets was limited by quantitative 
restrictions imposed on balance of payments grounds.153
With respect to the balance of payments prospects of the sterling area and Japan, the 
report was unable to offer a decisive recommendation because of fluctuations in Japan's 
sterling reserves. Although Britain had offered a £25 million sterling/dollar swap 
facility to Japan in order to restore Japan's sterling balances to £50-55 million by the 
end of 1953, the facility was not considered enough to enable Japan to overcome its 
deficit with the sterling area. The report identified three options open to Britain. To 
relax import restrictions to give Japan better access to sterling area markets; to force 
Japan to reduce its purchases from the sterling area generally; or to ask Japan to buy 
sterling using dollars or other currencies. There were snags to all three options. The 
first option would mean that Britain would lose the substantial trade it had built up in 
the colonies. If Britain forced Japan to reduce its purchases from the sterling area, as in 
the second option, there was a possibility that Japan would turn to other sources for 
trade. The third option was considered the best for Britain, but it was aware that Japan 
was against spending its dollars to purchase sterling. The report predicted that Japan 
might try to bring in dollar convertibility into the sterling payments agreement, if Britain 
tried to force Japan to use its dollars in the sterling area.154
On the GATT issue, the report attempted to identify the ways in which Japanese 
competition might prove to be 'disruptive'. It was, however, unable to come up with 
specific examples except the possible repetition of pre-war malpractices such as 
infringement of copyright laws and the practice of 'dumping'. The report identified 
several safeguards available to Britain if Japan entered the GATT. If Britain decided not 
to invoke article 35, it could safeguard its home market by increasing tariffs on a non- 
discriminatory basis, raise unbound MFN rates and negotiate increases in bound duties
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on MFN basis or implement article 19. The problem with the above options was that 
they would not help colonial, Commonwealth or foreign industries to safeguard their 
industries in British markets nor could they help Britain in their respective countries. 
Other options open to Britain were citing balance of payments as a means to restrict 
Japanese imports; the use of article 23; or the implementation of article 35. The report 
indicated that Britain would not be able to cite balance of payments as a reason for 
discriminating against Japanese goods in the long run, because Britain was expecting to 
move towards convertibility, in which case balance of payments arguments would no 
longer be applicable. Article 23 would enable Britain to safeguard its home market but 
Britain would not be able to discriminate against Japan without prior approval from a 
majority of the contracting parties. Conversely, article 35 would be limited to action in 
respect of Britain's domestic industries and its export interests in its colonies.
With regard to article 35, the report stressed that if Britain invoked it, there would be a 
division within the Commonwealth, as Canada, India and Pakistan were expected to 
support Japanese accession, while South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and South 
Rhodesia were expected to support Britain. Japan's reaction would be disappointment 
and anger, and there were fears that it might lead to a deterioration in Anglo-Japanese 
relations, and that the United States would consider the British government's action 
unreasonable.
On what action would be taken by these countries if Japan joined the GATT without 
any additional safeguards, the report concluded that it would result in an overall tariff 
increase. The report speculated that if article 23 was accepted by the GATT it could be 
used against Japan, but the report indicated that it would be unlikely that the article 23 
safeguard would be adopted at the GATT without British support. Britain was expected 
to benefit if the colonies, and the Southern Dominions decided to invoke article 23 or 
35. Neither India nor Pakistan was expected to take any action against Japan, while 
Canada was expected to make special arrangements for an arbitrary valuation to enable 
her to deal with the Japanese problem. The United States was expected to accept Japan 
with limited safeguards.
On the advantages and disadvantages of signing a commercial treaty, Britain had until 
mid-1956 to decide on what form of commercial treaty it should sign with Japan 
because the peace treaty of September 1951 had stipulated that Japan should give MFN 
treatment to all goods for four years after the ratification of the treaty. Various formulas 
for a commercial treaty with Japan were proposed such as a normal commercial treaty 
without a MFN-goods clause, or a treaty with a MFN clause which would enable 
Britain and the colonies to take unilateral defensive action in an emergency. The British
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embassy in Tokyo had already telegraphed to express the view that the first formula 
would be unacceptable to the Japanese. The report indicated that they did not expect 
Japan to accept the second option either, but it recommended that Britain should 'sound 
out' the United States and the Commonwealth countries on the proposal.
The report was mainly factual, and it highlighted the complexities behind British 
economic policy towards Japan. The main problem lay in the fact that Britain felt 
threatened by potential Japanese competition which might be violent and disruptive to 
British industries. Therefore, Britain wished to prevent Japan from being accorded the 
same MFN rights for goods as other countries. Although on the one hand, Britain 
wished to prevent Japan from becoming a threat, however, it was also aware of the 
importance of cheap Japanese goods for the 'underdeveloped' sterling area countries. 
Furthermore, various industries in the sterling area relied on sales of commodities to 
Japan, and therefore, despite the secondary importance of trade between the United 
Kingdom and Japan, Britain had to consider the future of the sterling area multilateral 
system. The situation was complicated further by the fact that there were fluctuations in 
the balance of trade between the United Kingdom and Japan. The problem facing 
Britain here was how to assist Japan in overcoming its deficit. Britain could either relax 
the overall sterling area import restrictions or ask Japan to restrict purchases from the 
sterling area. Both options had disadvantages for the United Kingdom and the sterling 
area. Moreover, in relation to the GATT, Britain had to find a policy which would not 
divide the Commonwealth countries or lead to a strain in relations with the United 
States. Therefore, Britain was faced with a complex dilemma consisting of domestic 
considerations, the position of the 'underdeveloped' sterling area countries, the future 
of the sterling area, and its relations with the United States.
The working party attempted to define a single British economic policy towards Japan, 
but as the content of the report indicates this was not possible. It is almost tempting to 
compare the first working party report of 1951 with the report of 1953, but this should 
be avoided as the issues presented to the working party in 1951 were less complex than 
those of 1953. Furthermore, the working party in 1951 had more than half a year to 
study Britain's relations with Japan, whereas the working party of 1953 only had two 
months.
A month and a half after the first Cabinet committee on tariff policy on Japan was 
convened, the second meeting was held on 22 July to discuss the report. Minutes 
indicate that there was no attempt by the committee members to integrate the two 
strands of the issue into one consistent policy towards Japan. This was partly because 
Britain was under pressure to establish a policy towards Japan before the next GATT
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session in September. Therefore, discussions were focused on the GATT issue, while 
it was decided that officials should continue examining UK commercial policy towards 
Japan.155 Thomeycroft, as was expected, argued that the United Kingdom should 
attempt to gain time to enable British industries to become resistant to Japanese 
competition. Moreover, the United States had indicated that they would be unable to 
undertake tariff negotiations with Japan in 1953. Therefore, he proposed that Britain's 
objective should be to defer the decision 'on the ground that the question remained 
hypothetical until it was possible to carry out the necessary tariff negotiations'.156 The 
Commonwealth Secretary, Viscount Swinton, said that it was impossible to generalize 
on the Commonwealth attitude towards Japan's GATT entry. Furthermore, he viewed 
the article 23 solution as ineffective in the protection of British industries. Both views 
were endorsed by the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton. The Joint Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Reading, however, was 
against any action which would 'greatly upset the Japanese'.157 He was not against the 
idea of postponing the question of Japan’s accession in September, but he told 
committee members that there was a movement towards accepting Japan on a 
provisional basis. The committee meeting concluded that Britain would attempt to get a 
deferment of the question during the next session of the GATT in September, but they 
also agreed to take the question to the Cabinet in order to decide what action Britain 
should take if deferment was not possible.158
The issue was brought to the Cabinet on 30 July 1953. The memoranda submitted by 
the Commonwealth Secretary and the Board of Trade both stressed that Britain should 
not accept the article 23 safeguard, because Britain would have to rely on a prior 
approval of the contracting parties. The Commonwealth Secretary went as far as to 
suggest that Britain should resort to invoking article 35.159 Neither the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer nor the President of the Board of Trade supported this view. Butler 
recommended that Britain not show its hand at the September session, due to the 
domestic, colonial, Commonwealth and foreign pressures.160 Thomeycroft also 
endorsed this view, and recommended that Britain should 'play for time, and refrain at 
the forthcoming conference from supporting Japan's entry into GATT or from defining 
in advance our attitude towards it'.161 Therefore, Thomeycroft, who was scheduled to 
attend the GATT session in September was authorized to 'refrain from supporting 
Japan's accession or defining in advance our attitude towards it, but to seek to have the 
issue deferred for a further period'.162
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Towards the Temporary Accession of Japan in the GATT
While these developments were taking place in Britain, the Executive Secretary of the 
GATT, Wyndham White was beginning to consider the temporary accession of Japan 
into the GATT.163 Wyndham White approached Hagiwara in early May and 
discussions followed on how to approach the other governments concerning this issue. 
Usually proposals of this kind were addressed to the other contracting parties through 
diplomatic channels in order to canvass their votes prior to the GATT session (as in the 
case of Britain and the article 19 proposal before the intersessional Committee meeting 
in February) but Hagiwara and White decided against an early approach to the other 
members. Instead the proposal would not be telegraphed to the other contracting parties 
until just prior to the GATT session.164
The two options now open to Japan were either to accede to the GATT through a minor 
tariff negotiation, also known as the Annecy formula165 or for Japan to accede to the 
GATT without prior negotiations, on the understanding that they would begin as soon 
as the freeze on tariff talks was lifted.166 It became apparent by July that the United 
States would be unable to endorse Japan into the GATT through the Annecy formula, 
as it was 'inconsistent with their commitment to Congress not to use renewed authority 
under the Trade Agreements Act for major tariff negotiations'.167 Therefore, Hagiwara 
and Wyndham White consolidated Japan's position towards its provisional GATT 
accession. Much time and energy went into writing the Japanese proposal, and the 
MOFA records indicate close collaboration between Wyndham White and Hagiwara in 
preparing a proposal that was most 'attractive' to the GATT contracting parties, in 
particular, to the United States.168
In mid-July, Wyndham White went to Washington and discussed his temporary 
accession proposal with officials.169 Although Dulles had agreed to this proposal by 
the end of July, the United States government was unable to endorse it until they had 
the approval of the interdepartmental trade agreements committee and congressional 
leaders. They were reluctant, nevertheless, to approach the committee or congressional 
leaders until the Reciprocal Trade Agreements act had been extended.170
Therefore by the end of July, it was not only Britain which was consolidating its 
position towards the question of Japan's accession to the GATT. While Britain had 
decided not to endorse Japan's accession to the GATT at the Cabinet meeting of 30 
July, the United States was leaning towards a temporary accession of Japan. 
Furthermore, Japan's provisional accession was discussed by the Japanese Cabinet and 
endorsed on 31 July.171
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Back in Britain, Whitehall officials had decided to notify Washington of Britain's 
decision, and a draft telegram drawn up by the Board of Trade was being circulated to 
the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of Exchequer for their approval when the 
Board of Trade received an airgram from Wyndham White conveying Japan's proposal 
for provisional membership.172 The Japanese letter conveyed its desire to enter into the 
GATT as a temporary member, as it did not foresee a general round of tariff 
negotiations in the immediate future. To compensate for this irregular procedure, Japan 
offered to bind a substantial number of its tariffs as quid pro quo. Moreover, the letter 
stressed that if no positive action was taken in regard to Japan's GATT accession at the 
eighth session, the Japanese government would be 'criticised and discouraged' from 
continuing its MFN treatment to the allied powers.173 To make their proposition 
attractive to the contracting parties, however, Japan suggested that if it was given 
provisional membership, commercial relations between Japan and the contracting 
parties would be based on the GATT, but that this 'interim arrangement’ would not 
prejudice the freedom of each individual contracting party over the question of Japan's 
permanent membership.174 The letter also indicated Japan's readiness to accept the 
'interpretation of article 23 set forth in the draft declaration recommended by the 
intersessional committee'.175 Furthermore, Japan expressed its readiness to negotiate 
'reciprocal tariff concessions with any GATT members which wishes to do so, with the 
idea that the resulting concessions would eventually be incorporated in the GATT 
schedule'.176 The untimely airgram from Geneva also conveyed the message that the 
US government supported Japan's provisional membership to the GATT.177
The telegram sent to Washington on 7 August, therefore, instructed the British embassy 
in Washington to ascertain whether it was true that the US administration was 
supporting Japan's provisional GATT membership, and to inform the US government 
that Britain wished to see the issue deferred for a further period, and that it hoped for 
American support for Britain's line.178 On 11 August, G. Parker and Mr. Scott of the 
British Embassy in Washington met with State Department officials. The American side 
represented by Samuel C Waugh, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs and John 
M. Leddy, Director of the Office of Economic Defense and Trade . Policy, was 
sympathetic to the British position, but were more concerned with the repercussions on 
US-Japan relations if they did not support Japan's proposal.179 When the result of the 
Washington meeting was relayed to the Foreign Office, the Marquess of Salisbury, 
who was the acting Foreign Secretary, sent a letter to Thomeycroft suggesting that 
Britain should accept Japan's provisional accession to the GATT, provided there were 
safeguards for Britain. He went on to suggest two possible safeguards. The first was 
the original British proposal of a safeguard according to article 19 of the GATT. The 
other, which he preferred, was the inclusion of an 'article 23' safeguard, with a
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provision which enabled the contracting parties to invoke article 35 at any time during 
Japan's provisional association.180 Thomeycroft rejected the Marquess of Salisbury's 
suggestion in his reply, because 'any form of Japanese association, however 
provisional in its technical status, must almost inevitably set the pattern in practice for 
Japan's later association on a permanent basis'.181 Furthermore, the Board of Trade 
decided that it should send telegrams to all Commonwealth countries in order to gain 
their support for the British position. When the Foreign Office was informed of this, 
they decided to take the issue to the Cabinet level in order to prevent the Board of Trade 
from pushing Britain towards an isolationist position within GATT. On 17 August, the 
Marquess of Salisbury sent a letter to Thomeycroft proposing to raise the matter at the 
Cabinet. In the letter he highlighted the dangers of resorting to what would be 
considered as invoking article 35 against Japan. He argued that it was better for Britain 
to accept Japan's provisional association and argue for implementation of certain 
safeguards rather than stand aside and let other members include Japan in the. 
association with less effective protection. He also argued that Britain would be in a 
better position to assess whether Japan would really be a potential menace by its 
temporary inclusion in the GATT.182
At the Cabinet meeting of 25 August the Marquess of Salisbury and Butler both hoped 
that little would be done to antagonize Japan, but Thomeycroft argued that Britain 
should abstain from voting, and this was supported by Swinton who believed in the 
importance of acting in 'concert with Australia and New Zealand'.183 The majority of 
the Cabinet members expressed support for the President of the Board of Trade and the 
Commonwealth Secretary's views and therefore it was decided that Britain should seek 
the cooperation of other Commonwealth countries, in particular Australia and New 
Zealand, in abstaining from voting on the question of Japan at the forthcoming session. 
It was also decided that if Thomeycroft, who was to attend the GATT session, was 
unable to obtain this support, the issue should be re-submitted to the Cabinet for further 
consideration.184
While the British government was deciding on its policy towards Japan's provisional 
accession, an intersessional committee of the GATT was being held between 17 to 20 
August in Geneva. The session was held in order to decide on an appropriate draft for 
the provisional participation of Japan in the GATT.185 The main points of the draft 
decision were that 'pending the conclusion of tariff negotiations, Japan will enjoy all 
the rights and obligations of the GATT including those of attending meetings, 
exercising a veto and paying a subscription. In return for this the Japanese government 
will agree to accord treatment of the Commerce of other contracting parties according to 
a schedule which they will present at the eighth session'.186 What worried the Foreign
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Office when they received this document was the fact that the draft decision drawn up 
by the intersessional committee did not include in the text any safeguards against 
Japanese competition, not even article 23 which had been discussed during the previous 
intersessional committee meeting in February. Therefore, although the British line was 
to abstain from voting for Japan, the Foreign Office representatives to the eighth GATT 
session were instructed to ensure through the 'medium of other delegations' that 
conditions for Japan's provisional membership would be drawn up so the wording 
would be acceptable to the British government in the future, when Japan applied for 
permanent membership.187
The British delegation had a difficult task ahead. It was instructed to abstain from 
voting for Japan's accession, but they were given instructions to influence the draft of 
Japan's temporary accession through the medium of other delegations, while attempting 
to rally the Commonwealth to join Britain in abstaining. A week before the start of the 
GATT session, Commonwealth representatives gathered in London where they held 
five preliminary Commonwealth discussions during a three-day period from 9 to 11 
September.188 Japan's accession was discussed during the fourth meeting on 10 
September.189 It became apparent during the meeting that both Ceylon and India were 
in support of Japan's provisional accession to the GATT. South Rhodesia, New 
Zealand and Australia together with the United Kingdom were in opposition to it, while 
the representatives from Canada, Pakistan and South Africa were unsure of their 
government's line. The preliminary Commonwealth discussions highlighted the fact 
that the Commonwealth countries were divided over Japan's accession and it was 
obvious that a united Commonwealth stand could not be expected.190
The Eighth Session of the GATT
The eighth session of the GATT began on 17 September. On the first day Matsumoto 
Shunichi, the leader of the Japanese delegation, met Thomeycroft. Matsumoto 
expressed his hope that Britain would support Japan's application for temporary 
accession and he emphasized more than once that Japan was feeling lonely as it was not 
a member of the United Nations and did not play a part in international 
organizations.191 Thomeycroft decided to tell Matsumoto of Britain's decision to 
abstain from voting in favour of Japan. He explained that the decision should not be 
taken as evidence of anti-Japanese sentiment and explained that while the United States 
was unsure of its commercial policy Japan should not be hasty about joining the 
GATT.192
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The first plenary session on Japan began on 23 September. At the meeting, the 
Japanese delegate spoke first and asked that Japan be accepted into the GATT on a 
temporary basis.193 The United States spoke in favour, while Thomeycroft who spoke 
next, said that Japan's bid for accession was premature and that Britain would abstain 
from voting.194 At the session, Denmark, Germany, India, Indonesia, Sweden, 
Austria, Chile, Turkey, Brazil, Italy, Pakistan, Greece and Ceylon gave their support in 
principle, whereas, France, Australia and New Zealand spoke in opposition.195 It was 
decided that a working party would be established to discuss the issue to be chaired by 
the head of the Chilean delegation, Garcia Oldini. The British delegation which had at 
first been set against Japan's temporary accession were by this time beginning to 
reconsider their stance. They were toying with the idea of admitting Japan to the 
organization without having to extend obligations towards them. The formula which 
Britain proposed to the working party was to change Japan's admission from that of 
temporary accession to Japan's fellowship in the organization.196 The reason for this 
compromise was the anxiety shared by all the contracting parties over the serious split 
in the GATT over the Japan issue.197
By the end of September, the British delegates on the Japan working party198 had 
managed to convince Wyndham White and the working party to revise the draft 
decision regarding Japan's temporary accession. The major difference between the 
original (old look) and the new draft (new look) was that in the old look, all those who 
voted for Japan's temporary accession were also voting automatically to base their 
commercial relations with Japan on the GATT basis. Whereas in the new look, Japan's 
temporary accession to the GATT would require a unanimous approval of the 
contracting parties, but the vote would not automatically indicate the contracting parties' 
desire to base their commercial relations on the GATT. Instead, those who wished to 
normalize relations with Japan were invited to sign a separate protocol.199 The two- 
stage approach meant that all contracting parties would have to accept Japan's 
participation in GATT meetings, but only those countries who wished to normalize 
their commercial relations with Japan were invited to do so. This formula, if adopted, 
would have enabled Britain to support Japanese temporary accession to the GATT 
without signing the separate protocol on the normalization of commercial relations 
based on the GATT. The Foreign Office expressed satisfaction with this compromise 
formula and hoped that the Board of Trade would also support it, as the initial French, 
Australian and New Zealand reactions were also favourable.200
Unfortunately for the Foreign Office, Thomeycroft could not support the compromise 
formula and in order to influence the GATT session towards Britain's opinion he 
ordered Edgar Cohen of the Board of Trade to Geneva without prior consultation with
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the other ministries.201 This decision was reached after a meeting between 
Thomeycroft and several officials of the Board of Trade on 30 September.202 The 
officials agreed that Britain should abstain from voting, and that they should try to hold 
together the group of countries who opposed Japan's accession. They decided that they 
would only compromise if it appeared that the 'front' was breaking and Britain was 
going to be left alone in opposition. In that case, it was agreed that Britain should agree 
to Japan's continued observer status instead of temporary accession, with full 
opportunity to participate in the discussion of the contracting parties. Moreover, Britain 
would persuade other contracting parties to acknowledge rather than sign its intention to 
place their commercial relations with Japan on the GATT basis 203 The significance of 
the two points decided by the Board of Trade was that Japan would continue to remain 
an observer, and that contracting parties may, if they wished, place their commercial 
relations with Japan according to the GATT, and that it would not involve votes or 
signatures by the contracting parties.
Cohen arrived in Geneva on 1 October. On arrival he immediately set up an 
appointment to see VA Clark and KL Press, the respective Australian and New Zealand 
delegates to the GATT. Both delegates thought the compromise formula was acceptable 
to them. After the meeting, Cohen realized the united opposition would have to be with 
France, although he thought the chances of Anglo-French unity remote, as Britain and 
France were having difficulties over the no-new-preference mle 204 The following day, 
however, Clark called on Cohen to inform him that Canberra was not entirely happy 
with the new compromise proposal. In particular, the Australian government was 
concerned by Japan's right to vote during its temporary membership, as Japan might 
vote against amendments such as article I (Imperial Preference) or other regulations 
which might seem discriminatory towards Japan.205 Later that day, Cohen discussed 
British and Australian concerns with Wyndham White and Winthrop Brown, and 
emphasized that Japan should not be given voting rights, which Wyndham White 
thought would be difficult to ask of Japan.206 Wyndham White was later able to 
persuade Japan to forego the right to vote on organic questions and on questions 
involving contracting parties who had no contractual relations with Japan under the 
GATT.207 Therefore it was evident that Wyndham White was attempting to do 
everything in his power to make it possible for Japan to enter the GATT without 
upsetting Britain and Australia.
Cohen returned to London after this series of meetings in order to report to the Board of 
Trade and to prepare a memorandum for submission to the Cabinet. At a Cabinet 
meeting on 6 October, Thomeycroft asked for the government's authorization to enable 
Japan to participate in GATT discussions without becoming a provisional member. The
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Cabinet granted Thomeycroft's request, and the British line was relayed to the British 
delegation in Geneva and to the UK High Commissioners in Australia and New 
Zealand on the same day.208 New Zealand supported the British line but Clark 
informed the UK Delegation on 9 October that although a decision had not been 
finalized, Australia would probably not be supporting the new proposal.
On 16 October, Lord Swinton, who was in Canberra, relayed Australia's final decision 
to the Commonwealth Relations Office. Australia's position was that it could not 
support any proposal which admitted Japan either as a provisional member or as an 
observer.209 As a result, Thomeycroft felt that there was no alternative but to revert to 
Britain's original standpoint and abstain from voting on Japan's accession.210 On 
hearing this news, the Japan and Pacific Department made it clear that they would not 
let the Board of Trade abandon the compromise formula without referring the matter to 
the Cabinet first.211 At the Cabinet meeting on . 19 October, Thomeycroft asked for 
permission to abstain from voting, but Eden warned the Cabinet that several 
compromises had been devised to meet British needs, and by abstaining Britain would 
impair its relations with Japan and cause annoyance to the US government. The Lord 
Privy Seal, HFC Crookshank, proposed that a further message be sent to the Australian 
government to tiy and get them to reconsider their decision.212 A despatch was sent to 
Australia, but the Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies refused to budge from his 
position. He thought Australia was already giving favourable treatment to Japan on the 
release of prisoners of war, and on import relaxations and could not compromise any 
further.213 Therefore the issue was brought back to the Cabinet three days later, where 
the British government formally agreed to abstain from voting on the question of 
Japan's provisional association with the GATT.214
On 23 October, the plenary session was convened and votes were taken on Japan's 
temporary accession to the GATT based on the new look. Twenty-six contracting 
parties supported Japan's accession which was enough for the requisite number of two- 
thirds majority. None voted against, and seven abstained from voting.215 They were 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand, France, Southern Rhodesia, Czechoslovakia and 
Burma,216 but on the following day, Burma asked that it be regarded as having voted 
in favour.217 The eighth session of the GATT thus saw Japan one step closer to 
membership.
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Sterling Payments Agreement
The other major issue that preoccupied British policymakers during this period was the 
sterling payments agreement with Japan. As noted above, in early 1953, it had been 
decided that Britain would ask its colonies to relax their import controls on Japanese 
goods. Furthermore, Britain extended sterling/dollar swaps as an interim measure while 
Japan faced a sterling shortage. Moreover, Japan had been asked to buy and sell goods 
from third countries using sterling in order to increase its sterling reserves. Of the three 
decisions taken in early 1953, Japan placed great hopes on two of them, the 
sterling/dollar swaps and an increase in colonial purchases from Japan. Sterling/dollar 
swaps began with the first tranche totaling £4,980,000 in early May. The various 
tranches were to total £25 million as agreed during Tojo's visit to London earlier in the 
year, and the swaps were to last for three months with an extra three-month renewal. 
The swaps were non-renewable after six months or when the sterling payments 
agreement expired on 31 December. The banks which dealt with the swaps were the 
Hong Kong Bank, the Chartered Bank, Chase National Bank, National City Bank, 
Mercantile Bank and the Bank of America.218 The second tranche of £5 million was 
called for in late May219 and the third of £5 million in June.220
At the same time that these swaps were coming into operation, however, there was very 
little sign of the effects of relaxation in the colonies.221 On 19 June, Ihara of the 
Japanese Embassy in London saw Serpell at the Treasury and expressed Japanese 
anxiety over the following issues. First, that Japan had received no information about 
relaxation from any of the British colonies except from Hong Kong and Singapore; and 
second, there were fears that the colonies in general were discriminating against 
Japanese textiles. As a result, Ihara explained that Japan was planning to send a mixed 
mission of officials and businessmen to London and then to the colonies to make 
contacts and enquiries into the 'marketability' of Japanese goods.222 In order to 
reassure Japanese Embassy officials that Britain had done all it could to relax colonial 
imports from Japan, SH Levine of the Board of Trade told another Japanese embassy 
official, Suzuki Yoshio, on 22 June that there was an inevitable time lag between the 
announcement of a relaxation of imports to the opening of letters of credit.223 The 
attempts at reassuring the Japanese side were not entirely successful because there was 
no sign of an increase in Japanese exports to the sterling area. The figures given to the 
British embassy in Japan for receipts and payments in June for visible and invisible 
trade was £11.384 million for exports and £26.355 million for imports.224 This meant 
a trade deficit of £14.971 million for the month of June. If Japan was unable to reverse 
its trade deficit with the sterling area and accumulate more sterling, it would have severe 
repercussions on sterling area-Japan trade in the 1954 budget. It was these 
considerations that were causing so much concern in Japan. The extent of the Japanese
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anxiety was elucidated by Ihara, Suzuki and Asakai in visits to the Board of Trade and 
the Treasury over three consecutive days.225
On 30 July Ihara met with Serpell and Hogg of the Bank of England to inform them 
that Japan would have no means of meeting its sterling commitments in the next two 
months if Japan did not receive an additional £10 million swaps. He was especially 
anxious as Japan had already taken up £23 of the £25 million swaps authorized in 
April, and they expected the remaining £2 million swaps to be used up within the 
following week.226
The Bank of England was opposed to the principle of extending further swaps to Japan 
because Japan’s sterling shortage was no longer a short-term problem and the swaps 
had originally been extended to Japan for temporary relief.227 Serpell was, however, in 
favour of extending further swaps as he thought there was a chance that Japan might be 
able to cover or repay them by the end of the year. He wrote a note to the Bank of 
England on 30 July explaining why further swaps should be extended. He felt that 
Britain had some obligation to extend them to Japan because part of the reason for 
Japan's sterling shortage lay with Britain's delay in 'agreeing to and effecting the 
relaxation of restrictions on imports of Japanese goods'.228 Serpell thought that if 
Britain refused to provide additional swaps, and instead asked Japan to pay dollars, it 
would lead to a return to bilateral trade relations between the sterling area and Japan 
which was contrary to British policy.
Straight after the note was written by Serpell and dispatched to the Bank of England, 
however, Serpell received a telegram from Washington informing the British 
government that Japan was exploring the possibility of borrowing $25 million worth of 
sterling from the IMF. The basis on which they wished to borrow sterling was 
repayment in yen in three years which was contrary to IMF regulations,229 but Serpell 
was not entirely against Japan approaching the IMF as Japan's loan would reduce 
Britain's own dollar liability with the fund.230 Furthermore, Japan's approach to the 
IMF would reduce the pressure on Britain to relax trade restrictions, as the swaps were 
extended to Japan on the expectation of trade, which meant that as long as they were 
offered to Japan, Britain would have to help Japan expand its exports to the colonies. 
This would have caused various problems with British industries and the Board of 
Trade.231 Serpell, therefore, proposed that Britain should still authorize further £10 
million swaps to Japan, but extend £5 million in the first instance and supply the 
additional £5 million if nothing came of the IMF proposal.232 Serpell's proposal was 
accepted by ministers, and Serpell sent a letter to Ihara on 31 July extending further £5 
million swaps during the month of August.233
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A month later, Japan's sterling position was no better and therefore, on 24 August, 
Sunobe Ryozo of the MOFA called on Norman Roberts of the British embassy in 
Tokyo to inform him that Japan had dispatched a telegram to the Japanese embassy in 
London on 22 August instructing them to appeal for further £5 million swap facilities as 
they would be short of sterling commitments by the end of September. The telegram 
indicated Japan's dissatisfaction with Britain's insistence that the MOF should sell 
dollars outright for sterling as it was contrary to the spirit of the sterling payments 
agreement.234
A day later, Ihara met with Serpell to talk over the matter. Ihara told Serpell that the 
Japanese government had finally agreed to draw sterling from the IMF on the normal 
basis, but until the IMF drawing came through, Ihara hoped that Britain would help 
Japan out by letting Japan have a further £5 million swaps on a three-month basis or 
enabling Japan to have £5 million worth of swaps for three months or less with an 
option to reverse the transaction as soon as the IMF drawing came through.235 In the 
end it was agreed that further swaps would be extended to Japan which would be 
withdrawn as soon as Japan received £5 million from the IMF. Furthermore, it was 
agreed that the unutilized portion of the £5 million swaps extended to Japan at the end 
of July would be extended to Japan for use in September.236 The two-and-a-half hour 
discussion between Serpell and Ihara made it clear that there would have to be full talks 
on sterling area-Japan trade before the end of the year as an increasing number of 
problems were plaguing the two signatories.237 In the meantime, the British side had 
not tackled the payments issue since the last meeting of the Cabinet tariff policy on 
Japan in July, and there was still no clear British policy on the matter.
By the end of September there was a mutual desire by both British and Japanese 
officials to hold a payments review. The British side was very keen on this as the 
Japanese side was about to publish their sterling import budget for the six month period 
from October 1953 to March 1954. The British government wished to 'discover' the 
Japanese import budget proposals and to find out how various British interests would 
be affected, furthermore, they were interested in finding out how the Japanese 
proposed to finance their import programme in the next budget when they obviously 
had no sterling.238 The payments review was arranged as a result of a conversation 
between Roberts and Oda, and it was opened on 1 October.239 The talks were informal 
and there was no publicity about the talks in Japan. Two meetings were held. The 
Japanese side was represented by Kitahara and two assistants, while the UK side was 
represented by AJ Phelps, who had replaced Thomas, and EL Hampson.240 The 
meetings consisted of discussions about the estimates and actuals of Japan's trade with
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the sterling area up to September 1953, but the British side was unable to draw out 
information concerning the Japanese forecast for the period between 1953 to March 
1954. The British side was unable to provide information to the Japanese side 
either.241 Therefore, the meetings were unproductive, and if any agreement was 
reached between the two parties, it was only a mutual agreement to hold formal trade 
and payment talks in the near future 242
By mid-October, Ogilvy-Webb of the Treasury was busy working on an ONC paper 
concerning Japan. The draft was ready by 17 October. At the same time, Serpell was 
approaching the Bank of England in the hope that the Bank would approve his proposal 
for extending the life of sterling/dollar swaps to Japan until 31 December in order to 
prevent ill-feeling between Britain and Japan prior to the payment talks 243 The first 
swaps were due in early November, but the Bank was reluctant to renew them based on 
the principle of the agreement. Moreover Hogg of the Bank thought that if the Treasury 
retreated from the original agreement of six months for the swap arrangement, it might 
give the Japanese the impression that Britain was worried by Japan's balance of 
payments position which might place Britain in a weaker position vis-a-vis Japan 
during the negotiations. Hogg expressed in his note that if Japan was forced to part 
with its dollars as a result of the expiration of the swap agreement, it might break down 
'some of the opposition in Japanese political circles to the acquisition of sterling against 
US dollars'.244 Watson of the Bank of England was also opposed to the renewal of 
swaps because he thought that once an extension was granted, Britain would eventually 
'cave in and concede further renewal of the whole £30 million'.245 Moreover, he 
pointed out that the original British aim of fostering the use of sterling in East Asia 
through Japan was no longer necessary as sterling was standing up on its 'own firmer 
feet' in East Asia due to extensive intra-Asian sterling trade relations. Furthermore, 
Japan was starting to see the importance of their trade with the non-dollar world, and 
therefore it was no longer necessary to over-regulate sterling-Japan trade.246
In the meantime, the Japanese objectives at the payments talks were being finalized. On 
20 October, Oda visited Roberts at the British Embassy in Tokyo to inform him of the 
agenda which the Japanese side wished to discuss with Britain during the trade 
talks.247 They were relaxation of sterling area restrictions on imports from Japan 
especially colonial restrictions on textiles, and in particular the lifting of the East African 
ban on textiles which had been enforced since 1952. Second, discussion concerning 
tariffs, especially as South Africa had recently decided to raise tariffs on cotton textiles 
from 45 to 75 percent with countries with which it did not have a trade agreement. The 
Japanese were also perturbed by Australia's decision to increase its tariffs on tinplate to 
12.5 percent and on plywood to 57 percent. All these were seen by Japan as counter to
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the policy of trade relaxation between the sterling area and Japan. Third, to discuss the 
reasons why Britain had decided not to extend further swaps to Japan.248 The Japanese 
side was especially indignant because when the sterling area was short of sterling, 
Japan had extended credit to those countries and they expected similar treatment in 
return.249 Fourth, a discussion on Britain's opposition to Japan's application for 
provisional membership to the GATT. Finally, Japan wished to know how it would be 
treated once sterling became convertible, and whether Japan would be one of the first 
countries to have convertibility and if not when.
On 29 October the Foreign Office sent a telegram to Tokyo instructing the British 
Embassy officials there to tell Oda that the British government was prepared to receive a 
Japanese delegation in late November or early December. The telegram indicated that 
Britain was not willing to discuss Commonwealth tariff matters nor Japan's accession 
to the GATT at the forthcoming talks. Moreover, due to the sensitivity of the 
convertibility issue, the Foreign Office instructed the British embassy that the issue 
would not be discussed in the manner in which the Japanese were hoping. With regard 
to the lifting of the textiles ban, the instruction to Japan was that it would be impossible 
before 1 May 1954.250 The substance of the FO telegram was reproved orally to Oda 
on 4 November. At the meeting it was revealed that Japan was neither seeking to renew 
or redeem the swaps which were due to mature on that day, and Oda told Roberts that 
they were ready to surrender the dollar equivalent of £8 million.251 On the question of 
sterling convertibility, Japan had sought more information on the subject as they 
suspected that transferable account area countries might be given convertibility status 
before bilateral account countries. Therefore, they were considering whether to bid for 
transferable account status.252 Moreover, Oda explained that the Japanese economy 
was at a 'crossroads', and in view of the continuing sterling shortage, he expected 
strong pressure from business circles for Japan to 'ally herself firmly with the dollar 
area'.253
The Japanese approach drove home to Britain that payments and trade talks were 
imminent. There were various issues that needed to be tackled. One of the first was 
whether to ask for dollars from Japan when the swap arrangement expired in 
November. Serpell, therefore, called for a meeting of the Japan working party.254 The 
first of the four meetings of the working party was held on 27 October.255 The meeting 
was devoted to the question of whether to extend the existing sterling/dollar swaps to 
Japan. It was divided between the Treasury, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office 
who all supported the extension, and the Bank of England, the Board of Trade and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office who opposed it. It was finally decided that a further 
meeting would have to be called at short notice if the Japanese side made a request for
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the maturing of swaps to be prolonged. If, on the other hand, they did not ask for the 
swaps, Britain was to reserve its position.256
On 6 November, Japan was placed as one of the items on the agenda at an ONC 
meeting. They discussed what line Britain should take when the sterling payments 
agreement with Japan expired on 31 December.257 Japan was identified as a problem as 
it was not in any monetary bloc, but it was an important trading partner, not so much 
for Britain but for the rest of the sterling area.258 In order to maintain a high level of 
trade between Japan and the sterling area, Japan needed to be solvent in sterling in 
1954. This meant that Japan would have to increase its holding of sterling reserves in 
1954 and the question that faced Britain was how this should be done; whether to limit 
sterling area-Japan trade to a minimum, extend credits to Japan so that it could continue 
trading with the sterling area, or to open the sterling area to Japanese goods.259 The 
note by the Treasury recommended that the sterling payments agreement should be 
renewed for another year, subject to amendments in the exchange of letters (signed 
August 1951). Although the committee decided against extending credit to Japan, it 
recognized that 'every effort1 should be made to prevent Japan from restricting its trade 
with the sterling area. Furthermore, it was decided that 'urgent' consideration should be 
given to the volume of imports permitted into the UK and the colonies in 1954 'in the 
light of other sterling area purchases from Japan and Japan's potential requirements 
from the sterling area'.260 Finally, it was recommended that Britain should try and seek 
a change in Japan's foreign exchange apparatus which strictly segregated their sterling, 
dollar and open accounts 261 The note by the Treasury, therefore, favoured increased 
trade between the sterling area and Japan, and in particular greater colonial and British 
market openings to Japanese goods. The only dissension was from the Board of Trade 
representative, AE Percival, who voiced his reservation as he thought it would be at the 
expense of British industries.262 Despite the Board of Trade's opposition, the 
committee supported the Treasury's note, and the committee invited Colonial Office and 
the Commonwealth Relations Office to find out how much they were expecting to 
import from Japan in 1954. Furthermore, the working party on Japan was invited to 
continue its studies, while the Foreign Office was invited to consult the UK 
Ambassador in Tokyo about the prospects of signing a commercial treaty with 
Japan.263 At the subsequent working party meetings the opening of Britain's African 
colonies to Japanese exports was discussed, but remained inconclusive.
On 1 December, the third and the last meeting of the Cabinet committee on tariff policy 
on Japan was held 264 At the meeting the importance of encouraging Japan to maintain 
a high level of trade with the sterling area was reiterated. The reasons were set out in 
the report submitted to the Cabinet Committee: that it would restrict UK exports and
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earnings from oil, shipping and insurance interests (invisibles); it would damage 
Commonwealth primary producers and result in lower Commonwealth earnings; that 
the colonies would be deprived of the low-cost Japanese goods on which they relied; 
and that it might lead some Commonwealth countries to conclude balancing bilateral 
deals with Japan thus damaging the multilateral character of sterling.265 As to how 
Japan should finance its trade with the sterling area, the Committee agreed that Japan 
should either look to the IMF for assistance or it should be encouraged to use its dollar 
reserves to finance sterling trade. Furthermore, they agreed that Japan should be 
encouraged to cease its distinction between the sterling and dollar sources of supply 
when setting out foreign exchange budgets. The aim behind this was to get Japan 
accustomed to the idea of selling dollars for sterling when it experienced sterling 
shortages. Although the ONC had relied on the committee on tariff policy on Japan to 
solve the problem of colonial import relaxations, the members were unable to reach a 
solution. The sticking point was the effect it might have on Lancashire, and the Board 
of Trade indicated that it would rather see increased quotas given to goods which were 
not particularly in the public eye.266 Just two days before the start of trade and 
payments talks with Japan, the British side had still not arrived at a negotiating position 
for the talks. Although there were agreements over general policy, there were still some 
outstanding points which needed to be worked out such as credit extension and colonial 
import relaxations of Japanese goods. Until the end, the problem was political and it 
was based on the plight of British industries.
Conclusion
Britain's trade policy towards Japan started off positively in 1953 as the Board of Trade 
decided against forestalling Japan's GATT accession. Although this was conditional on 
an appropriate safeguard to protect British industries, it was still a step forward for 
Britain. The rest of the year saw Britain retreat from this position due to the inadequacy 
of the article 23 proposal as a safeguard to protect domestic industries against Japan's 
GATT entry.
As for Britain's handling of the sterling payments agreement, British officials in Japan 
were acutely aware of the urgency of relaxing sterling area import restrictions against 
Japan, but politics within Whitehall prevented Britain from formulating a policy to 
increase Japan's sterling reserves immediately. The main culprits impeding a swift 
policy formulation were the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Board of Trade. 
The Board of Trade, in particular, did not take into account the amount of harm which 
would befall British and other Commonwealth interests if they were unable to sell 
goods to Japan. Japan's sterling shortage meant that there would be less foreign 
exchange allocation for sterling goods purchases, therefore, traders would be unable to
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sell their goods due to Japan's rigid separation of its foreign exchange budget. 
Fortunately, it was agreed that Britain would extend credit to enable Japan to tide over 
its period of sterling shortage.
1953 was supposed to have been the year when Britain took greater control of its 
financial and trade policy towards Japan, but Britain's handling of the above issues 
indicate that it was not entirely successful. In order to understand Britain's problem one 
has to look at Japan in a wider context. Britain was aware of the importance of Japan 
becoming part of the western trading community and knew that Japanese goods were 
crucial to certain sterling area countries. Britain, however, realized that once sterling 
became convertible, it would no longer be able to use balance of payments as a reason 
to restrict imports of Japanese goods in its traditional areas. Therefore, it was not long 
before Britain would have no effective safeguard against a possible influx of Japanese 
goods such as textiles and pottery into Britain's traditional trading areas. In short, the 
post-war sterling and GATT policies hinged on Britain finding a suitable safeguard 
which would enable it to implement protective measures if Japan violated friendly 
trading rules. With convertibility looming on the horizon, it was only natural that both 
the sterling payments agreement and GATT issues rose to the Cabinet level, as the 
Board of Trade made certain that Lancashire's interests were represented when the 
government formulated its financial and trade policy towards Japan. Therefore, 
Britain's procrastination and foot-dragging in 1953, was a result of the fact that it was 
unable to find a suitable safeguard acceptable to all parties.
Throughout this period, a great effort was made by both the United States and the 
United Kingdom to reach an agreement over Japan's GATT issue. Britain realized that 
without the US backing, none of Britain's proposals would have a chance of success 
with the contracting parties. The United States' motivation behind close cooperation 
with Britain was its realization that as the head of the Commonwealth, the latter could 
influence several Dominion votes against Japan and sabotage Japan's efforts to enter 
the GATT.
The overall effect of Britain's policy decisions on Japan was the impression that Britain 
was not willing to assist Japan re-enter the western trading community. The result was 
a growing Japanese belief that in order to 'kick-start' Japan's economy, it should look 
elsewhere. Therefore, Britain's policy in 1953 not only elucidates Britain's failure to 
stand at the helm and take a firmer control over its relations with Japan, but it also 
highlights the difficulties Japan faced in expanding its external trade relations.
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Table 4.1
Japan’s Balance of Payments. 1945-1956
Exports Dollar Sterling Open Accoun Total exports
9.1945-12.1946 82 (79.6) 2 (2.3) 18(18.1) 103 (100.0)
1947 48 (28.1) 56 (32.4) 68 (39.5) 173 (100.0)
1948 86 (33.7) 61 (23.9) 109 (42.4) 258(100.0)
1949 168 (33.0) 227 (44.7) 113(22.3) 509(100.0)
1950 294 (35.9) 244 (29.8) 281 (34.3) 820(100.0)
1951 316(23.4) 585 (43.2) 452 (33.4) 1354 (100.0)
1952 396 (31.2) 539 (42.4) 336 (26.4) 1272 (100.0)
1953 490 (38.5) 317(24.9) 467 (36.6) 1274 (100.0)
1954 560 (34.4) 492 (30.3) 575 (35.3) 1629(100.0)
1955 816(40.6) 649 (32.3) 545 (27.1) 2010(100.0)
1956 1095 (43.8) 906 (36.2) 498(20.0) 2500(100.0)
Imports Dollar Sterling Open Accoun Total imports
9.1945-12.1946 302 (99.1) 0(0.1) 2 (0.8) 305(100.0)
1947 490 (93.3) 24 (4.7) 10(2.0) 526(100.0)
1948 562 (82.3) 73 (10.7) 47 (7.0) 684 (100.0)
1949 680 (75.2) 139(15.4) 84 (9.4) 904 (100.0)
1950 558 (57.4) • 222 (22.8) 193 (19.8) 974 (100.0)
1951 1180 (59.2) 453 (21.8) 361 (19.0) 1995 (100.0)
1952 1221(60.2) 501 (24.7) 304(15.1) *2028 (100.0)
1953 1304(54.1) 602 (25.0) 502 (20.9) 2409 (100.0)
1954 1411 (58.8) 433 (18.1) 554 (23.1) *2399 (100.0)
1955 1332 (53.9) 599 (24.3) 539(21.8) *2471 (100.0)
1956 1725 (53.4) 1057 (32.7) 447(13.8) *3229 (100.0)
Total Balance Dollar Sterling Open Accoun Total Balance
9.1945-12.1946 -220 1 16 -202
1947 -441 31 57 -352
1948 -475 -11 61 -425
1949 -512 88 29 -395
1950 -264 21 88 -154
1951 -863 131 91 -640
1952 -824 38 31 -755
1953 -814 -285 -34 -1134
1954 -850 59 20 -770
1955 -515 49 5 -460
1956 -629 -151 51 -729
Note: (*) total imports do not add up due to the inclusion of particular regions. 
Source: MOF (ed.), Showa Zaiseishi: Shusen kara Kowa made 
vol. 19 (Tokyo: Tdyo Keizai Shinpdsha, 1978), p. 114.
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Table 4.2
Japan's Exports to the Sterling Area. 1951-1954 
________________________________________________________ million pounds
1951 1952 1953 1954
United Kingdom 18.7 26.5 8.9 17.9
Colonies(a) 59.4 79.9 47.8 65.6
Commonwealth 107.9 91.1 31.6 55
RSA 12.4 12.1 21.2 26.8
3rd Countries 2.5 3.4 2.6 16
Invisibles 12.3 15.4 17.8 13.5
H Invisibles 
S  3rd Countries
i
l 6  QRSA
:
| | j  □  Commonwealth
B Colonies(a) 
a  United Kingdom
1951 1952 1953 1954
Year
Note: (a) excludes Hong Kong between January/August 1951.
Source: Note by the Treasury in Cabinet ONC, 17 June 1955, ON(55)69, CAB134/1104, PRO.
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Table 4.3
Japan's Imports from the Sterling Area. 1951-1954 
_________________________________________________________ million pounds
1951 1952 1953 1954
United Kingdom 9.3 8 15.8 9.1
Colonies(a) 24.7 39.4 39.3 24.2
Commonwealth 105.4 109.7 128.5 66.7
RSA 10.9 14.4 20 15.8
3rd Countries 2.9 18.7 16.8 9.9
Invisibles 7.5 17.2 20.3 24.6
Usance 22.9
H Usance 
S3 Invisibles 
03rd  Countries 
URSA
□  Commonwealth 
0 Colonies(a)
0  United Kingdom
Note: (a) excludes Hong Kong between January/August 1951.
Source: Note by the Treasury in Cabinet ONC, 17 June 1955, ON(55)69, CAB134/1104, PRO.
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Table 4.4
Commonwealth Exports to Japan
(in £ million)
showing (1) T otal exports
(2) Amounts and Percentage exported to Japan
1950 1951 1952
Australia (1)485.7
(2) 26.9(5.5%)
778.8 
51.8 (6.7%)
539.4 
38.9 (7%)
New Zealand (1) 181.2
(2) 1.0 (0.6%)
245.1 
3.8 (1.6%)
240.8
3.5 (1.4%)
India (1) 434.3
(2) 5.6 (1.3%)
526.2 
12.9 (2.4%)
(a)350.6
3.5 (1.4%)
South Africa (1) 226.2 
(2) 0.7 (0.4%)
311.0
2.3 (0.9%)
N.A.
S. Rhodesia (1) 34.3
(2) 0.1 (0.2%)
35.9 
0.6 (0.4%)
44.9
Ceylon (1) 111.7
(2) 0.1(0.1%)
136.4 
0.6 (0.4%)
105.6 
0.8 (0.7%)
Pakistan (1) 139.5
(2) 15.8(11.3%)
216.2 
27.5 (12.7%)
167.6 
18.1 (4%)
Malaya (1) 4689.5
(2) 13.5 (3%)
708.9 
18.3 (2.6%)
457.2 
18.1 (4%)
Hong Kong (1) 237.9
(2) 7.4 (2.7%)
275.3
11.9(4%)
179.8 
7.6 (4.2%)
Note: (a) 10 months only
Of the above, major exports consisted of the following:
(1) gives total value of each commodity;
(2) gives value exported to Japan and its percentage to total
1950 1951 1952
Australia
Barley (1) 5.1
(2) 0.1 (16.1%)
7.2
2.6 (36.3%)
Wheat (1) 39.6
(2) 5.7(11.4%)
59.2
2.2 (3.7%)
Hides (1) 1.2 
(2) 0.1 (12.2%)
1.3
0.8(59.3%)
Wool (1) 250.0
(2) 11.2(4.5%)
505.6
41.1(8.1%)
258.5 
32.5 (12.5%)
New Zealand
Wool (1) 55.3
(2) 0.7 (1.3%)
94.2 
3.2 (3.4%)
N.A.
Hides (1) 1-5
(2) 0.2(12.9%)
1.9 
0.2 (8.6%)
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India
Coal (1) 2.5
0.3 (11.2%)
5.9
2.0 (33.7%)
(a) 5.1 
1.3 (25%)
Castor Oil (1) 4.4
(2) 0.9(20.2%)
0.1
? (43.8%)
Manganese Ore (1) 6.0 
(2) 0.6(10.6%)
11.9 
1.3 (11.2%)
13.2
0.4 (3%)
Linseed Oil (1) 4.3
(2) 2.3 (54.7%)
0.5
0.2 (47.6%)
Cotton and Cotton 
Waste
(1) 13.0
(2) 1.0 (7.6%)
15.8
4.4 (27.7%)
18.9
8.5 (45%)
Shellac (1) 6.4
(2) 0.1 (1.6%)
8.5 2.5 
0.2 (8%)
Mica (1) 7.5
(2) 0.1 (1.0%)
9.9
0.2 (2.4%)
South Africa
Southern
Rhodesia
values are negligible
Ceylon
Coir Fibre (1) 1.6
(2) ? (2.2%)
2.6
0.2 (7%)
1.4
0.2 (14%)
Black Tea (1) 56.4
(2)-
60.0 
0.2 (0.3%)
54.2 
0.3 (0.5%)
Rubber (1) 30.1
(2)-
42.9 
- (0.1%)
Pakistan
Cotton (1) 56.0
(2) 12.4 (22.2%)
103.8
23.8 (22.9%)
93.3
29.1 (31%)
Hides (1) 3.8
(2) 0.1 (3.8%)
5.8
0.4 (7.6%)
2 8
0.2 (7%)
Jute (1) 59.9
(2) 1.1 (1.8%)
77.2 
2.9 (3.8%) 52.1 (3.6%)
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Malaya
Rubber (1) 286.4
(2) 11.4(4%)
462.2 
13.1 (3%)
220.7 
10.7 (5%)
Iron Ore (1) 1.1
(2) 1.1 (100%)
2.0 
2.0 (100%)
2.7
2.3 (85%)
Iron Scrap (1)
(2)
1.6
1.2 (75%)
Tin (1) 55.3
(2)-
67.4
1.8
60.2 
1.6 (2.6%)
Hong Kong
Textiles (fabrics etc) (1) 20.8 
(2) 1.4 (6.7%)
26.7 
1.1 (4%)
33.8 
0.9 (2.6%)
Textiles (raw 
materials)
(1) 12.6 
(2) 1.1(9%)
4.9
1.5 (30%)
3 8
0.9 (24%)
Sugar and 
Confectionary
(1) 4.2
(2) 0.4 (9.5%)
5.7 
1.6 (28%)
2.6
0.7 (27%)
Oil Seeds etc. (1) 3.5
(2) 0.5(14%)
4.6
1.9 (41%)
3.8
0.3 (21%)
Source: Table attached to Report, 16 July 1953, ON(53)136, CAB134/1095, PRO.
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Chapter Five: Limits to Britain's Policy towards Japan
Introduction
1954 saw another attempt by Eisenhower to push through his liberal economic policy. 
This time his policy was based on the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy or the 
Randall Commission. Although not all of the commission's work was approved by 
Congress, Eisenhower was able to gain the power to enter into tariff negotiations, 
therefore, opening the way for Japan's GATT entry. Furthermore, the year saw the 
United States release Japan gradually from its obligation under the US-Japan bilateral 
agreement to maintain higher controls on exports to the PRC. As a result of this 
decision, Japan was given permission to remove 383 items from the embargoed list at a 
rate of 30 items per week from April. Eisenhower embarked on this policy in order to 
ensure Japan's continued alignment with the United States' trade control policy.1
For Britain, the year was turning into a test of its relations with Japan with the 
negotiations for the sterling payments agreement and the problem of Japan's entry to 
the GATT. The previous year had highlighted Britain's inability to formulate a 
congruent policy with respect to the above issues, therefore, it was crucial that every 
effort be made to emphasize that it was not pursuing an obstructionist policy vis-a-vis 
Japan. This was to become extremely difficult because of the strong domestic 
opposition to Japanese competition. Despite the limitations placed on Britain's trade 
policy, an examination of its regional policy highlighted Japan's importance for Britain 
in Southeast Asia. By 1954, Britain came to appreciate Japan's role as a bulwark in a 
region which seemed to be in the process of being overtaken by communism. 
Consequently, contrary to its policy towards the GATT, Britain supported Japan's 
entry into regional organizations such as the ECAFE and the Colombo Plan.
Japan continued in its quest to enter the GATT in 1954. Furthermore, Yoshida 
embarked on an overseas tour to improve his embattled image at home. If Yoshida had 
hopes of increasing his domestic support, the attempt backfired as he was out of office 
by the end of the year.
This chapter will continue to examine Britain's sterling and GATT policies towards 
Japan. The above policies have been juxtaposed with Britain’s policy towards Japan's 
integration in regional organizations in order to elucidate the overall policy towards 
Japan. In terms of Britain's economic policy, 1954 saw the reopening of the London 
Gold Market on 22 March. In order to reduce the amount of administrative work, a 
single rate was established for transferable sterling and all bilateral account countries
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became transferable accounts. Therefore, Japan became a transferable account country 
by default.2
Sterling Payments Agreement
In 1953 the British attempt to formulate a comprehensive policy towards Japan had met 
with little success. They were still trying to formulate one before the start of the sterling 
payments talks with Japan on 3 December. The last meeting of the Cabinet committee 
on tariff policy on Japan was convened on 1 December, and a loose framework 
towards the negotiations was settled. It was decided that Japan should be encouraged to 
maintain a high level of trade with the sterling area. Furthermore, Britain was to advise 
Japan to look to the IMF for assistance or to encourage it to use its dollar reserves in 
case of future sterling shortage, as Britain did not wish to continue with sterling/dollar 
swaps. Finally, Japan would be encouraged to cease dividing its foreign exchange 
budget between the sterling, dollar and open account areas.3 The finer details of the 
British position were still to be worked out; such as whether to extend short-term 
credits to Japan, and to what degree Britain's African colonies should relax their import 
restrictions on Japanese goods. These issues were not scheduled for discussion at the 
Cabinet level until 8 December, therefore, Britain was in the embarrassing position of 
having to stall discussions until a ministerial endorsement of the overall British 
negotiating position had been given.
On 3 December, the two sides came together for the first plenary meeting. The Japanese 
side was represented by officials from the MOF, the MITI, the MOFA, as well as 
various specialists from the Japanese embassy in London. The British side was 
represented by officials from the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade, the 
Colonial Office, the Bank of England, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the 
Ministry of Transport.4 At the meeting, Asakai Koichiro, the chief Japanese delegate, 
presented the British side with the Japanese statement on the issues which they wished 
to discuss during the talks.5 It included the need to redress the severe restrictions on 
Japanese imports into the sterling area, particularly to Australia, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom and its colonies.6 These restrictions were considered the main reason 
why trade between the sterling area and Japan had not reached the target figure for 
1953.7 The Japanese side also wanted to discuss Japan's GATT membership. 
Furthermore, they proposed that trade levels for 1954 should be £215.8 million in both 
directions. Concerning Japan's sterling holdings, the Japanese side hoped that Britain 
would extend financial facilities to Japan in order to enable it to tide over periods of 
shortage. Finally, the Japanese side proposed the introduction of special settlement 
devices between Japan and independent members of the sterling area.8
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The statement was only discussed briefly at the plenary meeting, as the agenda of the 
subsequent meetings had to be agreed. The Japanese side hoped to focus on the outlook 
for trade and payments in 1954, while the British sought a review of payments in 
1953.9 The reason for this was obvious; namely, that the British side had not 
formulated their policy for 1954.
At the next plenary meeting on the following day, the British side presented the 
Japanese with their reply to the latter's opening statement. The British position towards 
the Japanese statement was that import restrictions could not be the sole cause of 
Japan's inability to sell to the UK and colonies, especially in the light of the fact that the 
entrepot centres of Hong Kong, Singapore and Aden were opened to Japanese imports. 
Furthermore, the British side asked for further clarification concerning Japanese 
complaints about the restrictions, delays and administrative measures which impeded 
Japan's imports to sterling area countries.10 Concerning other issues, Britain proposed 
further examination of the problems. The British side placed great emphasis on the 
continuation of the sterling payments agreement and expressed their desire to find out 
whether the Japanese side also wished to continue with the arrangement. The only point 
which they refused to discuss with the Japanese delegates was Japan's GATT 
membership as they did not regard the payments talks as the appropriate place for such 
a discussion.11 The second plenary session was adjourned and the delegates split up 
into smaller specialized groups in order to discuss specific matters.
At the first of the two smaller meetings, the two sides recapped on the workings of the 
sterling payments agreement since it had come into force in 1951. After some 
discussion, the meeting turned to other matters. The British delegation asked the 
Japanese side to elaborate on the Japanese proposal for a special settlement device 
between the ISA (Independent Sterling Area) countries and Japan. What the Japanese 
had in mind with regard to this device was the establishment of bilateral clearing 
arrangements with Australia and Pakistan whereby special clearing accounts at the Bank 
of England would keep track of Japan's purchases of raw materials from the above 
countries. The device would ensure that Australia and Pakistan would buy an 
equivalent amount of manufactured goods from Japan thereby preventing a trade 
imbalance in Japan's relations with the respective countries. What the Japanese had in 
mind, therefore, was a return to bilateralism within the sterling area.12
While the Anglo-Japanese meetings were being convened in the Treasury, Japan was 
put on the agenda for a Cabinet meeting on 8 December. Butler, submitted a 
memorandum concerning the state of affairs as it stood; Japan's desired position; and 
Britain's hopes for trade. The most pressing issue was Japan's sterling shortage, and
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the fact that short-term facilities, such as the sterling/dollar swaps, had not helped to 
correct Japan's imbalance with the sterling area. This in turn had led Japan to propose a 
return to strict bilateralism in sterling area-Japan relations.13 To prevent Japan from 
taking the restrictive option, Butler saw the need for Japan to increase its sterling 
reserves and expand its sterling area trade relations. He proposed several measures 
including Japan purchasing sterling using its dollar reserves, and an end to Japan's 
division of its foreign exchange budget in line with the various trade blocs. Butler, 
however, realized the inadequacy of these measures in themselves and also 
recommended the relaxation of British and colonial import restrictions against Japan. 
He noted that he was aware of the fear of Japanese competition among select British 
industries, but underlined the colonial demand for cheap Japanese goods.14 
Furthermore, he questioned the validity of the use of quotas to keep Japanese goods out 
of the markets. Moreover, he stressed that without these inducements, Japan would not 
switch its trade from the dollar to the sterling area.15 In regard to the entrepot centres, 
he proposed that they be permitted to import freely from Japan. The President of the 
Board of Trade, Peter Thomeycroft, agreed to Butler's proposal and was willing for all 
the colonies to export up to their maxima, except for Nigeria, because he thought 
Japanese goods would drive UK manufacturers out of the Nigerian market. The 
Nigerian market was important for Lancashire as it was one of the three major overseas 
customers it had left.16 Thomeycroft hoped that Nigeria would limit its imports to £10 
million. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, did not think it was 
feasible that Britain could instruct Nigeria to restrict purchases, and proposed an 
informal agreement between Britain and Nigeria.17 As for restrictions in the UK, 
Thomeycroft agreed to an increase in the grey cloth quota by £2 million for re-export.18 
In regard to an extension of credit facilities to Japan, Butler recommended that they 
should only be extended to Japan on political grounds, for example, if Britain or the 
colonies were unable to relax their import restrictions.19
The Cabinet relegated the issue to the EPC on the following day, as the ministers 
concerned were all members of the committee.20 At the EPC, the Economic Secretary 
to the Treasury, Reginald Maudling, informed the committee of the IMF's reluctance to 
allow Japan to make further drawings from the fund unless an enquiry on Japan's 
economy and trade was conducted.21 The committee realized that the IMF's reluctance 
to provide further sterling loans to Japan would result in increased pressure on the UK 
and its colonies to relax their import restrictions on Japan, therefore, their voluntary 
import relaxation was considered a better alternative. The discussion then turned to the 
extent to which colonial restrictions should be relaxed. It was agreed that the minimum 
colonial import would be £21 million whereas the maximum would be £33 million.22 
Thomeycroft agreed with the content of Butler's memorandum to the Cabinet, and
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reiterated his willingness to see all the colonies import up to the maximum level from 
Japan. This effectively meant an increase of Japanese goods into the colonies by fifty 
percent from the 1953 level. As mentioned above, Thomeycroft had reservations in 
regard to Nigeria and therefore he reiterated his proposal to increase Japanese grey cloth 
imports into the UK by £2 million. Although he foresaw criticism from the 
manufacturing sector and parliament, he felt that this would not be a problem as Japan 
was still not a GATT signatory and thus if necessary, Britain could exclude Japanese 
goods at any time in the future.23
The EPC concluded that Britain was not in a position to restrict colonial purchases from 
Japan as there was no longer a balance of payments reason to restrict such imports, and 
the only possibility open to Britain was to persuade the colonies to curb their purchases 
from Japan. It was not possible, however, to decide what concessions the UK could 
offer to Japan until there was a clear indication from the Nigerian government 
concerning the powers of self-limitation they were willing to impose on Japanese 
goods. Therefore, the Colonial Office was instructed to despatch a telegram 
immediately to Nigeria and find out whether they were willing to limit Japanese 
imports.24
On 10 December, the third plenary session was held in the Treasury. Half of the 
meeting was spent on recapping what had been discussed by specialists since the last 
plenary meeting. The Japanese side presented Britain with annexes concerning the 
special settlement device, explaining how the arrangement would function. This whole 
arrangement was not well received by Britain. Furthermore, the Japanese side provided 
a counter-reply to Britain's response to its original statement. Japan could not accept 
that Japan's trade deficit with the sterling area was due to factors other than the area's 
import restrictions 25 They were also dissatisfied with the fact that Japanese exports to 
the entrepot centres were prohibited from being on-sold to sterling area countries except 
for those so-called traditional destinations such as Burma, Brunei and Sarawak.26 
Moreover, the Japanese were perturbed by import restrictions placed on Japanese 
goods in the African colonies, as they saw the African market as equal in importance to 
entrepot trading centres. Especially disturbing were import restrictions on all Japanese 
cotton and textiles to British East Africa which represented 77 percent of the East 
African colonies' imports from Japan in 1951 and 74 percent during the first six 
months of 1952.27 What the Japanese did not understand was why there had to be an 
administrative import restriction on Japanese goods if, according to the official line, 
there was no local demand for Japanese goods. Furthermore, they were concerned 
about the sharp decline in Japanese exports to Nigeria and they wished to find out more 
about Nigeria's import licensing system (see table 5.1 for cotton good imports into
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Nigeria).28 The basic Japanese line taken was that they were interested in renewing the 
sterling payment agreement for a further year, but wished to be able to trade with the 
sterling area on a more equal footing, and could not agree with the British line that 
import restrictions were not the reason for the decline in Japanese exports to the sterling 
area.
After the plenary meeting, the delegates divided into smaller groups again to discuss 
specific issues. On the same afternoon, a meeting was held to discuss Japan's estimated 
sterling imports in 1954 and the breakdown of the commodities that Japan wished to 
import. Furthermore, there were discussions over Japan's oil imports, and over British 
and colonial licensing systems 29 A day later, an informal meeting was held between, 
Serpell, Furley-Smith, Hogg and three Japanese delegates, Ihara, Tojo and Ushiba. 
The meeting was held primarily to discuss how Japan would finance its sterling 
shortage in the near future. The Japanese side came closer to the idea of using their 
dollars to pay for sterling area goods than before. This was on the condition, however, 
that the negotiations were successful, that Japan's exports to the UK increased and its 
proposal for a special settlement device was accepted by Britain.30 On the next day, 
two meetings were held simultaneously. One at the Bank of England to carry out 
statistical analysis on trade between the sterling area and Japan for 1953, and another in 
the Treasury to discuss Japan's foreign exchange budget system.31 At the latter 
meeting, the British side was most curious to find out how Japan divided its foreign 
exchange budget, horizontally, i.e. how they divided their foreign exchange budget 
between the sterling, dollar and open account budgets, and vertically, i.e. the division 
of sterling imports into the summer and winter budgets, as well as visibles and 
invisibles. Most interesting for Britain was the horizontal division in Japan's foreign 
exchange budget which was decided in the light of Japan's commitment with the open 
account countries. The sterling and dollar budgets were considered thereafter.32 
Vertical allocations on the other hand were divided between those on the automatic 
approval list such as rubber and sterling area machinery, where there was no specific 
allocation for each commodity; those on the specific allocation list which consisted of 
specific sums for sterling, dollar and open account purchases (switching was not 
normally permitted between the various accounts);33 and the miscellaneous list.
On 16 December, the EPC met again, as the Colonial Office had received an interim 
reply from Nigeria concerning estimated imports from Japan in 1954. Unfortunately for 
the British Delegation, the Nigerian government was unable to respond completely to 
British enquiries as Ministers were 'up country' and a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers was not possible until 22 December at the earliest. All that they could say was 
that they would expect import licences for at least £10 million worth of Japanese goods,
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but the telegram did not indicate any assurance by Nigeria that imports from Lancashire 
would remain at the same level.34 Thomeycroft spoke of the difficulties created by this 
situation. On the one hand, Britain had to show its willingness to extend trade 
concessions to Japan, conversely, he needed Cabinet approval before they could be 
implemented. He foresaw a political storm either way, as Lancashire would be directly 
affected if Nigeria decided to increase Japanese imports or if Britain decided to increase 
imports from Japan. In the meantime, there were discussions at the EPC meeting about 
how to deal with the situation. Maudling felt the negotiations could not go on without 
letting the Japanese know the full extent of the increased sterling earnings which Britain 
thought Japan could achieve.35 Geoffrey Lloyd, Minister of Fuel and Power, was 
concerned that a failure to reach an agreement with Japan at the negotiations might lead 
to a substantial decline in British oil exports to Japan in 1954 as Japan's purchases 
from the sterling area would decline relative to the reserves available. The meeting 
adjourned with the committee's decision to inform the Japanese delegates that Britain's 
position on import relaxations would not be finalized until after Christmas, which 
inevitably meant a prolongation of talks. Furthermore, with regard to trade flows, the 
committee reiterated Britain's aim of earning a surplus with Japan. As for colonial 
estimates, Japan was to be informed that Britain was only able to give 
recommendations and they were unable to either force colonial governments to 'restrict 
or increase their purchases'.36 As for the case of Nigeria, the latter were yet to decide 
how much they wished to import from Japan in 1954.37
Meanwhile, the Anglo-Japanese talks finally turned to the 1954 estimates at the fourth 
plenary meeting, although neither side could agree on the level of trade flows between 
Japan and the sterling area. The Japanese side had, since the beginning of the 
negotiations, amended their estimates for trade with the sterling area, and had arrived at 
a figure of £205 million for sales to the sterling area. Although the British side was 
unable to offer figures concerning its imports from Japan, talks went ahead 
nevertheless concerning British estimates for sterling area exports to Japan. The British 
estimate of sterling exports to Japan was £230 million, which was £25 million more 
than the Japanese estimates for its exports to the sterling area.38 The discussion soon 
turned to the issue of British visible and invisible exports to Japan. With regard to 
visible goods, most UK exports to Japan were on the automatic approval list, and their 
concern was whether there was sufficient allocation of sterling to ensure the purchase 
of these goods by Japan. Moreover, the British side indicated specific goods such as 
wool textiles, motor cycles, confectionery, whisky and remittances of film profits 
which they thought should be given a certain amount of licensing allocation.39 With 
regard to invisibles, the UK delegation was especially concerned over two issues. The 
first concerned Japan's oil purchases from the UK. Britain's dissatisfaction stemmed
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from Japan's desire to allocate only £8.5 million towards sterling oil, which was £3.5 
million short of the amount the UK wished to sell. Furthermore, Britain was 
dissatisfied because Japan planned to increase its overall oil imports, but little 
substantial increase was to be expected from the sterling area. Oil was an important 
issue for Britain because it was one of the commodities that Japan needed and the 
sterling area could supply (the other being wool). Britain was concerned as the decline 
in Japan's sterling reserves would in turn reduce Japanese requests for oil from the 
sterling area thereby potentially threatening Britain's market share. Therefore, Britain's 
aim was to maintain a certain percentage of oil sales with Japan. Britain was also 
anxious about the Japanese government's policy towards its shipping industry on two 
accounts; first, that Japanese importers were given inducements to use its own shipping 
in preference to that of other flags; and second that the Japanese shipping industry was 
being provided with government financial assistance. Both were considered unfair 
commercial practices, and the British shipping industry felt threatened by this unfair 
Japanese advantage.40 The Japanese denied the allegations of unfair competition, and 
assured Britain that Japanese vessels had only carried 48 percent of Japan's total 
foreign trade in 1952, which was a far lower figure than in the pre-war years 41 
Therefore, he tried to re-assure British concerns about the shipping sector.
On 23 December, the Colonial Office finally received a definitive telegram from 
Nigeria. It had decided to lower Japanese imports for 1954 from £15 million to £10 
million, thus safeguarding UK exports 42 The issue was raised with the Cabinet on 29 
December where Butler gave an oral report on the progress of the negotiations with 
Japan, and asked for Cabinet authorization for an increase in Japanese imports to the 
UK by £3.35 million bringing the total UK imports to £13.35 million, as a 'trade-off 
for Nigeria's decision to limit its exports from Japan. The additional £3.35 million 
would consist of £2 million worth of Japanese grey cloth for processing and re-export 
and £1.35 million for other goods.43 Although Thomeycroft expressed his reserve 
about this increase, he grudgingly agreed to the Cabinet decision 'in the general 
interests of sterling area trade'.44
In the two weeks that followed, various meetings were held to reach an agreement over 
the terms of the sterling payments agreement. On 1 January a meeting was held 
concerning Japanese exports to the colonies. The Japanese side wished to know how 
the British side would guarantee colonial purchases of Japanese goods. The Japanese 
side was particularly worried as colonial purchases in the previous year had not met the 
estimates. Furthermore, they were eager to understand the process by which goods 
were imported into the colonies as, in the previous year, it had taken so long between 
the issuance of import licences to the actual sales of products.45 The British side
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reassured the Japanese that entrepot trading centres would have no limitations on their 
imports from Japan as long as the goods were for domestic consumption or they were 
to be on-sold to a non-sterling area country. As for the rest of the colonies, Britain 
guaranteed that they would buy to the amount they estimated. Concerning import 
licences, Sydney Levine of the Board of Trade explained that the process usually took 
six weeks for goods to the UK (two weeks for applications to be submitted, following 
the issue of a notice to importers and a month for the examination of these applications) 
but he assured the Japanese that the process would take less for the colonies. The 
Japanese side asked Britain to liberalize colonial purchases of Japanese goods, but 
Kennedy of the Colonial Office explained that Britain was limited to recommending, 
instead of instructing, the colonies on their purchasing programmes.46
Between 4 and 20 January, the two sides met to iron out Japan's oil imports from the 
sterling area. The meetings remained inconclusive as neither could decide on whether 
Japan would purchase 25 percent of the total allocation for oil in the sterling and dollar 
foreign exchange budgets47 or buy 22.5 percent of Japan's total oil imports from the 
sterling area. 48
As the end of January approached, most of the contentious issues between the two 
sides had been settled, and the two negotiating teams were preparing to sign the new 
payments agreement. The laborious negotiation process continued, however, due to an 
unexpected complication. On 25 January, Percival of the Board of Trade, Kennedy of 
the Colonial Office and Serpell of the Treasury had to arrange a meeting with Asakai, 
Ihara and Ushiba. The problem arose as the British side had received a telegram from 
East Africa explaining their wish to reduce their Japanese estimates from £5 million to 
£2.5 million as they had decided to increase their textiles purchases from the UK. The 
news was received very badly by the Japanese representatives who walked out of the 
negotiation room 49 From the Japanese angle, they could not conceive of a change in 
the estimate so late in the negotiations. The Japanese side was aware of the 
constitutional position of the UK vis-a-vis the colonies (i.e. that Britain was not in a 
position to make decisions on their behalf), but they thought the British government 
was in a position to tell the East African territories to stick to the £5 million figure.50 
What was most disturbing to the Japanese was that the East African territories were a 
symbol of 'British restrictions on imports from Japan', and the latest news only 
confirmed their suspicion.51 Therefore, what the Japanese delegates were implying was 
that they could not totally embrace the idea that Britain had no leverage over their 
African colonies, and that if there were restrictions on Japanese products they were 
designed to protect or safeguard British goods. Furthermore, Japanese delegates were 
placed in a difficult position as they had secured Tokyo's approval of the UK desiderata
183
on the condition that there would be increased import relaxations towards Japanese 
goods in the colonies.52
On the following day, a meeting was convened to discuss the above issue. Asakai made 
a personal proposal in order to prevent the issue from damaging the negotiations. He 
asked that Britain increase grey cotton cloth imports by £1 million. Furthermore, in 
order to balance colonial figures, £1.5 million would be deducted from colonial 
exports. This meant decreasing the total colonial estimate from £34 million to £32.5 
million. Asakai, pointed out, however, that the £1.5 million deduction would not be 
taken entirely from the cotton quota. Moreover, the UK government would take steps 
with the colonies concerned so the original figure of £5 million would be restored at the 
time of the next trade review, and when that happened, the Japanese side indicated they 
would return the colonial quota to the original figure. Finally, the United Kingdom 
would accept Japan's proposal concerning sterling imports for 1954.53 The Japanese 
proposal was considered very lenient by British delegates, and in a note, Serpell 
deduced the reasons for this Japanese approach. First and foremost was their desire to 
conclude the negotiations and go home. There was also the anxiety that a delay might 
lead to further loss of trade in other colonies. Also included in the calculation was the 
belief that if an early agreement was reached, Britain might extend the £10 million 
swaps and possibly another £2.5 million if the agreement was mutually satisfactory. 
The only political problem faced by Britain was of course the likely adverse reaction by 
the textiles industry toward an increase in grey cotton cloth imports.54 The Board of 
Trade was, however, in support of increased grey cloth imports into Britain if that was 
the price that had to be paid to settle the negotiations with Japan. On 28 January, the 
Cabinet met to discuss the issue, and authority was given to the British delegates to 
agree to the extra £1 million grey cloth imports.55 On the same day the two delegates 
met and it was agreed that Asakai's proposals would be accepted by Britain. The 
British side wanted to confirm, however, what would be entailed by 25 percent of all 
oil supplied by UK-and US-controlled companies. Ushiba replied that oil supplied 
against cash or on ordinary usance terms would be included for computation, but oil 
supplied in order to finance investment and oil paid for in switch dollars would be 
excluded. At the meeting, Serpell announced that Britain would extend 'swaps' of up to 
£12.5 million to the MOF. These swaps would be available from 1 February 1954 until 
30 April 1954. Each 'swap' arranged was available for three months, renewable for a 
further three months.56 The sterling payments agreement between the United Kingdom 
and Japan was signed on the following day by the Japanese Ambassador, Matsumoto 
Shunichi, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, while the 
agreed minute was initialled by the leaders of the two delegations, David Serpell of the
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Treasury and Asakai Koichiro of the Japanese embassy.57 The press release was 
released at 1 am on 30 January.
The negotiations for the new sterling payments agreement between the sterling area and 
Japan began on 3 December 1953 and the agreement was signed on 29 January 1954. 
These negotiations were significant as it was the first comprehensive negotiations 
between the sterling area and Japan since the first sterling agreement was signed in 
August 1951. The main points of the agreement were that it would last until 31 
December 1954, unless it was extended prior to that date. Furthermore, both sides were 
eligible to terminate the agreement with three months' notice. As for trade, the target for 
1954 was £209.5 million both ways. In regard to third country transfers, the previous 
agreed minute was to be replaced with an outline of each other's practices.58 As in 
previous agreements, both sides agreed to maintain trade at the highest possible level. 
Moreover, Japan was granted £12.5 million swaps for a maximum of six months.59 
Britain's compromise during these negotiations was its decision to relax its 
discriminatory trade restrictions against Japan and an agreement to increase Japan's 
trade with the sterling area.60
Although the two sides were able to reach an agreement without too much acrimony, 
the British side had to prepare for a harsh wave of criticism as the government realized 
they would not be let off lightly for their last-minute decision to increase Japanese grey 
cloth imports by £1 million. In a House of Commons debate on 1 February, Maudling 
came under heavy attack from various speakers who opposed the government's 
decision to go ahead with imports of £3 million worth of Japanese grey cloth. Criticism 
centred around the fact that the government had informed rather than consulted the 
relevant industries on this decision.61 Opposition also stemmed from the Cotton 
Spinners and Manufacturers' Association, the Rochdale Weavers and Winders' 
Association, the British Pottery Manufacturers' Federation and the North Staffordshire 
Chamber of Commerce to name but a few.62 Maudling defended these accusations by 
explaining that he had informed Sir Raymond Streat, the Chairman of the Cotton 
Board.63 The criticism did not abate, however, and Harold Wilson^ the former 
President of Board of Trade in the previous government, asked for the adjournment of 
the House under standing order number nine 'for the purpose of discussing a definite 
matter of urgent public importance, namely, "(t)he conclusion of a trade and finance 
agreement with the government of Japan which, for the first time since the war, permits 
the entry of a wide range of Japanese consumer goods into the United Kingdom"...'64 
Standing order number nine was rejected, because the sterling payments agreement had 
already been signed. Instead, a Commons debate was scheduled for 10 February on the 
basis of a motion by the opposition that,
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...this House, while accepting the principle that Colonial Territories should not 
be forced to buy British goods when it is contrary to their interest, regrets the 
action of Her Majesty's Government in entering into a trade agreement with the 
Japanese Government without prior consultation with the industries concerned, 
and without securing assurances that Japanese exporters will not revert to 
previous unfair trade practices.65
The Commons debate on the Japanese trade agreement was a heated one, which lasted 
from 7:15 to 10:00 in the evening. At the end of the debate, the opposition motion was 
rejected by 296 votes to 265. The Conservative amendment of the motion which 
supported the signing of the payments agreement, but which reassured Lancashire that 
it would not be at the mercy of Japanese competition if Japan broke its treaty obligation, 
was approved by 297 votes to 258.66
The Japanese press, which was covering the British domestic reaction to the 
Agreement, was initially unfavourable to the agreement but according to John 
Chadwick of the British embassy in Tokyo, 'the storm in London and Manchester 
made people think that there must be some advantage to the agreement'.67
In the aftermath of the Commons debate, the shaken government decided to reach a 
Cabinet decision on Britain's overall policy towards Japan. The initiative was taken by 
the Foreign Office which submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet proposing Britain's 
support for attempts to keep Japan within the western sphere. The Foreign Office 
realized the extent of the fear about Japanese competition in Britain and the 
Commonwealth, but it argued that keeping Japan in the western orbit was far more 
important. Central to its argument was the fact that none of the stabilizing factors in 
Japan were firmly established and that therefore there was a slim chance that Japan 
might align itself with the PRC. Eden thus proposed that Britain should attempt to 
prevent any Chinese-Japanese association in East Asia and avoid a 'decisive shift in the 
world balance of power'.68 In order to reach this end, Eden proposed as high a level of 
trade between Japan and the sterling area as was consistent with British national 
interests. Moreover, he recommended a concerted effort in Britain to change 'the 
climate of British opinion towards Japan so as to bring it into closer accord with the 
overriding requirement of our national policy and interest'.69 The Foreign Office 
proposal was approved by the Cabinet on 24 March.70 Therefore, the government used 
the threat of a Sino-Japanese collaboration in order to support greater sterling area- 
Japan trade, and to reverse the emotional opposition towards Japan in Britain. Although 
Anglo-Japanese relations began to an unimpressive start in 1954, Britain was given a 
chance to overturn the tide with Yoshida's decision to visit the United Kingdom.
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The Postponement of Yoshida's visit to the UK
An invitation for Yoshida to visit the United Kingdom was authorized by Lord 
Salisbury and approved by Prime Minister Winston Churchill as early as September
1953. Although the British Ambassador to Japan, Sir Esler Dening, was authorized to 
invite Yoshida, he did not approach the latter on the matter until 26 January.71 Yoshida 
expressed delight at the invitation, but he warned Dening that his visit would be subject 
to political stability at home. The timing of the invitation was not exactly diplomatic in 
Britain either, as it was extended at a time when the House of Commons was in an 
uproar over the recently signed payments agreement with Japan. Since rumours about 
the invitation had already spread to the press, it became important for the government to 
substantiate it, and the press was informed of the government's invitation to Yoshida in 
early February.72
The main issue Yoshida was expected to raise during his visit to the United Kingdom 
was the question of a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, because the Japanese side 
had been asking on and off about British intentions for the past two years. It was not 
surprising that this issue would be broached by Yoshida as it had been raised during the 
recent negotiations for the sterling payments agreement. It was a growing concern for 
the British side as well because article 12 of the peace treaty only obliged Japan to 
extend MFN treatment to the signatories for four years. This meant Japan's MFN 
treatment towards Britain would terminate in April 1956. It was therefore of utmost 
importance that Britain sign a treaty of some form with Japan if the former wished to 
prevent the latter from discriminating against British nationals, shipping and goods. 
Moreover, the whole issue of the commercial treaty brought to the fore the question of 
whether Britain should grant MFN rights instead of de facto MFN treatment to Japan. 
If Britain granted MFN rights to Japan, it effectively meant Britain's extension of 
GATT rights.
On 14 April Dennis Allen of the Foreign Office wrote to AE Percival of the Board of 
Trade and proposed that the relevant ministries should consider what to do when the 
peace treaty lapsed.73 He suggested the Board of Trade produce a draft submission to 
the Cabinet by around 26 April.74 The Board of Trade agreed to write a draft brief, but 
this was not completed for another month. In the meantime, Yoshida's itinerary was 
taking shape, and the Foreign Office was informed by the Japanese that the Prime 
Minister would be visiting Britain from 21 to 30 June.75
In the interim period, a meeting was held at the Manchester Chamber of Commerce on 
17 May to discuss the problem of Japanese copying of British textiles. The meeting 
was attended by the Cotton Board, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, the British
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Rayon and Synthetic Fibres Federation and the Board of Trade.76 It was held primarily 
to show the relevant officials the extent to which Japanese copying of British textiles 
designs was being carried out, and the reasons why measures against this were not 
working. The officials were shown a collection of Japanese designs which were exact 
copies of British fabrics in their design and their colour, except that Japanese 
manufacturers used inferior dyes which disappeared after one-wash. This caused 
problems for British fabric makers, as consumers were unable to tell one fabric from 
another, causing direct injury to British industries, as buyers were 'holding off placing 
orders' in Lancashire.77 Sir Maurice Dean and AE Percival of the Board of Trade 
indicated to the trade spokesmen that the problem could be solved if they registered 
their designs with the Japanese equivalent of the Patents and Designs Act. This was 
opposed by the spokesmen because of the inadequacy of the act, and more importantly 
because the short life of many of the designs made it extremely expensive to register 
their designs with Japanese authorities. The trade representatives, therefore, asked that 
Yoshida be informed of this problem, and Sir Maurice Dean undertook to consider the 
matter.78
On 23 May, Percival sent a copy of a draft brief to CT Crowe of the Foreign Office on 
the British position regarding a commercial treaty with Japan 79 The proposal set out by 
Percival indicated Britain's support for a commercial treaty with Japan in theory, 
subject to certain provisions and safeguards. These were that Britain would continue to 
discriminate against Japanese goods on balance of payments grounds; that Britain 
would have the right to discriminate against Japan in the event of disruptive competition 
causing injury to producers in the UK; moreover, producers in the colonies and the 
Commonwealth countries would also be allowed to discriminate against Japan in the 
event of disruption. Furthermore, the Board of Trade saw the importance of clarifying 
to the Japanese that Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya did not want to extend MFN 
and national rights to Japanese business people because the respective governments 
were unsure about whether they could protect Japanese nationals against physical 
attack.80 On the following day, at a Board of Trade meeting, Thomeycroft opposed 
Percival's draft memorandum on the grounds that a commercial treaty with Japan was 
premature. The reasons behind his opposition was the evidence of excessive Japanese 
copying of British textiles designs, and the general public opinion against Japan in 
Britain. Thomeycroft was not against the signing of an establishment treaty,81 but he 
thought a commercial treaty at this juncture would do more harm than good to Anglo- 
Japanese relations.82
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Thomeycroft's position on the commercial treaty indicates the impact that the meeting at 
the Manchester Chamber of Commerce had on the Board of Trade. Before such 
evidence was shown to the Board of Trade, the textiles industry could only cite former 
Japanese 'unfair' practices as a reason for protection against Japan. The meeting, 
however, provided clear proof that Lancashire needed protection from Japanese 
competition. Fresh also in Thomeycroft's mind was the unexpected response in the 
House of Commons after the renewal of the sterling payments agreement. Therefore, 
on the same day, Percival wrote to Crowe retracting the draft memorandum. An 
amended version of the memorandum was approved by Thomeycroft on 27 May.83 
Before further work could be carried out, however, the Foreign Office received a 
telegram from Japan on 5 June, informing them of Yoshida's decision to postpone his 
visit to Britain indefinitely due to domestic political problems.84 Yoshida, however, 
authorized Mukai Tadaham, the former Finance Minister in the Yoshida Cabinet, to 
represent Japan in trade talks with the United States and Britain. This shifted the 
emphasis from the question of a commercial treaty to existing trade issues.85
At the Cabinet's EPC meeting on 24 June, Thomeycroft explained the reasons why the 
Board of Trade could not enter into a commercial treaty with Japan. The reasons were 
fears of fierce Japanese competition due to low wages in Japan. Furthermore, if Britain 
acceded MFN rights to Japan, the southern Dominions who were discriminating against 
Japanese goods in favour of British goods would probably end their discriminatory. 
policy, and follow Britain's lead and extend MFN rights to Japan. Moreover, Japanese 
competition had taken unfair forms in the past and there was no guarantee that Japan 
would not revert to those malpractices in the future. This promoted the view that Britain 
and the colonies should not tie their hands in any way as long as the uncertainty 
existed. This point was particularly important in the light of existing evidence 
concerning Japanese copying of British designs.86 Moreover, there were other forms 
of unfair Japanese competition known to the UK, such as the existence of Japanese 
apparatus to stimulate exports by means of 'incentives and tax allowances'.87 These 
points indicated the possible criticism the government would receive if it entered a 
commercial treaty with Japan. Several points were raised during the ensuing 
discussion, such as the importance of keeping Japan within the western bloc and the 
importance of negotiating a treaty to safeguard particular British interests such as 
banking, insurance, oil and shipping before the expiry of the peace treaty in 1956. In 
general, there was support for the Board of Trade's view that Britain should make a 
strong protest to Mukai about Japanese malpractices, but the committee as a whole 
indicated their interest in seeing an official study to look at the question of a commercial 
treaty with Japan in the context of Britain's policy towards the GATT.88
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Mukai arrived in the last week of June, and met with Butler, Thomeycroft and the 
Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, Alan Lennox-Boyd. The meeting between 
Mukai and Butler on 28 June remained general and short.89 The respective meetings on 
30 June with Thomeycroft and Lennox-Boyd, on the other hand, were over specific 
trade issues. Thomeycroft, at his meeting with Mukai, indicated which trade practices 
were considered 'unfair' by Britain. These were export subsidies such as currency 
retention schemes, taxation relief and link systems;90 furthermore, he expressed British 
concern over Japan's barter arrangements with various countries, as it was against the 
spirit of multilateral trade, and lastly, the British anxiety over Japan's copying of their 
textiles designs. In response to the above points, Mukai hoped that something could be 
done to curb export subsidies. On barter arrangements, he explained that they were 
used when Japan was unable to pay for goods through normal exchange. He 
emphasized the importance of this arrangement for the expansion of Japanese trade, but 
at the same time, reassured Thomeycroft that recourse to barter arrangements was only 
made when normal trade was not possible. With regard to copying of designs, Mukai 
said he had heard about complaints but had seen little evidence of this fact. He was later 
shown samples of Japanese copying. On seeing them, Mukai expressed his desire to 
suppress the malpractice.91 Mukai, as expected, hoped that Britain would support 
Japan's GATT entry, and moreover, that Japan and Britain could sign a commercial 
treaty in the near future. As agreed at the EPC meeting, Thomeycroft explained that a 
commercial treaty was not possible while Japanese commercial malpractices existed 92
At a meeting with the officials of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation later that 
day, Mukai was asked whether the Japanese government was financing or assisting the 
Japanese shipping industry. The issue was raised because it had come to the attention 
of the Ministry that Japanese shipping lines were making losses, but that it did not seem 
to affect the expansion of their operations nor the expansion of their fleets. This led the 
Ministers to believe that Japan's shipping industry was either receiving financial 
assistance from banks or financial institutions at government instigation, or having their 
operation losses underwritten by the government.93 Mukai in reply emphatically denied 
government assistance towards the Japanese shipping industry directly or indirectly, 
and explained that these shipping companies would go bankrupt in the long-run if they 
continued to record losses.94 The meetings with Mukai were important for British 
officials as they wished to settle Japan's trade malpractices before the latter succeeded 
in becoming a GATT member.
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Japan's Application to the GATT
British policy towards Japan's application to the GATT lay dormant in the first-half of
1954. The reason for this was partly because the Americans were examining their own 
foreign economic policy and until their position became clearer it was difficult for 
Britain to formulate a policy towards Japan.
In late June, Winthrop Brown of the American embassy in London told the Board of 
Trade representatives at a meeting that the United States had decided to support Japan's 
GATT accession, and furthermore that the United States was willing to provide 
compensation for any third country willing to extend concessions to Japan in the tariff 
negotiations prior to Japan's GATT entry.95 Brown notified the Board of Trade 
officials that if they wished to enter tariff negotiations with Japan and wished to get 
compensation from the United States, they should provide a list by 1 September. A 
strict deadline needed to be set, as the President's authority to negotiate tariff reductions 
under the Reciprocal Trade Act only extended until 12 June 1955.96 In reply, Frank 
Lee of the Board of Trade said he was not against conducting tariff negotiations early in 
the following year, but he saw difficulties if Japan's accession was raised at the same 
time, because of the limited time available for Britain to initiate a policy, especially with 
the holidays intervening between July and September. Furthermore, anti-Japanese 
feeling in commercial circles had become acute due to the widespread Japanese copying 
of British textile designs and patterns. Moreover, GATT was a sensitive issue on the 
British government benches and he did not want to see any unification of anti-GATT 
and anti-Japanese forces.97 The United Kingdom therefore sought a solution whereby 
the UK could conduct tariff negotiations without linking it to Japan's formal accession 
to the GATT. The meeting ended inconclusively, but both sides agreed to maintain 
close contact. At a higher level, Eden, who was in Washington, met with Dulles on 29 
June to discuss Japan and the GATT. Both sides acknowledged the difficulties of Japan 
entering the GATT, but Dulles told Eden that 'he felt it necessary to push on with 
Japan's admission'.98
On 5 July, the Japanese Minister in Berne sent a letter to the GATT asking for the 
inclusion of Japan's accession in the agenda of the ad hoc committee meeting on 
Agenda and Intersessional Business.99 Five days later, Oda at the Japanese embassy in 
London called on CT Crowe of the Foreign Office asking for British support for 
Japan's accession as a full contracting member of the GATT.100
Meanwhile, British and American officials continued their efforts to reach an agreement 
over Japan.101 At a meeting of the Board of Trade officials on 16 July, Frank Lee and 
Edgar Cohen of the Board of Trade broke the stalemate. They proposed an amendment
191
to article 35 so that a GATT member and a new acceder could base their trade relations 
on a bilateral agreement. In other words, instead of a contracting party invoking the 
existing article 35 against an acceding country, the amendment would enable the 
contracting party to welcome the new country into the GATT in principle, but base their 
trade relations on a bilateral treaty. This would enable the UK to take emergency action 
such as raising duties or imposing quotas if excessive imports by the acceder threatened 
to disrupt normal trade patterns.102 The initial reaction of Samuel C Waugh, Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Affairs, was not favourable as he thought it would set a 
precedent for other contracting parties when they were faced with potential competition. 
The Board of Trade representatives, however, were not seeking a quick reply from the 
Americans, as the proposal was still tentative, and it had yet to get Cabinet approval. 
Therefore Lee and Cohen asked the American representatives to keep the proposal 
confidential, as the British were not intending to present it at the upcoming ad hoc 
committee meeting.103
The ad hoc committee meeting of the GATT was convened from 26 July to 3 August, 
and the Japan issue was discussed on 29 July.104 The Committee agreed to commence 
Japanese negotiations from 1 February 1955 in Geneva.105 Those countries wishing to 
enter tariff negotiations were asked to inform the Executive Secretary of their position 
by 15 September. CW Sanders who attended as the British representative reserved 
Britain's position. Sanders’ statement was interpreted by the press as British opposition 
to the recommendation. Ironically, the government had not yet reached a policy 
decision on Japan's membership in GATT.106
The Report on a Commercial Treaty with Japan
On 14 July the ONC met to discuss what form the study on a commercial treaty with 
Japan should take.107 It was agreed that a working party would be set up under the 
chairmanship of the Treasury, with the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Supply, the Board of Trade and the Ministry 
of Transport as members.108 The main objective of the study was to examine the pros 
and cons of a commercial treaty with Japan, and the various ministries were asked to 
submit papers. The Board of Trade was given the responsibility for studying the 
advantages and disadvantages of a treaty, and an assessment of what the Japanese 
might want and how far their requirements could be met.109 The Treasury was given 
the task of examining Japan's general economic position, its competitive power, and 
the extent to which Japanese exports might be regarded as a danger to UK interests.110 
Finally, the Foreign Office, in consultation with the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
was asked to prepare and circulate a paper dealing with the foreign policy aspects of the
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question, and highlight complications which might arise as a result of differences with 
other countries.111
On 23 July, an informal meeting of the ONC was held to discuss the five notes 
prepared by the various ministries for the study, and to discuss what points should be 
included in the report.112 After a lengthy discussion, FF Turnbull of the Treasury, who 
was in the chair, concluded that there appeared to be three possible approaches to a 
commercial agreement with Japan. One was to make a full MFN commercial treaty with 
Japan and invite Japan fully into the GATT, this, however, was problematic due to 
opposition from various ministers. The second approach was the Board of Trade's 
proposal for implementing a safeguard 'which would enable countries to discriminate 
against imports of particular products if these were causing or threatening serious injury 
either to producers in the importing country or to the exporting interests of other 
members of the same preferential areas'.113 The third option was to attempt a 
commercial treaty excluding MFN treatment for goods, or in other words a simple 
establishment treaty, but it was unlikely that Japan would agree to such an offer.114 
Other alternatives included safeguarding Britain's position by reaching an agreement 
with Japan along article 19 of the GATT, or including a phrase indicating a gradual 
approach to Japan's full or qualified MFN treatment.115 In conclusion, the Board of 
Trade, the Treasury and the Foreign Office were asked to explore the three alternative 
approaches.116
At the same time as the ONC was considering Britain's position on a commercial treaty 
with Japan, the Cabinet's External Economic Policy Committee was meeting to discuss 
Britain’s GATT policy.117 The committee was made up of Cabinet ministers and it was 
chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. At the second meeting on 19 July, 
Thomeycroft was asked to circulate a memorandum indicating how he would propose 
to deal with the problem raised by Japan's GATT accession including the problem of 
the 'no new preference' rule in relation to Japan.118 The day before the third External 
Economic Policy Committee meeting, a Board of Trade memorandum dated 23 July 
was distributed to the various committee members proposing the continuation of 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa's right to maintain their high tariffs on 
Japanese goods on a discriminatory basis. Furthermore, it called for Britain to be given 
the right to take emergency action if Japanese practices or Japanese competition became 
intolerable.119 The Board of Trade believed Britain and Commonwealth rights could be 
secured if article 35 of the GATT was amended to enable Britain to base its trade 
relations with Japan along a bilateral treaty.120 Thomeycroft envisioned a carefully 
drafted 'escape clause' in the bilateral treaty which gave Britain and the colonies 
absolute discretion to put discriminatory tariff or quantitative restrictions on Japanese
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goods if one of the following occurred: heavy imports of Japanese goods which caused 
injury or threatened a UK or Commonwealth industry; if Japanese goods were sold in 
the UK or in any part of the world under unfair conditions; and if Japanese goods were 
dumped abroad with the help of government subsidies.121 Thomeycroft was aware of 
the difficulties of getting the Americans to approve his proposal but he thought there 
was a slight chance that 'we may win them over'.122
The Foreign Office, who had received the draft memorandum a few days prior to the 
meeting was dissatisfied with the interim Board of Trade proposal because it did not 
reflect the position of any of the other ministries, nor did it take into account the 
combined effort being undertaken in the ONC in regard to Britain's commercial policy 
towards Japan. It excluded various points such as the foreign policy implications of not 
giving full MFN rights to Japan; the immediate as well as long-term gains which might 
be derived from a generous commercial policy towards Japan; and the other alternatives 
under which Japan might be admitted as a full member of the GATT. Moreover, AD 
Wilson, who was the head of the Economic Relations Department, thought the views of 
the Tokyo embassy should be incorporated into any recommendations on Japan. 
Therefore, he emphasized the importance of the foreign policy aspect and recommended 
that the Foreign Office reserve its position if a discussion took place.123
The Board of Trade's proposal was discussed by the Committee on External Economic 
Policy on 27 July. At the meeting, the Colonial Secretary doubted whether any colonies 
other than Uganda or Kenya would 'take advantage of the opportunity to discriminate 
against Japan' in the way that was proposed by the Board of Trade.124 Conversely, the 
Commonwealth Secretary thought the Board of Trade's proposal would enable 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to continue to discriminate against Japan 
using tariff controls. Viscount Swinton, therefore, thought the Commonwealth 
countries should be instructed against taking any action which might prejudice the 
adoption of a common policy before they met at the meeting of Commonwealth 
countries in London prior to the GATT session in Geneva. The Minister of State, the 
Marquess of Reading, who was representing the Foreign Secretary, thought the ONC 
report should be considered by ministers before any final decision was reached. 
Therefore, the Board of Trade's proposal was accepted provisionally, but the final 
decision was subject to further consideration in the light of the ONC report.125
On the following day, at an informal meeting of the ONC, the committee members were 
informed of the conclusions reached at the External Economic Policy committee. 
Furthermore, it was agreed during the meeting that no 'radical re-casting of the draft 
report on commercial treaty with Japan was necessary', and the meeting took note of
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the various suggestions raised.126 In regard to the Board of Trade's proposal for a 
bilateral treaty overriding the GATT, Wilson of the Foreign Office thought there was 
very little likelihood of it being accepted in full by Japan and the United States, and that 
therefore it might be 'wise to indicate to ministers other approaches to the problem' 
such as an amendment of article 19.127 The Board of Trade, however, was against the 
article 19 alternative as the safeguard would only apply to the exporting country, thus 
preventing Commonwealth countries from invoking the article if British exports to 
Australia were suffering from Japanese competition.128 Wilson therefore proposed to 
delay the decision and asked that ministers wait for the views of Tokyo and 
Washington. In reply, the Board of Trade representatives maintained that the United 
States would only accept the proposal if Britain threatened to invoke article 35 as the 
only other alternative. Therefore, it was agreed that the alternatives were either the 
Board of Trade's proposal or the invocation of article 35.129
After the meeting, Wilson wrote of the disaster that had taken place at the ONC. He 
was particularly angry as the Board of Trade had sought an ultimatum between two 
choices: the Board of Trade's proposal or the invocation of article 35, which placed 
little room for Foreign Office manoeuvre. Wilson strongly recommended a meeting 
between the Board of Trade, Treasury and the Foreign Office officials to discuss the 
various options open to Britain, prior to the completion of the report.130
On 3 August, the ONC met again to discuss the report on Britain's commercial policy 
towards Japan, and the revised copy was circulated to the External Economic Policy 
Committee, the EPC and the ONC.131 The report was divided into five sections; a 
section on the content of a commercial policy; a section on the case for a more 
liberalized trade with Japan; one on the disadvantages of liberalized trade; the Board of 
Trade's proposal and the alternatives; and finally the conclusion.132
The first section of the report identified the usual components of a commercial treaty. 
The two main categories covered in a commercial treaty were 'reciprocal rights and 
treatment of individuals and firms, including the treatment of shipping and the liability 
of nationals and companies of one country to taxation in the other'.133 These were 
matters that were not dealt with in the GATT. The other category covered provisions 
about the reciprocal treatment of goods. Usually this meant giving MFN treatment on 
goods similar to the provisions laid down in the GATT. The first section focused on the 
provisions relating to matters other than goods. The report identified the importance of 
signing a commercial treaty in order to safeguard the following British interests: 
establishment provisions (MFN treatment for British nationals and companies, as well 
as, national and MFN treatment with regard to taxation), shipping (Britain's main
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desiderata, especially as shipping was one of Britain's main sources of invisible trade 
with Japan), good behaviour (to eradicate the copying of British designs and to 
eliminate export subsidies), consular convention, and finally, a double taxation 
agreement and an extradition treaty.134
This led to the second section of the report which concentrated on the advantages of a 
more liberal trade policy towards Japan. They were, that Japan's alignment with the 
west was a complete break with that followed by Japan in the previous twenty-five 
years; therefore the Foreign Office who compiled this section questioned whether the 
change would be lasting if Japan was not accepted as a full member of the free world. 
The danger of Japan leaning towards communism was also acknowledged, not only 
because it would create an industrial imbalance between the east and west, but also 
because of the danger it would pose to Britain's colonial territories such as Hong Kong 
and Malaya which were Britain's main economic assets in East Asia. Furthermore, the 
Foreign Office argued that Japan would see its GATT entry and the British response as 
a test of whether Japan was to be received as an equal in the western world. Moreover, 
an expansion of sterling-Japan trade relations was important because of the economic 
and political difficulties Japan was facing. The section also highlighted the hypocrisy of 
Britain advocating multilateral trade and the elimination of quantitative restrictions upon 
imports on the one hand, while excluding Japan from the western multilateral trading 
system on the other. Moreover, if Britain continued to discriminate against Japan, the 
latter would be less inclined to cooperate with the United Kingdom over sterling area 
trade.135 Conversely, the disadvantages of granting MFN rights for Japanese goods 
was a reiteration of the Board of Trade's position. Although other proposals were 
examined in the . report, the Board of Trade's suggestion was considered most 
appropriate because it enabled Japan to enter the GATT, but also ensured preferential 
treatment for British products in the southern Dominions.
Initially, the report was to be shown to ministers on the External Economic Policy 
Committee, but instead, the Cabinet approved on 10 August a memorandum by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer suggesting that the President's proposal should be 'tried' 
out.136 The Americans had already been approached by Britain and therefore it was a 
matter of waiting for their reply. If there was no reply by the end of September, the 
matter was to be discussed at the US-UK talks on the GATT review in Washington. 
The Commonwealth countries were to be approached at the October meeting of 
Commonwealth officials in London.137
The Board of Trade and Treasury representatives had a chance to discuss the British 
proposal with the Americans over three sessions at the end of September and the
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beginning of October when they went to Washington to hold US-UK talks on the 
GATT Review.138 Despite an attempt to reach a compromise, neither could see eye-to- 
eye, as Britain was against invoking article 35, while the American side was unable to 
embrace the British proposal which they felt was against the whole GATT concept. The 
sessions ended with the State Department agreeing to consider the issue further.139 The 
Board of Trade decided that the best plan was to allow time for British arguments to 
sink in further, and for Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador to Washington, to 
see Dulles on the issue in the following week.140
The British proposal was discussed with the representatives of the Commonwealth 
countries at the beginning of October.141 Representatives included those from Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the colonies.142 At the meeting, Canada remained aloof 
from Britain's proposal, as it had signed a commerce agreement with Japan on 1 April 
and supported Japan's GATT accession.143 Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and 
the Federation of Rhodesia supported the British proposal. The South Asian 
representatives saw the advantages of including safeguards, but they were unable to 
support a discriminatory policy against a fellow Asian country.144 Although Britain 
was unable to attain full support during the Commonwealth meeting, what was relayed 
to the State Department was different. They were told that 'all Commonwealth will 
support UK proposals regarding Japan'.145 This must have been part of the pressure to 
get American approval for the proposal, but if that was the case, the Americans were 
not taken in as C. Thayer White, Acting Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs of the 
Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, wrote in his correspondence to Peyton Kerr, the 
Acting Economic Counselor in Tokyo, that 'I should judge that the Commonwealth will 
initially present a united front but I wonder how long all of the members will hold this 
position under hammering from other countries'.146 Meanwhile, the Board of Trade 
decided to seek authority from the Cabinet to approach Japan with the proposal. It was 
hoped that an aide-memoire could be handed to the Japanese government before or 
during Prime Minister Yoshida's rescheduled visit in October so that the matter could 
be discussed while he was in Britain.147
However, even before the Board of Trade could get Cabinet authority for its plan, Oda 
of the Japanese embassy met with Percival at his own request on 9 October to find out 
whether the rumours about a bilateral treaty were in fact true. When Percival told him 
about the proposal on an informal basis, Oda 'stressed the undesirability of any action 
which formally singled out Japan'.148 Two days later, Oda saw Allen of the Foreign 
Office to inform him that he saw no prospects of the British proposal being acceptable 
to the Japanese. The reason being that if Japan granted special safeguards to Britain,
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other countries would probably clamour to get the same rights, whereby the Japanese 
would soon find that they had given away everything they had hoped to gain by 
becoming a member of the GATT.149
By early October, the Americans and the representatives of the Commonwealth 
countries were informed of the British proposal. The Americans were not completely in 
favour and there was no unanimous endorsement by the Commonwealth 
representatives. Furthermore, the Japanese reaction was negative. However, despite 
this less than favourable reaction from various quarters, Britain decided to pursue the 
Board of Trade's proposal because it was considered to be the best alternative given the 
recrudescence of anti-Japanese feeling in Parliament and among industry.150
On 15 October, the Foreign Office sent a draft aide-memoire to their Tokyo embassy 
for comments.151 Two days later, Dening replied informing the Foreign Office that the 
aide-memoire as it was drafted would 'only serve to infuriate the Japanese' because it 
began with 'a slap in the face', therefore, he strongly recommended against handing the 
aide-memoire in its 'present' form.152 Dening's alternative draft was accepted by the 
Board of Trade.153 On 19 October Sir Roger Makins sent a telegram to the Foreign 
Office, indicating his doubts about the line that Britain was taking. He thought Britain 
was trying to entrench itself in a position which was not 'either sensible or ultimately 
tenable'.154
On 20 October, the Board of Trade's proposal was discussed in the Cabinet, and 
Thomeycroft was given authority to hand the aide-memoire to the Japanese, but he 
was to be guided by the views expressed by the Foreign Office and the Treasury about 
how these proposals should be put to the Japanese government. The ministries' views 
were that the proposal should not seem tantamount to an ultimatum and that Britain 
should avoid threats to use article 35 of the GATT in the opening stages of the 
discussion with Yoshida.155 On 23 October—despite the misgivings on all sides—the 
aide-memoire was handed simultaneously to the acting Director of the Economic Affairs 
Bureau of the MOFA in Tokyo, and the Japanese Ambassador to the UK with the hope 
that it could be discussed with Yoshida during his UK visit.156
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Yoshida's UK Visit157
Two months after Yoshida had postponed his overseas tour, greater domestic stability 
enabled him to resume his plans. The details were finalized in August and his itinerary 
included visits to Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.158 His stay in the United Kingdom was due to last seven days from 21 to 28 
October. Among the itinerary for his UK visit was a meeting with Sir Robert Craigie, 
the former British Ambassador to Japan, a meeting with the representatives of the 
Federation of British Industries, an audience with the Queen, a meeting with various 
government ministers, a speech at the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and talks with the 
representatives of the National Federation of Far Eastern Prisoners of War.159
As Yoshida had no particular objectives that he wished to accomplish during his trip, it 
could be said that it was successful. That at least was the conclusion reached by WD 
Allen of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office in his letter to Dening dated 
16 November.160 The low-point during his trip was the press conference on the first 
day of his visit when he told the press that 'he had not been anxious to come to 
London, first because the reception of the Crown Prince last year had not been very 
cordial and second because as Japanese Ambassador between 1936 and 1938 he had 
failed to prevent war developing between our two countries'.161 The press who wished 
to be unkind to him, picked up on his first statement. Another 'unhappy occasion' was 
when he gave a speech in front of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. His bad English, his 
mannerisms, and his references to war criminals (and the hope that the incarcerated 
Japanese war criminals would get clemency), and Japan's entry in the GATT provoked 
members to ask a series of aggressive questions.162 He had better luck with the 
representatives of the Federation of British Industries and with the Far Eastern 
Prisoners of War Association, as these meetings helped to 'clear the air'.163
The more substantial talks were scheduled during his morning meeting with Eden, and 
his luncheon meeting with Butler on 27 October respectively. At his morning meeting, 
Yoshida said that he had only two points to raise: China and the Japanese war 
criminals. With regard to China, he had visions of weaning China away from the 
communist bloc, and re-integrating China into the free world. He said he planned to 
discuss the issue when he met Dulles in Washington, and hoped the British 
Ambassador to Washington, Sir Roger Makins, would assist Yoshida in broaching the 
subject with Dulles. In reply, Eden agreed that it was important to detach China from 
the communist alliance, and that western policy towards China was 'not altogether 
wise'.164 He, however, told Yoshida, that due to public opinion and opinion in the 
Senate, the US government would not be able to do anything about it until after the 
congressional elections on 2 November. Nevertheless, Eden said he would talk to
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Malcolm MacDonald about Yoshida's plans, and he also gave his word that Makins 
would be there to assist Yoshida in Washington.165 On the subject of the Japanese war 
criminals, Yoshida stated that he hoped that the 95 war criminals sentenced by the 
British and still incarcerated in Sugamo Prison would either be released, have their 
sentences reduced or get parole.166 Eden said that he was unable to make a 'political 
bargain on what was a purely judicial issue'.167
The conversation then turned to other subjects such as article 16 of the peace treaty168 
and the results of the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, before the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of 
Transport and Civil Aviation joined the meeting. The three ministers had pre-arranged 
to join the meeting half-way through the talks as they wished to discuss economic and 
trade issues with Yoshida. Unfortunately, for the three ministers, Yoshida was 
unwilling to discuss Anglo-Japanese payments issues or his views on the British aide- 
memoire which had recently been handed to the Japanese government. Yoshida 
indicated he would do whatever was possible to put a stop to Japan's copying of 
British designs, but over shipping he explained that the Japanese government was no 
longer subsidizing the shipbuilding industry, although the Japanese government did 
encourage Japanese banks to lend money to the shipping companies at a low rate of 
interest.169
At the luncheon meeting at 11 Downing Street, Butler was accompanied by the Minister 
of Defence, Earl Alexander of Tunis, Thomeycroft, and the Economic Secretary to the 
Treasury, Reginald Maudling. Yoshida was given the opportunity to raise any matters 
he wished, but he declined to take the opportunity to discuss specific issues, and talked 
again about China and his hope for increased Sino-Japanese trade.170
Yoshida' trip to the United States from 2 to 10 November, was more constructive in 
that the United States agreed to supply Japan with $100 million worth of surplus 
agricultural commodities to Japan.171 Yoshida did not mention the idea of increased 
western trade with China, but Makins, who reported on Yoshida's visit to .Washington, 
suspected that Yoshida was persuaded by his advisers not to raise the issue in the 
United States.172 Yoshida spoke of the possibility of setting up a high command in 
Singapore under Malcolm MacDonald to combat communism, but Dulles refused to
w c\y
commit himself in anyway. He also spoke of a greatly increased flow of investment 
capital to East Asia, or what the press dubbed the 'Asian Marshall Plan', but the $4 
billion a year program which Yoshida envisaged was quickly deemed impractical. 
Yoshida's call for the Asian Marshall Plan was a follow-up to the speech made by the 
head of the FOA (Foreign Operations Administration), Harold Stassen at the Colombo
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Conference in Ottawa in which he called for an Asian version of the Marshall plan.173 
It is understood that Yoshida thought that Stassen's Ottawa speech heralded a new 
orientation in US policy towards Asia, and that there would be increased finances for 
Asian economic development. Although the outline of Stassen's plan had been 
approved by the NSC, the US administration was far too divided over the United 
State's role in Asian economic organization to 'undertake any large-scale programme 
for Asian economic development modelled after the Marshall Plan for Europe'.174
Although, it would be difficult to assess the importance of Yoshida's visit to Britain 
and the United States, it must be concluded that as a goodwill tour it was largely a 
success, but that no political objectives were settled during his visit to the two 
countries. Conversely, if he had embarked on the tour to improve his domestic public 
image, the trip was a failure, as Yoshida was forced out of office on his return to 
Japan, and Hatoyama Ichiro became the new Prime Minister of Japan. For Britain, the 
trip did not alleviate Anglo-Japanese commercial difficulties because Yoshida refused to 
discuss the pertinent issues, therefore, they had to be dealt through alternate means.
Ninth Session of the GATT and the Japanese response to the British
Aide-Memoire
Although Yoshida seemed impassive about the British aide-m em oire, Japanese 
delegates to the GATT were not hesitant about discussing the matter with their US 
counterparts. At a meeting on 26 October, Hagiwara Torn and Togo Fumihiko of the 
Japanese delegation met with Leonard Weiss, Assistant Chief of the Commercial Policy 
Staff, in confidence. Hagiwara gave a copy of the aide-m em oire  to Weiss and 
explained that Japan preferred Britain to invoke article 35 of the GATT to the British 
formula. He proposed that contracting parties should be able to adopt the interpretation 
of article 23 as developed by the intersessional committee in order to facilitate Indian 
anxieties about Japanese competition. Furthermore, he advocated the conclusion of 
bilateral agreements with Australia and New Zealand similar to that reached with 
Canada. Moreover, he thought that the United Kingdom, South Africa, and other 
countries such as Cuba should invoke article 35 and base their trade relations with 
Japan on bilateral agreements. The agreements would be similar to the GATT, with the 
exception that the signatories would be able to take action against Japan under article 23 
without having to obtain the approval of the contracting parties for such action.175 
Weiss had some doubts about Hagiwara's proposals, but he did not discount them.
While awaiting the Japanese response to the aide-memoire, Britain was beginning to 
consider alternative action in case the Board of Trade's proposal was rejected by Japan. 
There was a meeting in the Foreign Office on 28 October, attended by representatives
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of the Treasury and the Board of Trade concerning this issue. 176 The four alternatives 
discussed at the meeting were action under article 19 of the GATT; action under article 
23 of the GATT in the form evolved by the intersessional committee in the previous 
year; the possibility of retaining Thomeycroft's proposal while modifying the content 
(i.e. excluding the clause that third countries be able to discriminate in Britain's favour); 
and lastly, the latest American proposal (i.e. for Britain to invoke article 35, at any time 
after Japan joined the GATT, and for Britain to negotiate a bilateral treaty with Japan 
which would come into effect in such an event) . 177 Neither the article 19 or 23 
alternatives were considered appropriate. It was a known fact that article 19 would not 
be approved by the other contracting parties, whereas article 23 was considered 
unsatisfactory by the Board of Trade as the final decision was in the hands of the 
contracting parties. Conversely, the American proposal was considered far too drastic. 
The second objection to this proposal was the fact that a third country such as Australia 
would have to invoke article 35 or cease to discriminate in favour of Britain. In 
conclusion, AD Wilson who chaired the informal meeting thought all the alternatives 
were 'second best' but it was clear that the American proposal was the least 
objectionable. 178
On 29 October in Geneva, the contracting parties voted on the recommendation by the 
intersessional committee that tariff negotiations should take place with Japan starting 21 
February 1955. Although the vote did not commit any member to enter into tariff 
negotiations, all the contracting parties voted in favour except for Britain, Australia, 
South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and France who abstained, 
and Uruguay, Peru and Nicaragua who were absent. 179
Meanwhile, informal discussions between British and Japanese officials indicated 
Japan's opposition to the aide-memoire. At a meeting between Percival and Asakai on 1 
November, Asakai even said that he would rather that Britain invoked article 35 if it 
could not accept Japan as a full member of the GATT. Furthermore, British fears that 
the invocation of article 35 would lead to a deterioration in Anglo-Japanese and Anglo- 
American relations became doubtful, especially as it was the Japanese side who wished 
to see Britain invoke article 35.
By mid-November, it was obvious that Japan was against the proposal and that 
therefore it was only a matter of receiving the official Japanese reply. On 1 December 
Japan handed an aide-memoire to Britain in which it indicated its inability to accept the 
British proposal. No alternative proposal was provided, but it expressed the Japanese 
wish to see the two countries conclude a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation in the near future. 180 The Japanese aide-memoire confirmed the death of the
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Board of Trade's proposal. On 14 December, the Cabinet met to confirm that fact and 
further discussions were scheduled. Therefore, Britain was left without a policy just 
two months before Japan was scheduled to start tariff negotiations.
Although the outcome of the sterling payments negotiations and the GATT seemed to 
indicate Britain's overall opposition to Japan's economic recovery, this was not entirely 
the case. This was evident in Britain's support for Japan's membership of the ECAFE 
and the Colombo Plan in 1954.
Japan's Membership of the ECAFE and the Colombo Plan
The EFAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) was an organization 
established under the umbrella of the United Nation's ECOSOC (Economic and Social 
Council) in March 1947. The original UN aim behind the ECAFE was to 'give effective 
aid to the countries devastated by war. ECOSOC further detailed the functions of 
ECAFE and directed the organization to assist in the reconstruction of Asia, and to 
maintain and strengthen the economic relations of the area TDOth among themselves and 
with other countries of the world' . 181 Initially, ECAFE membership was limited to 
Asian and non-Asian UN members with interests in the region. They were China, 
India, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, 
the United States and the United Kingdom. At the second general assembly, ECAFE 
members decided to invite non-self-governing Asian countries to the organization 
through an associated membership without voting rights. These associate memberships 
were granted to British Borneo, Burma, Ceylon and Hong Kong. Pakistan became a 
full member at the same general assembly. In 1948 New Zealand and Burma also 
became full members, and Nepal became an associate member. 182 Japan's first 
observer to ECAFE was a Japanese technical adviser who went as a SCAP observer to 
the sub-committee on the Steel Industry in August 1949.183 Japan began sending 
observers from the eighth session of ECAFE in January 1952, and it was then that 
Pakistan proposed to extend ECAFE's scope to include Japan. The proposal was 
adopted by the general assembly, with the Philippines as the only dissenting voice. In 
April 1953, the United States and France jointly proposed the full admission of 
Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Laos, Nepal, South Korea and South Vietnam at an 
ECOSOC meeting. This was opposed by half of the ECOSOC members as they were 
not UN members. A year later, the above countries were given full memberships, due 
to their eligibility for UN membership. 184
Initially, the Asian ECAFE members hoped that the non-Asian members would help the 
region industrialize, and they especially set hopes on the ECAFE becoming an 
organization capable of arranging an Asian economic recovery plan similar to the
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Marshall Plan, but they were to be disappointed. Moreover, the United States 
dampened any hopes of ECAFE becoming an aid-channeling organization. 185 Although 
ECAFE did not live up to the Asian members' expectations, the Colombo Plan faired 
better.
The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast 
Asia was formally launched on 1 July 1951.186 The idea behind the plan was proposed 
by the then Australian Foreign Minister, Percy Spender, at the first postwar meeting of 
the Commonwealth foreign ministers in Colombo. 187 The aim of the plan was to 
promote economic assistance to the non-communist countries in South and Southeast 
Asia. Although it was named the Colombo Plan, there was no single integrated plan for 
the region, and in fact it was made up of a series of bilateral arrangements between 
donor and recipient countries. The bilateral framework of the plan was established 
partly due to American insistence that it continue to maintain control over the assistance 
rendered and to retain freedom of action over US-funded projects. 188 The plan was 
originally established for a six-year period, and it was made up of Ceylon, India, 
Pakistan, Malaya, British Borneo, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 189 
Representatives of the IBRD and the ECAFE also attended the meetings. From the 
beginning, the members' intention was not to restrict it to a 'Commonwealth Club', and 
by 1954, the United States, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Burma, Nepal and Indonesia 
had become members. 190
Aid supplied through the Colombo Plan was made up of capital assistance. This was 
divided into assistance not described as Colombo aid because it was channeled through 
other international organizations such as the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank, 
and capital assistance provided by the donor countries. 191 Furthermore, capital was 
also supplied through the release of India, Pakistan and Ceylon's sterling balances, and 
later, through Japan's reparation payments to Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Vietnam. The other function of the Colombo Plan was the Technical Cooperation 
Scheme, which consisted of 'the supply of experts to assist in training, research or 
development in the requesting country; the provision of training places in institutions; 
and the provision of equipment for training and research purposes' . 192
Japan originally asked to join the Colombo Plan in late 1951, but Britain was against
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Japan's affiliation at that point, although it was not opposed to the strong Asiatic 
support for Japan's entry in the future. 193 In 1953, Japan asked to send an observer to 
the fifth consultative committee of the Colombo Plan. Japan's request was supported 
by India, but it was rejected formally due to Australia and New Zealand's opposition. It
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was not until the sixth session of the consultative committee meeting in Ottawa in 
October 1954 that Japan became a member of the Colombo Plan as a donor country. 194
Japan's aim behind its entry into the Colombo Plan was both economic and political. 
On the economic front, it was a better way of establishing economic relations with the 
countries of South and Southeast Asia than its earlier policy of exploitation of Southeast 
Asian raw materials for its own ends. In 1951, for example, Japan tried to wean itself 
from its over-reliance on American iron ore imports by shifting its emphasis on iron ore 
deposits in Southeast Asia. The MITI initiative envisaged investing in iron ore mining 
in Southeast Asia with Japanese private and public finances, and if Japan became short 
of capital, it planned to rely on US money. Japan expected to develop iron ore mining 
in India, Goa, Malaya, and the Philippines, and many missions were despatched to 
South and Southeast Asia, but with very little result. 195 Japan's mistake lay in the fact 
that it sought raw materials out of pure self-interest without emphasizing the possible 
gains for the countries of South and Southeast Asia. Second, it relied on US economic 
assistance which was not forthcoming. Therefore, from 1953 Japan decided to place 
more emphasis on the countries in question by actively cooperating in plans sponsored 
by the United Nations and other institutions, including the ECAFE and the Colombo 
Plan. Furthermore, future projects would be limited to those that were financed almost 
entirely by private firms, with some government assistance. Third, Japan was to settle 
its reparation payments to Southeast Asian countries as soon as possible. 196 Therefore, 
Japan's motives behind its Colombo Plan membership were primarily economic. There 
was also, however, a political motivation behind its membership of the Colombo Plan, 
namely to dilute Britain, Australia and New Zealand's suspicion towards the repetition 
of Japan's 'unfair trade practices' of the pre-war period. 197
Japan's entry in the Colombo Plan was made possible because of three factors. The 
reversal of Britain's opposition to Japan's membership, the American support for 
Japan, and the Asian members' desire to see Japan cooperate in Asian economic 
development. Britain's position was discussed at the working party on Economic 
Development in South and Southeast Asia on 25 August and 8  September respectively. 
On both occasions, there was close to no debate on Japan's membership, as it had 
become an accepted fact that Japan could serve a useful role in the 'underdeveloped' 
British colonies. 198 British support for Japan's membership of the Colombo Plan 
coincided with America's search for a viable economic organization which would 
facilitate economic development in South and Southeast Asia. The organization was to 
parallel the functions of the newly established Manila Treaty or SEATO (Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization) in the aftermath of the disastrous French defeat in Dienbienphu in 
May. 199 The United States had the option of creating a new economic organization or
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expanding one of the existing regional organizations. The issue was discussed at an 
Asian Economic Working Group set up by the State Department and the Foreign 
Operations Administrations in spring 1954.200 The ECAFE and SEATO were ruled out 
as the bases for a Southeast Asian economic organization; the ECAFE for the obvious 
reason that its membership included the Soviet Union and the PRC, and SEATO 
because the regional members were restricted to the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. 
The Colombo Plan was considered the most appropriate because of its bilateral nature 
which meant that Congress would approve any foreign aid to the region, and it would 
enable the United States to maintain strict control over its expenditure. More important, 
was the fact that it represented almost all the non-communist Asian nations in the 
region, except Japan, the Philippines and Thailand. Therefore, by the second half of 
1954, the United States had begun to focus on the Colombo Plan as the most viable 
regional organization and campaigned for Japan's inclusion.
Conclusion
1954 saw an expansion of sterling area-Japan relations but it came with a price. It 
opened up fears of Japanese competition and it also reflected badly on the British 
government, as they were portrayed as insensitive to Lancashire's plight. The industrial 
outcry and the extensive press coverage highlighted the political strength of Lancashire. 
Moreover, evidence of Japan's copyright infringements was further proof that Japan 
could not be trusted. The two events restricted Britain's policy towards Japan's GATT 
membership, therefore, the government had to support a policy with definite safeguards 
for Britain. The best option was the amendment of article 35 of the GATT and the 
conclusion of a bilateral agreement which overrode the GATT. The government's 
policy, however, received little international support and by the end of the year, Britain 
was without a policy. The series of events highlighted not only the strength of political 
influence held by Lancashire's representatives but also the underlying anti-Japanese 
sentiment in Britain, which was felt by Yoshida on certain occasions during his UK 
visit.
Although Britain was willing to see Japan incorporated in regional organizations to help 
the 'underdeveloped' countries in Asia, it became a different matter when Japan's trade 
expansion infringed on the lives of Lancashire workers. To understand why Britain 
opted for a policy in defense of Lancashire, one has to understand the fact that 
Lancashire symbolized British exports and British survival while Japan was seen as the 
sinister and unfair rival. Therefore despite the Foreign Office's attempts to highlight 
Japan's geopolitical importance, the British public could only comprehend the issue in 
terms of British prestige and livelihood.
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Table 5.1
Cotton Piece Imports into Nigeria. 1937-1954 
_________________________________________________________ million square yards
1937 1938 1939 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
Total 40.71 17.23 15.16 37.22 30.33 51.24 42.99 43.03
UK 29.54 11.29 9.71 17.06 15 26.46 h 5 13.13
India 3.81 3.36 2.08 6.71 6.03 4.45 10.05 15.67
Germany 1.22 0.34 0.36 1.65 1.35 4.03 3.65 2.18
Holland 0.97 0.33 0.68 0.87 0.78 2.32 2.23 2.39
Italy 0.87 0.3 0.49 0.28 0.57 1.33 0.74 1.04
Japan 0.81 0.73 0.74 10.27 5.82 10.3 4.16 7.29
Source: Cotton Board Quarterly Statistical Review no. 28 (March 1952), p. 25 and no. 42 
(June 1956), p. 31.
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C onclusion
Japan's rejection of Britain's aide-memoire at the end of 1954, left the latter without a 
policy towards Japan's GATT entry. With only two months before the opening of tariff 
negotiations in Geneva, it had very little time and few alternatives left. Therefore, 
Britain decided to invoke article 35 of the GATT against Japan as it could not give up 
its safeguards until the period of 'alteration and adjustment' in international trade had 
stabilized . 1 This decision was relayed to the Japanese government on 20 April. 2 
Consequently, when Japan formally acceded to the GATT on 10 September 1955, 
Britain became one of the fourteen countries to invoke article 35 against an acceding 
country, which was unprecedented in GATT history.3 In order to cushion the force of 
the decision, however, the British government furnished a statement in which it clearly 
stated Britain's wish to maintain a high level of trade between the sterling area and 
Japan through the continuation of the trade and payments agreements. Furthermore, the 
statement expressed Britain's desire to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan 
'whereby, in return for satisfactory shipping and establishment provisions, and or 
assurances in regard to copying and other unfair trade practices, we should undertake to 
continue to give Japan the MFN treatment on tariffs' . 4
True to its statement, Britain handed a draft commercial treaty to Japan in October 
1955. Britain hoped to sign a commercial treaty with Japan in the following year, as 
Japan's obligations towards the signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty expired 
in April 1956. Japan, however, showed little inclination to start the negotiations. The 
British were placed in an awkward position of having invoked article 35 of the GATT 
against Japan, but without a commercial treaty. Therefore, the only agreement 
governing Anglo-Japanese bilateral trade relations after 1956 was the sterling payments 
agreement.
On 31 March 1957, Japan and Britain decided to terminate the sterling payments 
agreement as the agreement and the accompanying exchange of letters were considered 
anachronistic and unnecessary. By this time, Japan was conducting more sterling trade 
with third countries, such as Germany and Sweden, which were formerly open account 
countries5. Furthermore, the forthcoming sterling convertibility would have made the 
agreement void. As a result, the exchange of letters of 1951 which stipulated that 
Britain and Japan should work in tandem to prevent the latter from accumulating an 
unreasonable amount of sterling no longer served its purpose.6 The sterling payments 
agreement was thus nullified and replaced by an Anglo-Japanese trade agreement.7 In 
the meantime, negotiations for a commercial treaty continued to drag through the years, 
while Anglo-Japanese trade difficulties arose over shipping and textiles.
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In the end, it was not until 14 November 1962 that Britain and Japan signed a Treaty of 
Commerce, Establishment and Navigation.8 It is interesting to note that Britain was one 
of the last sterling countries to sign a commercial treaty with Japan. Moreover, in a 
protocol to the treaty both parties agreed to safeguard their industries against a sudden 
surge of damaging imports. Although the safeguards were reciprocal, it was obvious 
that it was designed to serve British industrial interests. The wording of the protocol 
was based on article 19 of the GATT, therefore, the Board of Trade finally succeeded 
in including the article 19 safeguard in a treaty with Japan.9
It can be argued that the postponement of a commercial treaty until the early 1960s was 
an indication of the secondary importance of Anglo-Japanese trade in the post-war 
period. It is true that Anglo-Japanese relations was overshadowed by US-Japan 
relations for the obvious reason that the United States had overall control over the allied 
occupation of Japan. Furthermore, the United States initiated the 'reverse course' in 
1948, and saved Japan from economic collapse through the injection of dollars in the 
shape of the Korean war procurements. This enabled Japan to amass much needed 
dollars and ensured Japan's supply of raw materials from the dollar area. Moreover, the 
United States has traditionally been seen as Japan's benefactor who facilitated the 
latter's post-war trade relations with Southeast Asia and its return to western comity of 
nations. Conversely, current scholarship has maintained that Britain opposed the 
expansion of Japan's trade with Southeast Asia because an increase in exports of 
Japanese manufactured goods to the region was thought to threaten Britain's market- 
share in its traditional trading area, thus obstructing the triangular trading system which 
existed between Britain, its Southeast Asian colonies and the United States, and 
thereby, reducing Britain's ability to earn dollars via its colonies.
The aim of this thesis has been to challenge the view that British policy was entirely 
motivated by Japanese competition in Southeast Asia. Through documentary evidence, 
it has highlighted that Japan became important to Britain and the sterling area because of 
the potentially important role it could play in East Asia vis-a-vis the sterling area. 
Britain came to realize by 1951 that Japan produced cheap manufactured goods that 
were affordable and in demand by its Southeast Asian colonies. Moreover, by 
encouraging trade between Japan and sterling countries in Asia it was possible to 
reduce the huge sterling balances held by countries like India. Britain also saw that it 
could take advantage of Japan's potential as the workshop of Asia by making Japan the 
currency engine that pumped sterling in Asia. Finally, Japan came to be viewed by 
Britain as a bulwark against communism in the region, and its loss to the communist 
bloc was seen as a psychological and economic threat to Britain's Southeast Asian
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interests. Therefore, contrary to the accepted view, Britain had its own policy towards 
Japan. It had designs to wean Japan away from its dollar-mindedness and integrate 
Japan into the sterling area system. By doing so, it hoped to prevent greater 
collaboration between the United States and Japan. Moreover, it was hoped that greater 
Japanese involvement in sterling trade would revive sterling as the dominant currency 
in East Asia.
Although Britain saw that Japan could play a significant role in Southeast Asia, 
problems arose due to Japan's application for entry in the GATT. Britain questioned the 
wisdom of extending equal tariff rights to Japan when Anglo-Japanese relations in the 
inter-war period had been soured by intense Japanese trade competition. Britain was 
particularly worried that Japan might repeat its 'unfair' competition, and marginalize 
British goods in its traditional trading areas. As a result, Britain sought to include 
safeguards within the GATT which would provide protection for British manufacturers 
against Japanese competition with little success. What should be illuminated is the fact 
that despite the inter-relation between sterling and GATT policies, the two were 
represented by different ministries. The Treasury was responsible for sterling policy, 
therefore, there was general support for greater sterling area-Japan trade. Conversely, 
the Board of Trade was responsible for commercial treaties. Moreover, it represented 
British industries, thus, it made sure that industrial interests played a large role on 
whether Britain should extend MFN rights to Japan. Therefore, it was this 
contradiction in British policy that hamstrung British intentions towards Japan in the 
1950s, leading American and Japanese officials to perceive Britain as hostile to Japan's 
economic recovery. Consequently, it is understandable why scholars such as Borden, 
and Schaller, who relied almost solely on American documents misinterpreted British 
intentions toward Japan. Furthermore, the contradiction in Britain's commercial and 
financial policy indicates that one cannot examine one without the other, as it would 
lead to a distorted view of British external interests.
It should be emphasized, however, that despite the incongruence in the sterling and 
GATT policies, a combined effort was made by the State Department and the Foreign 
Office to find a solution to enable Japan to join the GATT without seriously affecting 
the future of British industries. Each attempt failed as none was considered adequate by 
the Board of Trade. The British decision to reject the compromise solution was 
considered by the Foreign Office to be damaging to its relations with the United States. 
First because Britain relied economically on the United States, and second, because it 
did not wish to be perceived as an uncooperative ally when it was attempting to 
cultivate a 'special' relationship with the latter. The Board of Trade's refusal to extend 
MFN rights to Japan naturally affected Anglo-Japanese relations. Japan viewed
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Britain's unwillingness to admit Japan in the western comity of nations as evidence of 
the former's ingrained hostility towards Japan. In the end, the Board of Trade's policy 
proved to be short-sighted because while Lancashire was protesting the threat from 
Japanese competition, India and Hong Kong were taking advantage of their imperial 
preferential status to make in-roads into Britain's traditional trading areas. 10
Although it is difficult to ascertain whether Britain would have been able to wean Japan 
away from the dollar bloc, there was a time in the early 1950s when a number of 
Japanese officials were willing to see an increase in sterling trade. Unfortunately, 
Britain was unable to make the most of this opportunity due to its inability to find a 
congruent financial and trade policy towards Japan. Therefore, despite an attempt to 
establish closer sterling relations with Japan, Britain instead created the foundation for 
the deepening of relations between Japan and various sterling area countries in the Asia- 
Pacific. 11
From a wider perspective, the thesis covers a period when western nations were 
coming to grips with changes in their political and economic influence in the post-war 
world. The United States found itself standing above the rest of the western world. It 
used its power to protect the free world from falling victim to communism, but it also 
attempted to use its power as leverage to force the western countries to abide by its 
blue-print for the world. This included the adoption of the American containment policy 
and its vision of a multilateral trading system. Furthermore, it attempted to force the 
western bloc to apply a stringent economic embargo on strategic and non-strategic 
exports to the communist bloc. Western countries agreed to adopt the American- 
sponsored economic embargo for the duration of the Korean war and while they were 
in receipt of the Marshall aid. With the end of both in 1953, European powers, in 
particular, Britain, became restive and applied pressure on the United States to relax the 
communist embargo as Japanese and German economic recovery meant increasing 
competition in the same, limited market. In 1954, COCOM controls were relaxed. 
CHINCOM controls remained unchanged in that year, but Britain unilaterally abolished 
the China differential on 27 May 1957.12 On 16 July of the same year, Japan 
announced that as of 30 July, it would follow the British initiative and adopt COCOM 
levels to all trade with Communist China. 13 In June 1958, the Consultative Group 
declared that there would be a further relaxation on export controls to the communist 
bloc, and the two lists would merge into one. 14 Therefore, 1958 saw the end of the 
American-sponsored 'wedge' policy against China, and its attempts to enforce export 
controls on its allies, as it was leading to problems within the western alliance.
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In the post-war period, Japan faced an enormous task of restoring its economy, and 
returning to the international community. Japan realized early in the occupation that its 
immediate post-war future was explicitly linked with the United States. Therefore, it 
attempted to play the 'subordinate' role in its relationship with the United States, which 
meant relying on US economic charity. The United States, however, wished to see 
Japan become independent of its aid. When the latter realized this, it began to place 
greater emphasis on its relations with the non-dollar countries. This included relations 
with the sterling area, but sterling area-Japan relations remained unpredictable due to 
the extreme swings in Japan's sterling reserves. Japan also set great store on its 
relations with Southeast Asia. Despite its ambition to form a peaceful 'Greater Co- 
Prosperity Sphere' under the aegis of the United States, Japan realized that it would 
have to act in an 'acceptable and orderly' manner if it wished to normalize its relations 
with Southeast Asia. Therefore, it embarked on reparation payments to countries in the 
region starting with Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines. 15 Furthermore, the 
Japanese government understood that its investment and aid would be accepted more 
readily if it was supplied via international organizations, therefore, it strove to become a 
member of regional organizations. Despite Japan's attempts to return to the comity of 
nations, the process proved to be gradual. It also found difficulties in finding trade 
outlets as highlighted in its relations with the sterling area. Consequently, the 1950s 
saw the Japanese government concentrate its efforts on increasing domestic demand for 
its manufactured goods. Moreover, Japan strengthened its economic ties with the 
United States. Japan's decision to rely on the American market was due to the 
combined disappointment with the sterling area's r-ea<fmess^to^)pen its markets to 
Japan, and Southeast Asia's inability to consume Japanese goods in great quantities.
Britain, too, had an enormous economic task ahead, as it sought to find a solution to its 
balance of payments problems. Politically, it was in search of a role. Not able to attain 
superpower status, it sought to carve out an economic and political power base which 
would enable it to continue to influence world affairs. The solution was the sterling area 
and the Commonwealth. Despite Britain's attempts to solidify its economic foundation 
in the 1950s, convertibility failed to restore sterling as a major currency, and the Suez 
debacle served to highlight sterling's weakness. Therefore, convertibility led to a 
gradual withdrawal of members from the sterling 'club'. In its search for a balance 
between its own economic problems, its relations with the sterling/Commonwealth and 
its role in world affairs, Britain failed to find an equilibrium. Britain's unsuccessful 
attempt to reinstate sterling as a major East Asian currency was a reflection of this, and 
by the end of the 1950s, Britain increasingly found itself sidelined in Asia.
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Appendices
One: Japanese Proposal
In our discussions, we have stressed the necessity both in principle and in practice of 
retaining the dollar clause in the Payment Agreement and we have explained at some 
length the reasons for such necessity. The UK representatives, on the other hand, have 
expressed disagreement to this proposal as a matter of principle. With such a 
fundamental discrepancy of the mutual positions, it is now apparent that even after 
further negotiations of considerable length, it will be difficult to arrive at an agreement. 
In order, therefore, to avert the various difficulties and disruptions which would ensue 
failing the conclusion of an appropriate Payments Agreement, and thus to enable an 
uninterrupted flow of trade between Japan and the sterling area, we would like to 
propose at this point, after having carefully considered the various proposals and 
explanations made by the UK side, the conclusion of an agreement along the following 
lines as an immediate solution of the situation.
1. Japan assesses the maximum amount of her working balances (excluding these 
accrued from temporary credit facilities, etc.) for the coming one year period at 
£ million.
2. The UK undertakes, during this period, to adopt effective measures to prevent the 
above sterling balances from remaining in excess of the afore-mentioned ceiling 
continuously ever a period of three months and also to prevent any excess of such 
ceiling at the end of June, 1952.
3. Japan may raise the above ceiling of £____ million, if she deems it necessary for the
orderly promotion of her trade. The UK may propose the raising of such ceiling for 
Japanese consideration. However, the final decision to raise the ceiling rests with 
Japan.
4. For the purpose of preventing the excess accumulation contemplated in paragraph 2:
(a) not only will the UK give no discriminatory treatment to Japanese imports from the 
sterling area countries and territories, but will spare no efforts to facilitate exports to 
Japan, especially as to such commodities as goods and raw materials.
(b) Transfer from Japanese sterling balances to third countries will be freely permitted, 
except only in those cases where they are normally prohibited under UK's exchange 
control practices.
(c) The UK would grant on a Govemment-to-Govemment basis, financial facilities to 
Japan, in order to cover the latter's sterling shortage arising from seasonal import 
requirements.
5. Both parties will consult each other from time to time in order to attain the common 
objective of expanding trade between Japan and the sterling area on a mutually 
satisfactory basis and preventing the excess accumulation of sterling contemplated in 
paragraph 2 .
6 . Should the Japanese Govt see a sign of excessive accumulation of sterling balances 
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, the Japanese Government may advise 
the UK Government to take appropriate measures toward an immediate correction of 
such situation. The Japanese Government reserves its right to abrogate this agreement 
if, in spite of the afore-mentioned advice, such situation is not rectified promptly. In the 
event of such abrogation, both parties will immediately commence to negotiate a new 
agreement.
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7. This agreement will be effective for one year ending as of 30th June, 1952. Both 
Governments will commence to negotiate a new agreement not later than 31 st May, 
1952.
8 . After the abrogation of the expiry of the effective term of this agreement, Japan will 
be entitled to continue to utilise without restriction her sterling balances for imports 
from the sterling area as well as from third countries. For this utilisation of sterling 
balances, the UK will continue to abide by the provisions of paragraphs 4(a) and (b).
9. The re-adoption of a dollar clause will be considered in negotiating a new agreement. 
Source: Telegram from Tokyo to FO, 5 July 1951, F0371/92633 FJ1121/121, PRO.
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Two: Sterling Payments Agreement between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of Japan
Tokyo, 31st August, 1951
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(hereafter referred to as "the Government of the United Kingdom") and the 
Government of Japan
Have agreed as follows:-
ARTICLE 1
All payments between residents of Japan and residents of the Scheduled Territories, 
other than such as must necessarily be made in yen, shall be settled in sterling.
ARTICLE 2
The Government of Japan will ensure that their appropriate authorities shall buy and 
sell sterling and that the rates of those authorities for sterling and for the United States 
dollar shall be related to one another at the middle rate quoted by the Bank of England 
for the United States dollar.
ARTICLE 3
All sterling payments to residents of Japan which residents of the Scheduled Territories 
or of countries outside the Scheduled Territories are permitted to make under the 
Exchange Control Regulations in force in the United Kingdom shall be made to 
Japanese Accounts.
ARTICLE 4
(1) The Government of the United Kingdom shall not restrict the transfer of sterling 
which is at the disposal of residents of Japan to other residents of Japan or to residents 
of the Scheduled Territories.
(2) The Government of the United Kingdom shall not restrict the availability of sterling 
under the control of the Japanese Foreign Exchange Control Board for making 
payments in respect of direct current transactions to residents of such countries (other 
than Japan and the Scheduled Territories) as may be agreed between the Bank of 
England and the Japanese Foreign Exchange Control Board.
ARTICLE 5
The Government of Japan shall not restrict the acceptance by residents of Japan of 
sterling from residents of the Scheduled Territories and, as regards payment in respect 
of direct current transactions from residents of such countries (other than Japan and the 
Scheduled Territories) as may be agreed between the Bank of England and the Japanese 
Foreign Exchange Control Board.
ARTICLE 6
In so far as the Japanese Exchange Control Regulations from time to time permit, the 
Government of Japan will facilitate the transfer of yen accruing to residents of the 
Scheduled Territories from permitted current transactions to other residents of the 
Scheduled Territories or to residents of Japan, ad the transfer of such yen into sterling.
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ARTICLE 7 
For the purposes of the present Agreement -
(a) the expression "the Scheduled Territories" shall have the meaning from time to time 
assigned to it under the United Kingdom Exchange Control Act, 1947;
(b) the expression "Japanese Account" shall mean an account of a resident of Japan 
which is for the time being recognised by the Bank of England as a Japanese Account 
for the purposes of the present Agreement;
(c) the expression "payments in respect of direct current transactions: means payments 
in respect of transactions of the type defined in Article XIX (i) of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund which are made by a principal resident 
in the country from which payment is made and which relate exclusively ( 1) to goods 
(other than gold bullion, gold coin or gold either in semi-manufactured or fully 
manufactured from) imported into, and for use or consumption in, that country and 
originating in the country to which payment is made or (2 ) to services rendered to 
residents in the former country by residents of the latter country.
ARTICLE 8
For the purposes of the present Agreement the Bank of England shall act as agent of the 
Government of the United Kingdom and the Japanese Foreign Exchange Control Board 
as agent of the Government of Japan.
ARTICLE 9
The present Agreement shall come into force upon the entry into force of a Peace Treaty 
between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Japan, 
provided that the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers acting in respect of Occupied Japan which 
came into force on 31st August, 1952, shall not previously have terminated. In the 
event, however, that notice of termination of the latter Agreement shall already have 
been given but not have expired, the present Agreement shall come into force only for 
the remainder of the period of such notice and shall then terminate, unless both 
Contracting Parties agree to the contrary. At any time after the entry into force of the 
present Agreement either Contracting Party may give notice to the other of its intention 
to terminate it and the present Agreement shall cease to have effect three months after 
the date of such notice. It shall terminate, unless both Contracting Parties agree to the 
contrary, on 31st August, 1952.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective 
Government, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at Tokyo this Thirty-first day of August, 1951, in duplicate.
For the Government of the United For the Government of Japan:
Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland:
GEORGE CLUTTON SHIGERU YOSHIDA
Source: Sterling Payments Agreement between the Government o f  the United Kingdom 
o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government o f  Japan (with exchange o f  
notes) in Parliamentary Papers vol. 31, Cmd 8602, pp. 599-604.
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Exchange of Notes
No. 1
The Acting United Kingdom Political Representative in Japan to the Japanese Minister 
for Foreign Affairs
United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan, 
M. le Ministre, Tokyo, 31st August, 1951.
With reference to the Payments Agreement signed today between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Japan, I have the honour to set out the understanding which has been 
reached on the subject of consultation between the parties to the Agreement during its 
currency in order to assist in its satisfactory operation.
To ensure the smooth working of the Agreement, the Government of the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Japan mutually recognise the desirability of keeping 
Japan's sterling balances within reasonable limits. In order that at all times Japan may 
hold sufficient sterling to meet her requirements, without, however, accumulating an 
excessive amount, having regard to all the circumstances, both parties will take all 
reasonable measures to prevent, or correct should it occur, any chronic imbalance of 
payments in either direction.
With this intention in mind the two parties have agreed, in addition to the 
informal consultation which will take place between the Government of the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Japan or their Agents under the Agreement in the 
normal course of its current operation, to meet at short notice, which maybe given by 
either party, in order to discuss any aspect of the development of the payments 
relationship between the two countries which may appear to call for special 
consideration.
I shall be grateful for your Excellency's confirmation of this understanding.
I avail, & c.
GEORGE CLUTTON
No. 2
The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Acting United Kingdom Political 
Representative
The Gaimusho,
Sir, Tokyo, 31 st August, 1951.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of today's date reading as 
follows:-
(as in No. 1)
I have pleasure in confirming that the understanding of your Government as set out in 
that Note corresponds to that of the Government of Japan.
I beg, & c.
SHIGERU YOSHIDA
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No. 3
The Acting United Kingdom Political Representative in Japan to the Japanese Minister 
for Foreign Affairs
United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan 
M. le Ministre, Tokyo 31 st August, 1951.
In connexion with the facilities which will be available to Japan on a administrative 
basis for transfers of sterling between Japan and countries outside the Scheduled 
Territories in settlement of direct current transactions during the currency of the 
Payments Agreement signed today between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Japan, I have the honour to 
inform your Excellency that, as an extension of these facilities, the United Kingdom 
Exchange Control will, so long as that Agreement is in force, be prepared for its part to 
approve any transfer of sterling in settlement of direct current transactions from Japan 
to any country in the "transferable account" system (comprising the countries listed in 
the Third Schedule to the United Kingdom Exchange Control (Payments) Order, 1950, 
as amended from time to time) or in the group of "Other Countries" (comprising 
territories outside the Scheduled Territories and outside any of the territories specified 
in the schedules to the United Kingdom Exchange Control (Payments) Order, 1950, as 
amended from time to time), provided there is no objection on the part of the authorities 
in the receiving country to settlement in sterling.
I avail & c.
GEORGE CLUTTON
No. 4
The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Acting United Kingdom Political 
Representative
The Gaimusho,
Sir, Tokyo, 31 st August, 1951.
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of today's date reading as 
follows:-
(As in No. 3)
I am glad to take not of its contents on behalf of the Government of Japan.
I beg, &c.
SHIGERU YOSHIDA.
Source: Sterling Payments Agreement between the Government o f  the United Kingdom 
o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government o f  Japan (with exchange o f  
notes) in Parliamentary Papers vol. 31, Cmd 8602, pp. 599-604.
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Three: The Yoshida Letter
Dear Ambassador Dulles,
While the Japanese Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty were being debated 
in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors of die Diet, a number of 
questions were put and statements made relative to Japan's future policy toward China. 
Some of the statements, separated from their context and background, gave rise to 
misapprehensions which I should like to clear up.
The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political peace 
and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan's close neighbour. At the 
present time it is, we hope, possible to develop that kind of relationship with the 
National Government of the Republic of China, which has the seat, voice and vote of 
China in the United Nations, which exercises actual governmental authority over certain 
territory, and which maintains diplomatic relations with most of the members of the 
United Nations. To that end my Government on November 17, 1951, established a 
Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Formosa, with the consent of the National 
Government of China. This is the highest form of relationship with other countries 
which is now permitted to Japan, pending the coming into force of the multilateral 
Treaty of Peace. The Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Formosa is important 
in its personnel, reflecting the importance which my government attaches to relations 
with the National Government of China, if that government so desires, a Treaty which 
will reestablish normal relations between the two Governments in conformity with the 
principles set out in the multilateral Treaty of Peace. The terms of such bilateral treaty 
shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all territories which are now, 
or which may hereafter be, under the control of the National Government of the 
Republic of China. We will promptly explore this subject with the National 
Government of China.
As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually condemned by 
the United Nations of being an aggressor and in consequence, the United Nations has 
recommended certain measures against that regime, in which Japan is now concurring 
and expects to continue to concur when the multilateral Treaty of Peace comes into 
force pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 (a) (iii), whereby Japan has undertaken "to 
give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the 
Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United 
Nations may take preventive or enforcement action". Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow in 1950 is 
virtually a military alliance aimed against Japan. In fact there are many reasons to 
believe that the Communist Party in its program of seeking violently to overthrow the 
constitutional system and the present Government of Japan. In view of these 
considerations, I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no intention to 
conclude a bilateral Treaty with the Communist regime of China.
Yours sincerely,
SHIGERU YOSHIDA
Source: Letter from the Prime Minister o f  Japan to Dulles, 24 December 1951, FRUS 
1951, vol. 6 P a r t i , p  1438.
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Four: The Text of GATT Articles 19, 23, 25 and 35
Article 19
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
1 (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations 
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any 
product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party 
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in 
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is 
being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in 
sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to 
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a 
contracting party which receives or received such preference, the importing contracting 
party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant 
obligation in whole or part or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the 
product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such 
injury.
Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 
of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in 
advance as may be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and 
those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of the product 
concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When 
such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference, the notice 
shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical 
circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, 
action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior 
consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after 
taking such action.
3 (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is 
not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, 
nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected 
contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such action is 
taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written 
notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the 
application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case 
envisaged in paragraph 1(b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party 
requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other 
obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES do not disapprove.
Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is 
taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or 
threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers 
of products affected by such action, that contracting party shall, were delay would 
cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and 
throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or other obligations as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.
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Article 23 
Nullification or Im pairm ent
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of 
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this 
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not 
it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party, may with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter make 
written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it 
considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give 
sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned 
within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1(c) of 
this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The 
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them 
and shall make appropriate recommendations to fie contracting parties which they 
consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The 
CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, wifi the Economic 
and Social council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental 
organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary. If the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to 
justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the 
application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other 
obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the 
circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other 
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than 
sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the intention to withdraw from this Agreement and 
such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such 
notices is received by him.
Article 25 
Joint Action by the Contracting Parties
Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time for the purpose 
of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action and, 
generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this 
Agreement. Wherever reference is made in this Agreement to fie contracting parties 
acting jointly they are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to convene the first meeting 
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which shall take place not later than March 1, 
1948.
Each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at all meetings of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.
Except as other wise provided for in this Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast.
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In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party 
by this Agreement; provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of the 
contracting parties. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may also by such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other voting 
requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and
(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of this 
paragraph.
Article 35
Non-Application of the Agreement between particular Contracting
Parties
This Agreement, or alternatively Article II of this Agreement, shall not apply as 
between any contracting party and any other contracting party if:
the two contracting parties have not entered into tariff negotiations with each other, and 
either of the contracting parties, at the time either becomes a contracting party, does not 
consent to such application.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may review the operation of this Article in particular 
cases at the request of any contracting party and make appropriate recommendations.
Source: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT 
Law and Practice (Geneva: GATT, 1994).
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Five: Agreed Minute (Various Annexes Excluded)
1. Delegations representing the United Kingdom and Japanese Governments met in 
London between 3 December 1953, and 29 December 1954, to consider financial and 
trade questions arising connecting with the Sterling Payments Agreement of 31 August 
1951, as renewed on various occasions, and now due to expire on 31 January, 1954.
2. Both delegations stated the intention of their Governments to sign a Sterling 
Payments Agreement in the revised form shown at annex A.
3. The United Kingdom delegation stated their Government's intention of continuing to 
make available the maximum practicable facilities for the use of sterling in Japan's trade 
with third countries. The Japanese delegation stated that their Government's intention 
was to make the fullest possible use of the facilities provided, which at the present time 
are as described in the memorandum at annex B. Both delegations also stated that the 
intention of their Governments was to follow the procedures set out in this paragraph in 
place of that set out in the exchange of notes attached as numbers 3 and 4 to the Sterling 
Payments Agreement of 1951.
4. The Japanese delegation asked whether, having regard to Japan's prospective 
shortage of sterling during the early part of 1954, the United Kingdom would be 
prepared to authorise the provision of Sterling/US dollar "swap" facilities. The United 
Kingdom delegation said that it was the intention of their Government to instruct the 
Bank of England to authorise applications from the London foreign exchange market to 
make further Sterling/ US dollar "swaps" with the Japanese Ministry of Finance up to 
an amount not exceeding £12.5 million, under the arrangements and subject to the 
conditions set out in annex C. The Japanese delegation said that it was the intention of 
their Government to take advantage of these facilities on the conditions stated. Both 
delegations said that it was the intention of their Governments to regard these 
arrangements for special sterling assistance as exceptional and final.
5. The Japanese delegation asked for the views of the United Kingdom delegation on 
certain special payments arrangements (annex D) which their Government wish to 
propose to certain Independent Sterling Area countries. The United Kingdom 
delegation said that in view of their Government such arrangements would not be 
consistent with the intention of the Sterling Payments Agreement. The Japanese 
delegation stated the intention of their Government to pay full consideration to the UK 
views on this subject.
6. Both delegations stated that it was the intention of their Government to maintain trade 
between Japan and the Sterling Area at the highest possible level in 1954.
7. The two delegations considered Japan's probable sterling receipts from the Sterling 
Area in 1954 and estimated that these might amount to £209.5 million in respect of 
Japan's receipts from Independent Sterling Area countries, and the following estimates 
on a cif basis for Japan's receipts from the United Kingdom, the Colonies and 
"invisible" items:
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£ million
U K  14.5
Colonies 91.5
Hong Kong 37
Singapore and Malaya 23
Aden 6
West Africa 18
East Africa 2.5
Others 5
Invisib les 11
8. The Japanese delegation stated the strong desire of their Government that there 
should be an increase to £5 million from £2.5 million in the established volume for 
1954 of imports from Japan into the East African territories. The United Kingdom 
delegation stated that it was the intention of their Government to inform the East African 
territories of the Japanese Government's views. The Japanese delegation stated that if 
the lower figure were increased, their Government would then be prepared to accept a 
reduction of up to £0.5 million in the value of grey cloth imported by the United 
Kingdom from Japan during the remainder of 1954, and would consider an appropriate 
increase in the figure of £32.5 million for Japanese imports from the Colonies (See 
annex F and paragraph 11 below).
9. The United Kingdom delegation said that they estimated the value of imports in 1954 
from Japan into the United Kingdom of goods which Japan was supplying, whether 
under open general or individual licence or under other arrangements, at £7.7 million. 
They said further that it was the intention of their Government to authorise the import 
into the United Kingdom of goods not at present permitted to be imported up to a value 
of about £6.8 million. Particulars of these additional imports at annex E.
10. The United Kingdom delegation also stated that it was the intention of their 
Government to notify the Governments of Hong Kong, Singapore and the Federation 
of Malaya, and Aden forthwith that they may permit the importation of goods from 
Japan without limit and the re-export of such goods without restriction except that re­
exports to Sterling Area destinations may be authorised only where import licences 
have been granted by the territory of ultimate destination. The United Kingdom 
delegation also stated that it was the intention of their Government to notify each other 
of the Colonial Governments that it may permit the importation from Japan of any type 
of goods which may be imported from other non-Sterling Area territories up to the total 
amount which it has told the United Kingdom Government it would be prepared to 
authorise in 1954 (see table in paragraph 7 above). The United Kingdom delegation 
further stated that the Colonial Office would furnish the Japanese Embassy in London 
with copies of notices issued from time to time by Colonial Governments in relation to 
their imports from Japan.
11. The United Kingdom delegation established that the value of goods and services 
which the Sterling Area countries would wish to sell to Japan in 1954 would total £224 
million. The Japanese delegation took note of this statement but said that Japan's aim 
was to strike a balance between her receipts from and her payments to the Sterling Area 
in 1954. The Japanese delegation also stated the intention of their Government to 
provide during 1954 for visible imports (other than oil), from the United Kingdom and 
Colonies amounting to £16 million and £32.5 million, fob respectively, subject to 
review, should either Government so desire, after 1st August 1954. The Japanese 
delegation further stated that, to assist in securing this end, their Government intended 
to authorise the import for sterling during 1954 of £47 million worth of goods on the 
Japanese "automatic approval" list and £5.5 million worth of goods in the 
"miscellaneous" category. Of these amounts one half would be provided for in the 1954 
summer foreign exchange budget and the remainder, subject to the review referred to
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above, in the winter foreign exchange budgets. The lists of goods in the "automatic 
approval" and "miscellaneous" categories under the current winter foreign exchange 
budget of 1953, i.e. is at 1st October 1953, and 30th October 1953 respectively, would 
be retained in the 1954 summer budget. The Japanese delegation also stated that it was 
the intention of their Government to authorise the import for sterling in 1954 of certain 
specific commodities from the United Kingdom and Colonies as set out in annex F.
12. The Japanese delegation stated that it was the intention of their Government to 
provide sterling for the import during 1954 of oil from UK-controlled companies up to 
a total value equal to at least:
(a) 25% of the total value of the oil imported into Japan on cash or credit terms, 
supplied by or originating with the UK and US controlled companies, and invoiced in 
sterling or US dollars;
or
(b) 22.5% of the value of all oil imported from any source, whichever may be greater.
. Note: "UK controlled companies" for the purpose of this Agreed Minute includes Shell.
13. As regard petroleum chemicals, minor petroleum products, lubricants and tetra­
ethyl lead, the Japanese delegation said that it was the intention of their Government 
that, where these commodities were available for sterling, the same opportunities would 
be given for supplying them (in this case, against sterling) to UK controlled companies 
as to any other companies. Where these commodities were not available for sterling and 
had in the past been supplied by UK-controlled companies against payment in US 
dollars, UK-controlled companies would be permitted as well to participate on an equal 
basis in this trade, so long as US dollars were provided for importation of these 
products.
14. The United Kingdom delegation stated the intention of their Governments of adding 
Japan to the list of countries for which allowances for tourism are authorised by the 
exchange control authorities of the United Kingdom and the Colonies. The Japanese 
delegation said that their Government had not yet felt able to introduce a system of 
standard allowances for tourism, all application for foreign currency for travel abroad 
being treated individually on their merits; if however at any time in the future 
allowances for tourism were introduced in respect of travel by residents of Japan to any 
foreign country or countries it was the intention of their Government that the United 
Kingdom and Colonies would be given as favourable treatment as that accorded to any 
other country.
15. The Japanese delegation said that it was the intention of their Government (a) that 
import quotas for UK films should be announced simultaneously with import quotas 
for all other films of foreign origin and (b) that the proportion of film earnings to be 
remitted to UK producer should be no smaller than the proportion to be remitted to the 
United States of America or any other major supplier of film. For this purpose a major 
supplier includes a country whose quota is one-third or more of the UK quotas. They 
also took note of the United Kingdom request that during 1954 the proportion should 
not be less than 30 percent gross rentals.
16. The United Kingdom delegation submitted two memoranda on (a) Japan's 
exchange control regulations concerning shipping and (b) the Japanese Government's 
financial assistance to the Japanese shipping industry (annexes G and H). The Japanese 
delegation took note of these memoranda. They confirmed that it was not the policy of 
their Government to allow the operation of their import or exchange controls to place 
British shipping at a disadvantage compared with shipping or other flag, including the 
Japanese.
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17. The Japanese delegation stated that in view of the importance of the trade relations 
existing between the United Kingdom and the Colonies on the one hand and Japan on 
the other, the Japanese Government wished to conclude a Treaty of Commerce and 
Navigation with the United Kingdom as early as possible, particularly in order to settle 
questions of entry, residence and establishment. The United Kingdom delegation took 
note of this desire.
Source: Agreed minute attached to the minutes o f  the plenary meeting held in the 
Treasury, 29 January 1954, T236/4150 OF63/208/05X, PRO.
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